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THE 

THEOLOGICAL   EDUCATOR 


ndikd  hy  lite 

RE\^    W.    ROBERTSON    NICOLL,    M.A.,    LL.D. 

F.ditoy  of  ••  Tlu  Uxpositor  " 


DR.  JAMES  IVERACWS 
CHRISTIANITY  AND  EVOLUTION 


NEW  YORK 
THOMAS   WHITTAKER 

2  AND  3,  BIBLE   HOUSE 
1894 


Hit  ii\]to\oQknl  6buxat0i% 

A  Manual  of  Christian  Evidences. 

l>y  the  Rev.  Prebendary  Ruw,  ]\I.A.,  D.D. 
An  Introduction  to  the  Textual  Criticism  of  the  New 
Testament. 

By  the  Rev.  Prof.  B.  B.  Warfield,  D.D. 
A  Hebrew  Grammar. 

By  the  Rev.  W.  H.  Lowe,  M.A. 
A  Manual  of  Church  History. 

J]y  the  Rev.  A.  C.  Jennings,  M.A. 

Vol.  I.     From  the  First  to  the  Tenth  Century. 

Vol.  II.     From  the  Tenth  to  the  Nineteenth  Century. 
An  Exposition  of  the  Apostles'  Creed. 

By  the  Rev.  J.  E.  Yonge,  M.A. 
The  Prayer  Book. 

By  the  Rev,  Prof.  Charles  Hole,  B.A. 
An  Introduction  to  the  New  Testament. 

By  Prof.  Marcus  Dods,  D.D. 
The  Language  of  the  New  Testament. 

By  the  Rev.  W.  H.  Slmcox,  M.A. 
The  Writers  of  the  New  Testament :  Their  Style  and 
Characteristics. 

By  the  same  Author. 
An  Introduction  to  the  Old  Testament. 

By  the  Rev.  C.  H.  H.  Wright,  D.D. 
Outlines  of  Christian  Doctrine. 

By  the  Rev.  H.  C.  G.  Moule,  M.A. 
The  Theology  of  the  Old  Testament. 

By  the  Rev.  Prof.  W.  H.  Bennett,  M.A. 
The  Theology  of  the  New  Testament. 

By  the  Rev.  Prof  W.  F.  AnEXKv,  M.A. 
Christianity  and  Evolution. 

By  the  Rev.  Prof.  Iverach,  D.D. 


CHRISTIANITY 
AND    EVOLUTION 


JAMES    IVERACH,   M.A,   D.D. 

PROFESSOR  OF  APOLOGETICS  AND  EXEGESIS   OF  THE  GOSPELS   IN   THE 
FREE   CHURCH  COLLEGE,   ABERDEEN 

Author  of  "  Is  Cod  Knowable  ?"  "  Life  of  St.  Paul;'  etc. 


"Things  are  also  Thoughts,  and  have  a  reference  to  the 
Thought  that  set  them  there,  and  to  the  Thought  that  finds 
them  there." 


NEW   YORK 

THOMAS   WHITTAKER 

2  AND  3,  BIBLE  HOUSE 

1894 


^ 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER   I. 
EVOLUTION   AND  BEGINNINGS.' 

Evolution  the  woi'king  hypothesis  of  scientific  men — 
Evolution  as  a  dogmatic  faith — Truth  of  evolution-^ 
The  primitive  nebulosity — Spectrum  analysis — Star 
systems — Professor  Karl  Pearson  on  lifeless  chaotic 
mass — Chaos  unthinkable — Homogeneousness — Evo- 
lution must  commence  somewhere — Its  commence- 
ment a  relative  unity 1 

CHAPTER  II. 

EVOLUTION  AND   LAW. 

Nature  is  w^hat  is  fixed,  stated,  settled — Law  and  hypo- 
thesis— The  nebular  theory — Its  plausibilities  and  its 
difficulties — The  nebular  theory  and  evolution — It 
involves  a  rational  system — The  theistic  argument — 
Continuity — Evolution  a  real  process — "Instability 
of  the  homogeneous" — Multiplication  of  effects — 
"  Is  the  effect  more  complex  than  the  cause  ? " — 
Criticism  of  this  statement .      '  .         .         .         .         .17 

CHAPTER   III. 

NATURE  AND  INTELLIGIBILITY. -4.  ^  V-^ 

Additional  factors — Transition  from  physics  to  chemistry — 
Chemical  elements — Their  character,  relations,  adap- 

-^  tations,  periodicity — Rational  character  of  these  rela- 
tions— Nature  is  intelligible,  and  therefore  related  to 
intelligence — Attempts  at  explanation — The  chemical 
elements  exist  in  the  unity  of  one  system  .        .        .33 


vi  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  IV. 

THE   STRIFE  AGAINST    PURPOSE. 

Is  the  issue  raised  by  evolution  new  or  old  ?— Scope  of 
evolution — Is  evolution  self-explanatory  ? — Fiske  on 
teleology,  against  and  for— Order  and  purpose- 
Efficient  and  final  causes — Caprice — Spinoza  on  final 
causes  —  Mathematics  —  Purposiveness  —  The  same 
facts  and  laws  appear  from  the  point  of  view  of  cause 
and  of  purpose — Chance  or  purpose    .        .        .        .50 

CHAPTEPt   Y. 
EVOLUTION   AND  CREATION. 

History  of  the  earth — Evolution  as  seen  in  geologic  eras 
— Continuity  of  the  process — Succession — Advance 
and  preparation  for  advance — Physics  and  geology — 
Some  unsettled  questions — Professor  Caird  on  evolu- 
tion from  two  points  of  view — At  the  beginning  or 
at  the  end,  which  1 — Is  the  issue  arbitrary  arrange- 
ment versus  evolution  ?— No :  creation  by  slow  process 
is  creation — Illustrations — Mechanics  and  purpose 
once  more GO 


CHAPTEPt   VI. 

ORGANIC  EVOLUTION. 

Statement  by  Professor  Ray  Lankester — New  sets  of  terms 
used  in  biology — Why  are  there  new  terms? — Dr. 
Burden  Sanderson — Darwinism — Variation,  struggle 
for  existence,  natural  selection,  transmission — 
Anthropomorphic  character  of  the  process — Malthu- 
sianism — Utilitarianism — What  is  natural  selection  1 
— Comparision  with  the  process  of  denudation  in 
geology  by  Mr.  J.  T.  Cunningham— Darwin  on  the 
eye — Professor  Huxley's  reproduction  of  chance — 
Organic  evolution  likely  true,  but  its  factors  not  yet 
discovered 88 


CONTENTS  vii 

CHAPTER   VII. 

ORGANIC  EVOLUTION  {continued). 

Biology  before  and  after  Darwin — Physical  continuity  of 
life — Laws  and  conditions  of  life — Adequacy  or 
inadequacy  of  natural  selection  '/—Inter-relations  of 
life — Professor  Geddes  on  anthropomorphism  of  the 
nineteenth  century  and  of  the  eighteenth — Weismann 
— Natural  selection  is  elimination  of  the  unfit — 
Oscillation  between  natural  selection  as  negative 
and  as  positive — Poulton,  "  that  selection  is  examina- 
tion"— Teleology  run  mad — Mimicry — Search  after 
utility — Mutual  benefit  of  species  in  co-operation — 
Illustration — Struggle  for  existence  thus  modified-  - 
Eesults 110 

CHAPTER  VIII. 

SUPER-OEGANIC   EVOLUTION. 

Controversy  regarding  heredity — Spencer  and  Weis- 
mann— Machinery  of  evolution  defective— Limits  of 
organic  evolution — Man  does  not  modify  himself, 
but  modifies  his  environment — Survival  of  the  fittest 
explained  by  Huxley  and  by  Spencer — Evolution 
does  not  account  for  advance — Illustration  of  man's 
power  of  modifying  his  environment — Results  .         .182 


CHAPTER   IX. 

EVOLUTION  AND  PSYCHOLOGY. 

Human  and  animal  intelligence — Rational  self-con- 
sciousness— Habit — Feelings,  emotions,  appetites  in 
rational  beings  and  in  irrational — Differences  in 
kind  and  in  degree — Romanes  and  Spencer — Can 
feelings  make  a  consciousness? — The  self — Genesis 
of  self  according  to  Romanes  and  Spencer — Unity 
of  human  nature — Russel  Wallace's  dcistic  view — 
Creation  is  continuous — Results         ....  154 


viii  COXTENTS 

CHAPTEK  X. 

y  EVOLUTION  AND  ETHICS. 

Ethics  o£  evolution — Professor  Huxley's  ethical  ideal — 
Whence  derived  ?— Not  from  cosmic  iDrocess,  not 
from  Greek  or  Roman  ethics,  nor  from  ordinary 
human  ethics — Ethical  life  :  what  it  is — Struggle 
for  existence  partial  in  cosmos  :  at  its  fiercest  in 
human  life — Spheres  of  human  conduct  non- 
moralised —  floral  ideals — Moral  obligation — Tlic 
Christian  ethical  ideal — Its  acknowledged  supre- 
macy— Its  character — Pccognition  of  it — Not  derived 
from  evolution — Christian  ethics  both  test  and  goal 
of  ethical  evolution 178 

CHAPTER  XL 

EVOLUTION  AND   RELIGION. 

The  Christian  religion — The  Christian  goal  of  life — 
Fellowship  with  Cod — Christian  religious  ideal  real- 
ised in  Jesus  Christ — Immanence  of  God — Christ  not 
evolved — Evolution  holds  for  all  others — The  ghost 
theory  of  religion— Spencer's  reconciliation  of 
science  and  religion  —Criticism — Worship  for  an- 
cestors distinguished  from  worship  of  ancestors— 
Involved  conduct  and  evolved  belief — Universality  of 
religion— Manifestations  of  religion— Correspond- 
ence with  reality — Eternal  element  in  religious 
emotion— Christianity  and  evolution — Analogy  be- 
tween evolution  in  all  spheres  and  the  evolution  of 
Christian  life 20-1 


CHAPTER   I 

EVOLUTION  AND   BEGINNINGS 

Evolution  the  working  hypothesis  of  scientific  men— Evolu- 
tion as  a  dogmatic  faith — Truth  of  evolution — The 
primitive  nebulosity — Spectrum  analysis— Star  systems — 
Professor  Karl  Pearson  on  lifeless  chaotic  mass — Chaos 
unthinkable — Homogeneousness— Evolution  must  com- 
mence somewhere — Its  commencement  a  relative  unity. 

EVOLUTION  is  the  working  hypothesis  of  most 
scientific  men  at  the  present  time.  In  no 
branch  of  science  is  it  without  influence,  and  in  the 
sciences  which  deal  with  life  it  is  dominant.  We 
cannot  escape  from  it.  Its  technical  phrases  have 
become  parts  of  current  common  speech ;  and  such 
words  as  "  natural  selection,"  the  "  struggle  for 
existence,"  and  "  the  survival  of  the  fittest  "  are  on 
the  lips  of  every  one.  It  does  not  matter  to  what 
sphere  of  human  work  we  turn,  for  in  all  alike  we 
meet  with  the  same  mental  atmosphere.  Are  we 
students  of  physics  or  chemistry,  we  have  no  sooner 
mastered  the  elements  of  the  science  than  we  are 
plunged  into  questions  which  deal  with  the  "  evolu- 
tion "  of  the  "  atom "  or  the  "  molecule "  from, 
simpler  forms  of  matter.  Do  we  study  mechanics, 
then  we  are  brought  into  a  sphere  where  men  talk 
of  the  evolution  of  the  steam  engine  or  of  some  other 

1 


2  ailRtSTIANITY  AXD  EVOLUTION 

macbine  which  has  slowly  grown  from  less  to  more 
till  it  has  reached  its  present  state.     Are  we  students 
,  of  man,  then  w^e  become  accustomed  to  inquiries  into 
the  evolution  of  the  family,  of  marriage,  of  the  com- 
munity, of  the  state.     Morality  is  evolved,  religion 
also.     On  all   hands  men   are  busy  tracing  out  the 
lines  of  evolution  from  the  general  to  the  particular, 
from  the  simple  to  the  complex,  until  it  is  aifirmed 
**  that  the  whole  world,  living  and  not  living,  is  the 
result  of  the  mutual  interaction,  according  to  definite 
laws,  of   the   powers   possessed  by  the   molecules  of 
which  the  primitive  nebulosity  of  the  universe  was 
composed"  (Huxley,  Life  of  Darwin^  vol.  ii.,  p.  210). 
It  is  evident  enough  that,  in  these  views  of  Professor 
Huxley,  evolution  has  passed    beyond   the   stage   of 
a  working  hypothesis,  and  has  become  both  a  philo- 
'sophy  and  a  dogmatic  faith.    'We  are  restricted  to 
molecules,  their  powers,  and  the  interactions  of  their 
powers  for  the  explanation  of   the  universe ;    when 
the  molecules  are  given  in  their  primitive  nebulosity, 
the    whole  result  follows.     There   can   be  no  incre- 
ment from  without,  no  guidance  from  above,  nor  any 
leading  along  a  definite  line  to  a  predetermined  end. 
The   molecules   and   their  interactions  must  be  com- 
petent to  produce  all  that  has  come  out  in  the  process. 
We  need  not  say  how  great  is  the  issue  involved  in 
this  claim,  nor  how  strenuously  it  is  to  be  resisted. 
It  is  sometliing  gained,  however,  to  have  the  claims 
of  evolution  considered  as  a  dogmatic  faith  stated  so 
clearly,  and  to  know  with  what  w^  have  to  deal. 
^      Manifestly  evolution  as  a  working  hypothesis  and 
evolution  as  a  dogmatic    faith  mean    very  different 


EVOLUTION  AND    BEGINNINGS  3 

things.  Even  if  we  grcint  tluit  it  is  more  than  a 
working  hypothesis — let  us  grant  that  it  is  the  highest 
scientific  generalisation  to  which  the  human  mind 
has  yet  attained ;  that  in  it  we  have  a  law  of  the 
widest  working  which  is  operative  in  all  the  realm 
of  nature,  animate  and  inanimate — yet  this  concession 
falls  far  short  of  the  immeasurable  demand  which 
Professor  Huxley  makes  in  the  name  of  evolution. 
Let  us  suppose  it  proved  as  a  scientific  generalisation, 
and  we  may  still  say,  with  Professor  Eraser,  "  evolu- 
tion itself,  if  proved,  would  be  only  an  expression  of 
physical  causation — of  phenomenal  significance  and 
interpretability — though  it  may  yet  turn  out  to  be 
the  most  comprehensive  of  all  merely  phenomenal  laws, 
and  the  liighest  expression  of  the  sense  symbolism,  a 
physical  causation,  which  Berkeley  has  so  emphatically 
contrasted  with  spiritual  and  transcendent  causality  " 
{Eraser  on  Berkeley^  p.  227).  But  the  advocates  of 
evolution  are  not  content  with  the  concession  that 
it  is  the  most  comprehensive  of  all  phenomenal  laws ; 
they  demand  absolute  submission.  Evolution  must 
reign  without  a  rival ;  everything  must  bend  to  its 
sway. 

The   imperious  demands  which  Professor  Huxley, 
Mr.  Herbert  Spencer,  and  others  make  in  the  name 
of     evolution    must    not    be    allowed,    however,    to 
frighten  us  away  from  the  name,  or  to  blind  us  to 
the  truth  which   is   contained   in  it.    ,  Extravagant  | 
claims  must  not  be  allowed  to  discredit  legitimate  de- 1 
mands,.     In  fact,  the  real  work  done  by  evolution,  the  i 
truth  set  forth  by  it,  the  grandeur  of  its  generalisation,  1 
and   its   consistency  with    scientific   truth  genei-ally,  1 


4  CHRISTIANITY  AXD   EVOLUTION 

make  one  sorry  when  the  theory  is  pushed  to  an 
extreme  which  makes  it  untrue  and  inadequate. 
We  are  not  surprised  when  the  expounders  of  this 
theory  of  the  universe  are  filled  with  cosmic  emotion 
at  the  greatness  and  grandeur  of  the  process  they 
describe  ;  nor  do  we  wonder  that  they  are  carried 
away  with  the  rapture  into  which  they  are  thrown  : 
for  no  reader  can  withhold  his  sympathy  and  admira- 
tion. It  is  grand  and  ennobling  to  sweep  back  in 
thought  across  the  hundred  million  years  or  so  which 
separate  us  from  the  time  when  our  earth  was  only 
vapour,  and  to  be  led  on  from  that  point  of  time, 
through  all  the  intervening  ages,  as  one  science  after 
another  guides  our  footsteps,  until  we  arrive  at  the 
complex,  differentiated,  integrated  world  of  the  present 
time,  with  its  life,  intelligence,  ethics,  religion,  science, 
art,  and  to  have  some  unclerstaneling  of  the  process 
whereby  this  has  come  out  of  that.  But  we  may  still 
have  the  rapture  and  the  admiration  :  we  may  admire 
and  so  far  revere  and  be  thankful  for  the  work  done 
in  the  service  of  evolution,  and  yet  withhold  that 
fi.nal  sacrifice  demanded  in  her  name. 

Almost  every  book  on  evolution  and  every  magazine 
article  devoted  to  the  subject  tries  to  hark  back  to  the 
''  primitive  nebulosity."  Not  many  of  them,  however, 
commit  themselves  to  any  definite  theory  on  the 
question  of  the  nebular  view.  Some,  ineleed,  with  a 
courage  which  we  cannot  sufliciently  adojire,  speak  as 
if  Kant  or  Laplace  had  left  nothing  for  their  followers 
to  do.  Mr.  Fiske  is  quite  sure  on  the  matter.  "  In 
the  slow  concentration  of  the  matter  constituting 
this    solar    nelnda,"    he    says,    "as   both    Kant    and 


EVOLUTION  AND   BEGINNINGS  5 

Laplace  have  elaborately  prove  1,  the  most  prominent 
peculiarities  of  the  solar  system  find  their  complete 
explanation"  {Cosmic  Philosophy^  vol.  i.,  p.  360). 
We  shall  have  something  to  say  of  this  later  on. 
At  present  we  may  observe  that  Professor  Huxley's 
statement  does  not  limit  itself  to  the  solar  system  ; 
it  extends  to  the  universe.  The  progress  of  science 
has  made  it  much  more  probable  that  some  form 
of  the  nebular  theory  is  true.  While  this  is  so,  any 
tenable  view  of  the  nebular  hypothesis,  or  any  view 
consistent  with  facts,  has  presented  that  hypothesis 
in  a  form  which  is  not  available  for  the  purposes 
of  evolution.  Professor  Huxley  assiimes  "  a  primitive 
nebulosity  of  the  universe."  If  this  has  any  meaning, 
we  must  try  to  imagine  all  the  matter  of  the  universe 
dispersed  equally  through  space,  and  in  a  uniform 
physical  condition.  If  we  were  to  trace  the  process 
backwards  from  the  present  hour,  and  try  to  follow 
the  various  steps  by  which  the  star  systems  came 
to  their  present  condition,  we  should  finally  arrive 
at  the  primitive  nebulosity.  But  then  we  should 
have  to  explain  the  fact  that  there  are  so  many 
systems  that  have  not  yet  emerged  from  their  first 
estate. 

Spectrum  analysis  has  made  us  acquainted  with 
the  physical  condition  of  many  kinds  of  stars.  If  w 
study  such  works  as  Schellen's  S'pectrum  Analysis^  or 
Miss  Gierke's  System  of  the  Stars,  we  shall  become 
acquainted  with  worlds  at  all  stages  of  their  history. 
"We  can  indeed  hesitate  to  admit  neither  the 
fundamental  identity  of  the  material  elements  of 
the  universe,  nor  the  nebulous  origin  of  stars.     The 


6  CHRISTIANITY  AND   EVOLUTION 

transition  from  one  to  the  other  of  the  two  great 
families  of  the  sidereal  kingdom  is  so  gradual  as  to 
afford  a  rational  conviction  that  what  we  see  con- 
temporaneously in  different  objects  has  been  exhibited 
successively  in  the  same  objects.  Planetary  nebulae 
pass  into  gaseous  stars  on  one  side,  into  nebulous 
stars  on  the  other,  the  greater  nebulse  into  clusters. 
The  present  state  of  the  Pleiades  refers  us  ine\dtably 
to  an  antecedent  condition  closely  resembling  that  of 
the  Orion  nebula  ;  the  Andromeda  nebula  may  repre- 
sent the  nfi  scent  stage  of  a  splendid  collection  of 
suns.  But  even  though  stars  without  exception  havej 
sprung  from  nebulae,  it  does  not  follow  that  nebuljel 
without  exception  grow  into  stars.  The  requisite 
conditions  need  not  invariably  have  been  present. 
Other  ends  than  that  of  star  production  are  perhaps 
subserved  by  the  chief  part  of  the  present  nebulous 
contents  of  the  heavens.  The  contrast  between 
stellar  and  nebular  distribution  is  intelligible  only  as 
expressing  a  definitive  separation  of  the  life-histories 
of  the  two  classes — a  divei'gence  destined  to  be 
perpetual  along  their  lines  of  growth."  {Sijstem  of 
the  Stars,  p.  396.)  Thus  we  see  how  naturally 
astronomy  uses  the  language  of  evolution,  and  how 
the  new  astronomy  with  the  aid  of  the  mighty 
instrument  of  spectrum  analysis  has  added  to  our 
knowledge  and  increased  our  wonder.  A  cross 
section  seems  to  give  us  also  the  line  of  the  life- 
history  of  a  star  or  a  system  of  stars.  And  the 
theory  of  Kant  with  regard  to  the  solar  system  seems 
to  have  reference  also  to  the  sidereal  system.  May 
we    by  an    act    of    faith    go   back  to   the   primitive 


EVOLUriON  AND   BEGINNINGS  7 

nebulosity  of  the  universe,  and,  assuming  a  primitive  , 
nebulosity,  with  known  qualities  and  laws,  seek  thus  I 
to  account  for  the  universe  ?     We_inust  start  some- 1 
where,  and  perhaps   for   some   purposes  a  primitive 
nebulosity  is  as  good  a  starting-place  as  we  can  have. 
But  we   should   observe  how  many  things  we  have 
assumed,  and  how  much  we  have  taken  for  granted. 
We  have  assumed    "  molecules  possessed  of   definite| 
powers,"  that  these  powers  work  according  tq^defimtel 
Jaws,    and    that    out  of  their  mutual  interaction    a  J 
definite  world   of  order  will    arise.      Now  these   are 
large  assumptions,  and  if  granted  have  raised  many 
important   questions.      What   has   been    assumed    is 
something  definite,  and  yet  the  attempt  is  constantly 
made  to  make  it  indefinite.     There  is  nothing  more 
common  than  to  call  the  "  primitive  nebulosity  "  chaos. 
"  Suppose,"  says  Professor  Karl  Pearson,  "the  highly 
developed  reason  of  some  future  man  to  start,   say, 
with  clear  conceptions  of  the  lifeless  chaotic  .masa_of 
60,000,000  years  ago,  which  now  forms  our  planetary 
system,  then  from  these  conceptions  alone  he  will  be 
able  to  think  out  the  60,000,000  years'  history  of  the 
world  with  every  finite  phase  which  it  had  passed 
through ;    each    will    have    its    necessary   place,    its 
necessary  course  in  this  thought  system.     And  this 
total  history  he  has  thought  out  ?    It  will  be  identical 
with  the  actual  history  of  the  w^orld ;  for  that  history 
has  evolved  in  the  sole  way  conceivable."     [The  Ethics 
of  Freethought,  p.  29.) 

Apart  from  the  other  issues  raised  by  this  statement, 
we  concentrate  attention  on  one  aspect  of  it.  This 
we    do    mainly   because    Professor    Karl    Pearson   is 


8  CHRISTIAXITY  AND   EVOLUTION 

here  a  representative  writer.  Many  other  people,  of 
less  ability  than  he,  speak  of  a  primeval  chaos  out 
of  which  somehow  order  must  emerge.  But  may  we 
ask  how  we  are  to  have  "clear  conceptions  of  a  life- 
less chaotic  mass,"  whether  we  consider  it  as  existing 
a  number  of  years  ago  or  at  the  present  hour  1  We 
can  only  conceive  of  it  just  in  proportion  as  we  think 
the  chaos  awa}^  A  mass  means  something ;  it  has  a 
certain  bulk,  a  certain  shape,  a  certain  kind  of  con- 
sistency ;  and  if  it  has  these,  to  speak  of  it  as  chaotic 
is  mere  rhetoric.  A  clear  conception  is  possible  only 
if  theie  is  something  clear  to  be  apprehended ;  and 
to  speak  of  a  clear  conception  of  a  chaos  implies 
something  chaotic  in  the  mind  which  speaks. 

The_primitive  nebulosity,  if  it  ever  existed,  was  as 
definite,  as  much  subject  to  law,  as  clearly  marked  b}- 
definite  qualities,  as  the  universe  which  is  supposed  to 
have  evolved  out  of  it.  At  all  events,  it  existed  in  a 
definite  material  state  ;  it  occupied  space ;  molecules 
or  atoms,  or  the  material  which  afterwards  aggregated 
into  atoms  or  molecules,  were  there.  There  were 
definite  laws  at  work,  and  there  were  mutual  inter- 
actions; and  just  in  proportion  as  these  existed,  clear 
conceptions  of  the  so-called  "  lifeless  chaotic  "  mass 
are  or  were  possible. 

If  the  primitive  nebulosity  had  any  qualities  what- 
soever, then  all  the  advantages  which  were  gained  by 
calling  it  chaotic  are  lost.  Somehow,  I  do  not  know 
how,  but  there  seems  to  be  a  hazy  idea  in  the  minds 
of  many,  that  if  a  start  can  be  made  in  chaos, 
and  afterwards  a  cosmos  appears,  a  solution  of  the 
problem   of   creation    has    been    obtained.     Given    a 


.is  I 


EVOLUTION  AND   BEGINNINGS  9 

chaotic  primitive  nebulosity,  and  given  clear  concep- 
tions of  it,  then  the  universe  must  arise  :  such  is  the 
problem  and  its  solution.  But  we  have  no  account  of 
the  transition,  nor  any  rational  attempt  to  show  why 
and  how  chaos  should  cease  and  cosmos  begin.  Thi 
difficulty  besets  the  mechanical  theory  of  the  universe 
as  it  besets  every  other  theory.  How  to  get  our| 
starting-point  is  the  perplexity.  We  cannot  begin* 
with  chaos ;  and  if  w^e  begin  with  anything  definite, 
where  have  we  got  it  %  We  may  place  the  elephant 
on  the  back  of  the  tortoise,  but  what  will  support  the 
tortoise  ? 

It  is  amazing  that  those  who  assume  the  primitive 
nebulosity  do  not  see  that  it  raises  precisely  those 
questions  concerning  order,  its  source,  method,  and 
law,  which  aie  raised  by  the  universe  as  at  present 
constituted.  It  raises  these  questions  also  in  a  form 
more  difficult  of  solution.  We  may  not  ask  how 
this  nebulous  mass  came  to  be ;  if  we  did  ask,  we 
should  at  once  be  told  that  we  must  not  inquire 
regarding  origins.  Leaving  origins,  then,  we  may 
ask  whether  the  mass  is  constituted  so  and  so,  and  in 
such  a  manner  as  to  make  a  certain  result  inevitable. 
If,  as  Professor  Karl  Pearson  says,  ''  the  universe 
is  what  it  is  because  that  is  the  only  conceivable 
fashion  in  which  it  could  be — in  which  it  could  be 
thought  " — we  may  conclude  that  thought  has  gone 
to  the  making  of  it.  If  thought  has  come  out  of  the 
universe,  if  the  universe  is  a  universe  which  can  be 
thought,  then  thought  has  had  something  to  do  with 
it  from  the  outset.  There  is  thought  in  the  primitive 
nebulosity,  and  thought  of  the  most  marvellous  kind. 


10        CHBISTIAXITY   AND   F^VOLUTTON 

But  we  can  scarcely  ascribe  the  thought  to  the 
molecules,  Wh(  nee  has  it  come  ?  We  humbly  submit 
that  at  this  stage  we  require  more  thought  to  make 
clear  what  we  mean. 

If  instead  of  Professor  Karl  Pearson's  chaotic  mass! 
we  take  the  indefinite,  incoherent  homogeneity  of  I 
Mr.  Herbert  Spencer,  we  have  not  made  any  advance.  I 
Suppose  we  grant  the  possibility  of  such  a  homo- 
geneity, we  cannot  get  it  to  act.  Mr.  Spencer  him- 
self recognises  this  :  "One  stable  homogeneity  only  is 
hvpothetically  possible.  If  centres  of  force,  absolutely 
uniform  in  their  powers,  were  diffused  with  absolute 
uniformity  through  unlimited  space,  they  would  remain 
in  equilibrium.  This,  however,  though  a  verbally 
intelligible  supposition,  is  one  which  cannot  be  repre- 
sented in  thought,  since  unlimited  space  is  incon- 
ceivable. But  all  finite  forms  of  the  homogeneous, 
all  forms  of  it  which  we  can  know  or  conceive,  must 
inevitably  lapse  into  heterogeneity."  (First  Princijyles, 
p.  429.)  The  homogeneity  which  his  system  demands 
is  dismissed  as  inconceivable,  "since  unlimited  space 
is  inconceivable."  And  then  he  proceeds  to  speak  of 
"  all  finite  forms  of  the  homogeneous " ;  and  by  so 
doing  cuts  down  tlie  only  branch  on  which  he  can 
sit.  A  finite  form  of  the  homogeneous  is  really 
destructive  of  his  hypothesis.  For  the  finiteness  of 
the  form  postulates  a  difference  between  the  homo- 
geneous and  its  environment ;  and  as  that  difference 
is  both  continuous  and  active,  it  will  not  allow  the 
homogeneous  to  exist.  The  very  notion  of  a  finite 
homogeneity  is  self-destructive. 

Another   result   follows.      The   objection  which  is\ 


EVOLUTION  AND   BEGINNINGS         11 

brought  against  absolute  homogeneity  implies  that  the 
absohite  or  the  ultimate  reality  can  manifest  itself 
only  in  finite  forms.  Any  other  than  a  finite  mani- 
festation, "  though  a  verbally  intelligible  proposition, 
is  one  that  cannot  be  represented  in  thought,  since 
the  unlimited  is  inconceivable."  How  contradictory 
this  is  of  mo.ny  of  Mr.  Spencer's  propositions  we  need 
not  here  determine.  But  the  remark  that  "  unlimited 
space  is  inconceivable  "  does  not  hinder  him  from  saying 
on  the  same  page,  "  The  absolutely  homogeneous  must 
lose  its  equilibrium,"  and  yet  "they  would  remain 
in  equilibrium."  Hence  we  have  this  dilemma  :  If  the 
homogeneous  is  absolute,  it  will  remain  in  equilibrium  ; 
if  the  equilibrium  is  disturbed,  then  the  homogeneity  \ 
is  not  absolute. 

How  does  evolution  commence  according  to  Mr. 
Spencer?  " All  finite  powers  of  the  homogeneous — 
all  forms  of  it  which  we  can  know  or  conceive — must 
inevitably  lapse  into  heterogeneity.  In  three  several 
ways  does  the  persistence  of  force  necessitate  this. 
Setting  external  agencies  aside,  each  unit  of  a 
homogeneous  whole  must  be  differently  affected  from 
any  of  the  rest  by  the  action  of  the  rest  on  it.  The 
resultant  force  exercised  by  the  aggregate  on  each 
unit,  being  in  no  two  cases  alike  in  both  amount  and 
direction,  and  usually  not  in  either,  any  incident  force, 
even  if  uniform  in  amount  and  direction,  cannot 
produce  like  effects  on  the  units.  And  the  various 
positions  of  the  parts  in  relation  to  any  incident  force 
preventing  them  from  receiving  them  in  uniform 
amounts  and  directions,  a  further  difference  in  the 
effects   wrought    on    them    is    inevitably    produced." 


12        CHRISTIANITY  AND   EVOLUTION 

{First  Princijyles,  p.  429.)  Let  any  one  try  to 
think  out  these  propositions.  "  Each  unit  of  a 
homogeneous  whole  must  be  differently  affected  from 
any  of  the  rest  by  the  aggregate  action  of  the  rest 
on  it."  Why  ?  The  necessity  is  not  apparent.  If 
a  whole  be  homogeneous,  then  it  would  result  that 
each  unit  must  be  similarly  affected  by  the  aggregate 
action  of  the  rest  on  it.  If  it  be  differently  affected, 
whence  the  difference  ?  If  the  difference  be  one  in 
position,  then  homogeneity  has  vanished  and  hetero- 
geneity has  begun.  Every  attempt  made  by  Mr. 
Spencer  to  make  a  commencement  postulates  differ- 
ence, and  any  difference  is  destructive  of  the  homo- 
geneity.^, At  the  beginning  of  all  evolution  he  has 
to  bring  in  somehow  actual  differences,  real  adjust- 
ments, and  relations,  and  yet  he  endeavours  to  evolve 
these  out  of  an  original  simplicity.  Evolution  has  to 
begin,  not  from  a  minimum  simplicity,  but  from  what 
looks  like  a  rational,  intelligible  adjustment  of  means 
to  ends,  and  of  qualities  and  properties  in  relation  ; 
and  this  is  exactly  the  theistic  position. 
/  The  primitive  nebulosity  of  Professor  Huxley,  the 
/lifeless  chaotic  mass  of  Professor  Karl  Pearson,  the 
J  absolutely  homogeneous  of  Mr.  Spencer,  and,  we  may 
f  add,  similar  postulates  of  other  writers,  do  not  serve 
the  purpose  of  those  who  have  introduced  them  to  our 
notice.  They  do  not  help  us  to  pass  from  the  indeter- 
minate to  the  determinate,  and  they  do  not  help  us 
to  get  intelligence  o\Tt  of  what  is  not  intelligent. 
Every  problem  presented  by  the  present  complex 
universe  is  presented  also  by  the  primitive  nebulosity. 
It    is   an    attempt   to    get  what   is    adjusted   out  of 


EVOLUTION  AND   BEGINNINGS  13 

what  is  not  adjusted,  relations  out  of  what  has 
none,  and  differences  out  of  that  which  has  no 
difference.  Every  step  proceeds  on  what  has  been 
formally  denied,  and  the  result  is  mere  .confusion 
of  thought ;  for  evolution  can  commence  only  wheni 
change  begins,  and  the  absolutely  homogeneous,  if 
left  to  itself,  cannot  even  begin  to  change.  Thus  we 
are  at  the  outset  constrained  to  postulate  some  force 
outside  of  the  homogeneous  in  order  that  changejmay 
begin  ;  or  if  the  beginning  of  change  is  due  to  some- 
thing within  the  homogeneous,  then  we  have  difference 
to  start  with.  There  is  no  way  of  escape  from  the 
thought  of  prearranged  activities  within  the  mass 
which  Professor  Karl  Pearson  calls  chaotic. 

Prearranged  activities,  however,  is  the  very  sup- 
position of  which  the  writers  in  question  seek  to 
get  rid.  They  value  the  primitive  nebulosity  just  in 
proportion  as  it  enables  them  to  make  a  beginning, 
and  to  get  the  work  of  intelligence  without  the  help 
of  intelligence.  It  is  just  the  old  attempt  of  trying 
to  get  something  out  of  nothing.  We  are  not  to  ask 
any  question  about  the  primitive  nebulosity.  We  are 
not  to  ask  how  it  happened  to  be  there,  nor  inquire 
into  its  previous  history,  if  it  had  a  history.  We  are 
to  be  willing  to  take  it  for  granted.  At  a  certain  time, 
many  millions  of  years  ago,  there  existed  a  primitive 
nebulosity,  an  undiffeientiated  chaotic  mass  of  matter, 
in  an  extremely  attenuated_formj  equally  balanced 
in  all  directions,  and  each  part  of  it  indistinguish- 
able from  every  other  part.  It  is  homogeneous 
throughout.  Let  us  suppose  also  that  the  mass  is  in 
what  may  be  called  the  pre -chemical  state  of  matter. 


14        CHBISTIANITY  AND   EVOLUTION 

What  is  now  known  as  atoms  and  molecules  has 
not  yet  come  to  be.  The  different  chemical  elements 
have  not  yet  aggregated  together.  There  is  one 
stuff,  and  only  one,  and  each  part  of  it  is  identical 
with  every  other  part.  Let  us  grant  the  supposition. 
It  is  possible  that  such  stuff  has  existed.  The 
experiments  and  reasonings  of  Mr.  Norman  Lockyer 
have  made  it  at  least  possible.  The  chemical  elements 
may  be  vaiious  combinations  of  one  uniform  stuff. 
There  may  have  been  a  time  when  matter  was  abso- 
lutely homogeneous.  But  the  supposition  does  not 
help  us.  For  somehow  change  has  to  begin  and 
change  has  to  continue,  and  has  to  continue  in 
one  direction.  As  soon  as  change  has  begun  the 
undifferentiated  stuff  becomes  differentiated,  the  in- 
determinate becomes  determinate,  and  the  chemical 
elements  appear.  When  once  they  are  made  they  are 
never  unmade.  It  is  not  necessary  for  our  purpose  to 
inquire  as  to  whether  science  can  trace  the  genesis  of 
the  molecule  ;  for  all  the  kinds  of  matter  we  know  are 
gathered  up  into  various  limited  sorts,  and  each  of 
these  sorts  is  practically  indestructible.  "  Though  in 
the  course  of  ages  catastrophes  have  occurred  and 
may  yet  occur  in  the  heavens,  though  ancient  systems 
be  dissolved  and  new  systems  evolved  out  of  their 
ruins,  the  molecules  out  of  which  these  systems  are 
built,  the  foundation-stones  of  the  material  universe, 
remain  unbroken  and  unworn."  So  speaks  Professor 
Clerk  Maxwell.  Again  he  says :  "  There  are  im- 
mense numbers  of  atoms  of  the  same  kind,  and  the 
constituents  of  each  of  these  atoms  are  incapable  of 
adjustment  by  any  powers  now  in  action.     Each  is 


EVOLUTION  AND   BEGINNINGS         ]5 

physically  independent  of  all  the  others.  Whether 
or  not  the  conception  of  a  multitude  of  beings 
existing  from  all  eternity  is  in  itself  self-contradictory, 
the  conception  becomes  palpably  absurd  when  we 
attribute  a  x^elation  of  q^uantitative  equality  to  all 
these  beings.  We  are  then  forced  to  look  beyond 
them  to  some  common  cause  or  common  origin  to 
explain  why  this  singular  relation  of  equality  exists, 
rather  than  any  of  the  infinite  number  of  possible 
relations  of  inequality.  Science  is  incompetent  to 
reason  on  the  creation  of  the  world  out  of  nothing.' 
We  have  reached  the  utmost  limit  of  our  thinking 
faculties  when  we  have  admitted  that,  becaus^jnatter 
cannot  be  eternal  and  self-existent,  it  must  have  been/ 
created."  i^Encyc.  Brit.,  vol.  iii.,  art.  "Atom,"  p.  49, 
9th  ed.)  We  should  like  to  ask  whether  the  primitive 
nebulosity  is  composed  of  definite  atoms  and  molecules 
or  not.  If  it  is  in  the  pre-atomic  stage  pictured  by 
Mr.  Norman  Lockyer,  then  clearly  its  first  work  is 
to  become  atomic.  If  it  has  become  atomic,  then  we 
have  no  longer  to  deal  with  a  homogeneous  kind  of 
stuff,  but  with  a  stuff  that  has  got  itself  packed,  into 
sixty  or  seventy  different  kinds — kinds  which  persist, 
which  no  power  can  change,  and  no  use  can  wear 
out.  The  problem  thus  becomes  infinitely  more 
complicated.  It  is  not  now  a  case  of  the  absolutely 
homogeneous  losing  its  equilibrium,  and  thus  in- 
stituting a  series  of  changes;  but  it  becomes  a  problem 
of  how  to  obtain  a  unity  out  of  sixty  or  seventy 
different  sets  of  things,  each  set  of  which  is  different 
from  all  the  others,  and  of  each  set  there  is  an 
incalculable    number.      The    problem    is  not  how  to 


16       CHRISTIANITY  AND  EVOLUTION 

obtain  otherness  out  of  unity,  but  to  gather  the 
differences  into  a  unity.  An  abstract  unity  will  not 
suffice.  It  is  not  enough  to  abstract  from  the 
difference  of  each  separate  set  of  molecules,  and 
generalise  them  all  under  the  common  name  of 
matter ;  nor  to  abstract  from  the  various  energies  at 
work  in  the  universe,  and  generalise  them  under  the 
common  name  of  force :  what  is  needed  is  a  kind  of 
unity  which  shall  keep  the  differences,  and  recognise 
the  special  nature  of  each  kind.  And  this  is  a  unity 
made  up  of  relations.  Thus  at  the  very  basis  of  the. 
material  system  there  is  evidence  of  rationality  of| 
the  very  highest  order.  Given  sixty  or  seventy 
different  kinds  of  stuff,  each  with  its  own  proper 
qualities  and  attributes,  to  make  out  of  them  a  stable 
and  progressive  univei-se — that  is  the  problem  ;  and  it 
is  one  evidently  of  a  higher  kind  than  that  presented 
to  us  by  Mr.  Spencer. 

Thus  we  have  the  theistic  problem  and  answer! 
before  evolution  can  be  said  to  have  begun.  Whetheij 
these  molecules  have  had  a  previous  history  or  not, 
at  all  events  they  have  passed  now  out  of  any  sphere 
which  can  be  influenced  by  the  struggle  for  existence. 
A  molecule  of  hydrogen  continues  to  be  a  molecule 
of  hydrogen  wheresoever  it  may  be,  in  whatsoever 
combination  it  may  exist,  and  whatsoever  work  it 
may  be  doing.  If  it  ever  had  to  struggle  for  exist- 
ence, it  has  long  ago  got  past  that  stage.  It  exists, 
it  cannot  be  changed,  it  does  work,  and  about  it 
evolution  has  nothing  to  say.  And  yet  the  problem 
of  its  existence  and  its  qualities  and  its  relations  is  as 
irreat  as  those  which  evolution  is  called  on  to  solve. 


CHAPTER   II 

EVOLUTION  AND   LAW 

Nature  is  what  is  fixed,  stated,  settled — Law  and  hypothesis 
— The  nebular  theory — Its  plausibilities  and  its  diffi- 
culties— The  nebular  theory  and  evolution — It  involves 
a  rational  system — The  theistic  argument — Continuity — 
Evolution  a  real  process — "  Instability  of  the  homogene- 
ous " — Multiplicatiou  of  effects — "  Is  the  effect  more  com- 
plex than  the  cause  ?  " — Criticism  of  this  statement. 

THE  unity  of  the  primitive  nebulosity  must  have 
been,  as  we  have  seen,  a  unity  of  elements  in 
relation  to  one  another.  It  is  not  undifferentiated 
stuff,  but  definite  molecules  existing  in  definite 
relations.  It  is  not  chaotic,  but  orderly,  and  existing 
in  relations  which  can  be  thought.  Thus  the  unity 
of  the  primitive  nebulosity  is  already  rational  and 
intelligible.  If  this  is  possible  at  the  outset,  then 
the  process  of  evolution  will  also  be  rational  and 
intelligible,  and  the  outcome  will  also  be  rational. 
It  is  not  for  us  to  contend  against  the  existence  of  aj 
primitive  nebulosity  either  of  the  solar  system  or  of/ 
the  sidereal.  Nor  have  we  any  interest  in  contending/ 
against  the  discovery  of  method,  order,  law  in  nature. 
We  are  glad  to  sit  at  the  feet  of  those  who  can  show 
us  the  widening  bounds  of  order  and  law,  who  can 
teach  us  to  know  the  dominion  of  order  and  law 
17  2 


18        CHRISTIAXITY  AND   EVOLUTION 

where  we  were  once  unable  to  discover  it.  We  gladly 
follow  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer  as  he  leads  us  on  from 
stage  to  stage  of  existence  and  of  knowledge,  and 
shows  us  how  every  stage  is  under  law,  and  that  even 
the  very  discovery  of  law  is  itself  subject  to  law. 
We  may  not  agree  with  him  either  in  the  general  or 
in  the  particular,  but  we  are  grateful  for  the  wide 
outlook  he  has  cast  over  the  universe,  and  for  a 
possible  interpretation  of  the  order  of  nature.  We 
had  learned  from  Bishop  Butler  that  the  meaning 
of  nature  is  what  is  fixed,  settled,  determined,  and 
that  what  is  fixed  and  settled  has  had  reference  to 
some  cause  which  made  it  so. 

Thus  we  were  prepared  in  the  interests  of  theology  | 
to  welcome  every  conquest  of  science  and  every  fresh  I 
proof   of   the   universal  reign   of  law.      The  Bishop 
had  taught  us  to  look  for  the   traces  of  the  Divine 
footsteps,    not    in   what    appears   to  be  lawless  and 
capricious   and    arbitrary,    but    in    that   which    was 
fixed,  steadfast,  determined.     Thus,  on  the  principles 
of  Bishop  Butler, — which  are  also  the  principles  of 
a  true  theology, — we  are  to  wait  for  the  instructions 
of  our  masters  in  science.     They  are  the  true  inter- 
preters of  nature,  as  they  are  also  the  discoverers  of 
its  laws.     They  have  proved  that  the  law  according 
to    which    a   stone   falls   to    the  ground    is    the    law 
accordmg  to  which  the  planets  describe  their  orbits 
and  the  stars  maintain   their  places.      And  if   they 
tell  us  that  the  earliest  known   form   of   the  solar 
system  is  that  of  a  gaseous  nebula,  and  if  they  can 
prove  this  to  be  the  fact — well,  then  we  accept  the 
fact,  and  act  accordingly.     If  they  tell  us  that  the 


EVOLUTION  AND   LAW  19 

widest  law  known  to  them  is  that  of  evohition,  that 
by  the  way  of  evolution  the  universe  has  come  to  be 
what  it  is— well,  if  it  is  so,  we  see  no  more  reason 
why  we  should  be  disturbed  by  evolution  than  we 
have  been  by  gravitation.  Neither_gravitation  nor 
evolution  is  ultimate,  and  when  science  has  done  its 
work  something  remains  to  be  said. 

Let    us   therefore    without    hesitation    follow    our 
scientific  teachers,  with  the  sure  belief  that  they  do 
us  service  whenever  they  can  disclose  to  us  order  and 
method  and  law  in  nature.     They  also  will  no  doubtl 
tell   us   what   has   been    proven^  and   what   is   oniyl 
probable.    They  will  observe,  we  hope,  this  distinction, 
and  will  give  us  due  notice  when  they  leave  the  firm 
ground  of  proof  and  take  to  speculation.     And  we 
have  a  right  to  expecit  that  they  will  keep  hypothesis 
separate  from  ascertained  law.     For  the  most  part, 
we  have  no  reason   to   complain.     We  get   sublime 
speculation,  but  we  also  get  profound  calculation  ;  and 
as  a  rule  these  are  kept  separate.     With  reference  to 
the  matter  before  us,  the  primitive   nebulosity  and 
the  nebular  theory,  for  the  most  part  competent  men  '^ 
deal  with  it  as  a  speculation,  and  not  as  a  certainty.  ' 
Laplace   himself    did   so.       He   placed   the    nebular ' 
hypothesis  on  a  different  footing  from  his  statement 
about  the  stability  of  the  solar  system.     This  was  a 
proof  that  all  the  changes  of  the  solar  system  were 
periodic,  that  if  it  is  disturbed  a  little  it  will  oscillate 
and    return    to   its    old    state.      This    demonstration 
proceeded  on  the  assumption  that  the  planets  were 
rigid  bodies,  and  on  that  assumption  the  demonstration 
is   complete.      Corrections  have  to  be  made  because 


20       CHRISTIANITY  AND   EVOLUTION 

the  planets  are  not  rigid  bodies ;  but  these  do  not 
concern  us  here.  The  point  is  that  Laplace  himself 
threw  out  his  suggestion  of  the  nebular  theory  simply 
as  a  speculation.  The  theory  of  the  stability  of  the 
solar  system  followed  with  inevitable  certainty  from 
the  theory  of  gravitation.  But  the  nebular  theory 
could  not  be  deduced  from  the  theory  of  gravitation, 
and  must  continue  to  rank  only  as  a  hypothesis.  It 
has  its  difficulties,  and  it  has  its  probabilities ;  but 
as  yet  science  does  not  affirm  its  truth. 

Its.  probabilities  are,  to  use  the  language  of    Sir 

Robert  S.  Ball :  "  Many  of  the  features  in  the  solar 
system  harmonise  with  the  supposition  that  the  origin 
of  the  system  has  been  that  suggested  by  the  nebular 
theory.  We  have  already  had  occasion  in  an  earlier 
chajDter  to  allude  to  the  fact  that  all  the  planets 
perform  theii-  revolution  around  the  sun  in  the  same 
direction.  It  is  also  to  be  observed  that  the  rotation 
of  the  planets  on  their  axes,  as  well  as  the  movements 
of  the  satellites  around  their  primaries,  are  following 
the  same  law,  with  one  slight  exception  in  the  case  of 
the  Uranian  system.  A  coincidence  so  remarkable 
naturally  suggests  the  necessity  for  some  physical 
explanation.  Such  an  explanation  is  offered  by  the 
nr-bular  theory.  Suppose  that  countless  ages  ago  a 
mighty  nebula  was  slowly  rotating  and  slowly_con- 
tracting.  In  the  process  of  contracting  portions  of 
the  condensed  matter  would  be  left  behind.  These 
portions  would  still  revolve  round  the  central  mass, 
and  each  portion  would  rotate  on  its  axis  in  the  same 
direction.  As  the  process  of  contraction  proceeded 
it  would  follow  from  dynamical  principles  that  the 


EVOLUTION  AND   LAW  21 

velocity  of  rotation  would  increase ;  and  thus  at 
length  these  portions  would  consoHdate  into  masses, 
while  the  central  mass  would  gradually  contract 
to  form  the  sun.  By  a  similar  process  on  a 
smaller  scale  the  systems  of  satellites  were  evolved 
from  the  contracting  primary.  These  satellites  would 
also  revolve  in  the  same  direction,  and  thus  the 
characteristic  features  of  the  solar  system  could  be 
accounted  for."  {Story  of  the  Heavens,  p.  501.)  The 
language  is  exceedingly  cautious.  It  is  said  "  many 
of  the  features  in  the  solar  system  harmonise  with 
the  supposition."  "  Thus  the  features  of  the  solar 
system^could^e  accounted  for."  Sir  Kobert  Ball  does 
not  say,  "  They  are  accounted  for."  This  is  very  dif- 
ferent from  the  statement  already  quoted  about  the 
primitive  nebulosity,  and  very  different  from  what  is 
required  by  the  part  which  the  nebular  theory  is  made 
to  play  in  the  theory  of  evolution.  What  was  the 
state  of  the  nebula  ?  Was  it  hot  or  cold  ?  We  must 
think  of  the  matter  of  it  as  in  some  state.  Are  we 
to  think  of  the  matter  of  the  nebula  as  consisting 
of  the  same  kinds  of  atoms  as  those  we  know  to-day  % 
Were  these  atoms  arranged  according  to  their  specific 
gravities  ?  If  they  were,  the  heaviest  would  gravitate 
to  the  centre  and  the  lighter  would  gather  at  the 
circumference ;  but  the  whole  business  must  somehow 
arrange  itself  so  that  the  earth,  for  example,  may 
start  fair  and  have  capital  enough  for  all  its  ex- 
penditure. A  nebula  abandoned  to  the  influence  of 
gravity,  and  left  to  shape  itself  as  it  might,  is  yet 
to  be  so  conceived  as  to  provide  a  suitable  endow- 
ment for  each  member   of  the   family.     It  looks  at 


22        CHPdSTIANITY  AND   EVOLUTION 

this  stage  as  if  the  nebular  hy^jothesis  needed  to  be 
supplemented. 

'^  Suppose  that  countless  ages  ago  a  mighty  nebula 
was  slowly  rotating  and  slowly  contracting."  It  is 
easy  to  make  the  supposition,  and  yet  exceedingly 
difficult  to  realise  what  is  involved  in  it.  The  matter 
of  the  nebula  is  exceecUngly  rare,  so  attenuated  that 
the  matter  of  the  solar  system  stretched  beyond  the 
bounds  of  the  orbit  of  the  most  distant  planet. 
Mr.  Proctor  declai'es  that  in  such  a  system  rotation 
is  impossible  ;  and  it  is  indeed  difficult  to  conceive  a 
continuous  rotation  of  such  an  attenuated  body. 

It  is  an  essential  part  of  the  theory,  in  the  use 
made  of  it  by  evolution,  that  no  help  can  be  brought 
to  the  nebula  from  without.  It  is  a  self-contained 
system,  and  all  its  energy  is  contained  within  itself, 
and  its  quantity  of  energy  cannot  be  increased  or 
diminished.  Unless,  however,  we  postulate  action  of 
a  force  beyond  the  system,  it  is  difficult  to  see  how 
there  should  be  any  rings  cast  off  from  the  whirling 
mass.  As  the  mass  contracts  the  gravitation  in- 
creases, and  at  the  same  time  the  rate  of  rotation 
grows  more  rapid.  The  possibility  of  forming  a  ring, 
or  of  detaching  it  from  the  main  body,  depends  on 
the  relation  between  the  centripetal  and  centrifugal 
forces.  The  application  of  the  theory  to  the  present 
solar  system  depends  on  the  ability  of  the  theory  to 
demonstrate  that  at  the  various  orbits  of  the  planets 
the  centrifugal  forces  increased  by  precisely  so  much 
as  to  necessitate  the  breaking  off  of  just  such  masses 
and  no  more  as  make  up  the  various  planets  from 
Neptune  to  Mercuiy.     Again,  the  theory  would  seem 


EVOLUTION  AND   LAW  23 

to  lequire  that  the  orbits  of  the  planets  would  bear 
some  relation  to  the  orbit  traced  by  the  equator  of  the 
cei^tral  body  where  each  particular  planet  has  broken 
off.  But  there  is  really  no  relation  between  the  two. 
The  nebular  hyj^othesis  has  as  yet  afforded  no 
explanation  of  the  distribution  of  matter  tlii'oughout 
the  solar  system,  nor  of  the  size  of  the  planets,  nor  of 
their  relative  density ;  as  a  mechanical  explanation  it 
has  so  far  failed,  and  if  we  are  to  have  an  explanation 
of  the  solar  system,  we  shall  need  something  more 
than  can  be  given  us  by  the  primitive  nebulosity. 
'•  A  mighty  nebula  slowly  rotating  and  slowly  con- 
tracting" does  not  exj^lain  much.  It  will  not  explain, 
for  instance,  the  number  of  chemical  elements  in  the 
earth.  Take,  for  example,  what  we  know  of  the 
constitution  of  the  nebula  in  Orion.  "  We  see  that 
it  consists  in  part  of  stars,  making  up  perhaps  in 
number  for  their  deficiency  in  size.  These  stars  are 
bathed  in  and  surrounded  by  a  stupendous  mass  of 
glowing  gas,  partly  consisting  of  that  gas  which 
enters  so  largely  into  the  composition  of  our  ocean, 
namely,  hydrogen.  The  wide  distribution  of  this 
substance,  the  lightest  of  all  the  known  elements,  is 
one  of  the  most  striking  facts  in  the  material  con- 
stitution of  the  universe."  {Story  of  the  Heavens, 
p.  462.)  May  not  the  reason  why  hydrogen  is  so 
conspicuous  in  the  spectrum  of  the  nebula  in  Orion 
simply  be  because  it  is  the  lightest  of  all  the  known 
elements,  and  is  thus  farthest  removed  from  the 
centre  of  attraction'^  Might  we  not  expect^  then, 
that  the  farthest  distant  of  the  planets  would  also  be 
the  lightest?     But  the  density  cf  Saturn  is  less  than 


24        CHRISTIANITY  AND   EVOLUTION 

the  density  of  Uranus,  and  the  density  of  Yeniis  is 
less  than  that  of  the  Earth.     Be  that  as  it  may,  our  I 
present  contention  is,  that  the  nebular  hypothesis  is  I 
not  of  a  kind  to  bear  the  weight  laid  on  it  by  the) 
theory  of  universal  evolution. 

The  nebular  hypothesis  is  a  very  fascinating  one, 
and  we  need  not  be  surprised  that  in  the  hands  of 
Mr.  Fiske,  for  example,  it  is  made  to  do  large  service 
to  his  cosmic  philosophy.  Nor  are  we  concerned  to  deny 
whatsoever  truth  may  be  in  it.  We  know  that  there 
are  nebulae  in  the  universe,  and  that,  for  example,  the 
great  nebula  in  Andromeda  "  is  in  a  state  of  extensive 
and  majestic  whirl " ;  we  may  also  have  some  conception 
of  the  relative  distribution  of  stars  and  nebulae  :  but  as 
for  a  theory  of  the  life -history  of  a  star  or  of  a  system 
of  stars,  science  at  present  has  none.  Our  astronomy 
is  so  advanced  just  because  we  know  so  little  about  the 
planets  or  the  stars.  That  is  to  say,  we  have  had  to 
do  with  planets  in  the  mass,  and  have  dealt  only  with 
their  masses,  orbits,  rotation,  and  other  matters  of 
the  same  sort.  But  such  mechanical  knowledge  is 
altogether  insufficient  for  the  purpose  for  which  it  is 
sometimes  used.  That  purpose  is  mainly  to  show  that 
the  mechanism  of  the  heavens  is  self-explanatory. 
The  solar  system  is  so  far  self-explanatory,  if  we  are 
allowed  to  postulate  the  stability  of  the  system  as  an 
end  in  view,  and  the  various  positions,  sizes,  and 
relations  of  the  planets  as  subservient  to  that  end. 
Apart  from  that  end  the  various  adjustments  are 
unintelligible  and  incalculable. 

I      The   nebular   theory    does   not    explain    even    the 
mechanics  of  the  system,  far  less  does  it  explain  the 


EVOLUTION   AND   LAW  25 

life-hifetory  of  it.  By  its  vague  and  general  terms,  | 
and  its  wide  and  grand  sweep,  it  has  seemed  to 
accomplish  much,  and  it  falls  in  so  well  with  the 
general  tendency,  that  we  are  not  surprised  to  find  it 
bulk  so  largely  in  current  literature.  It  advances 
from  the  simple  to  the  complex  in  so  charming  a  way, 
it  seems  to  assume  so  little  and  accomplish  so  much, 
that  people  are  quite  delighted  with  it.  But  when  the 
theory  is  adjusted  to  the  facts,  its  simplicity  is  gone, 
and  what  it  has  accomplished  is  not  so  great  after  all. 
Thus,  with  regard  to  the  nebular  theory,  we  are  brought 
back  to  a  position  similar  to  that  which  confronted  us 
before.  The  unity  we  have  to  start  with  is  not  simple, 
but  complex.  It  is  again  a  unity  of  related  elements, 
and  thus  a  unity  which  is  not  merely  material ;  it  is 
also  rational.  It  is  not  as  if  we  could  get  a  simplicity 
to  which  we  may  add  complexities,  or  out  of  which 
we  could  evolve  complexities,  but  something  different. 
If  we  have  a  naked  simplicity,  it  will  not  work.  But 
the  primitive  nebulosity  has  many  elements  in  it.  It 
has  at  least  matter  in  a  certain  state  ;  what  that  state 
is  we  cannot  well  say.  It  has  a  certain  rotation,  slow 
it  may  be,  but  with  a  certain  momentum,  which  must 
be  equal  to  the  sum  of  all  the  separate  momenta  exist- 
ing in  the  solar  system  at  the  present  hour.  It  has 
a  certain  bent  and  direction,  and  the  union  of  these 
elements  and  tendencies  has  to  be  accounted  for. 
As  with  the  elements  of  matter,  so  with  the  solar 
system,  the  unity  we  have  to  start  with  is  an  ideal, 
a  rational  unity,  and  the  mere  mechanics  of  the 
system  gives  no  rational  explanation  of  the  system. 
The  interest  we  have  in  the  primitive  nebulosity  is 


26        CHRISTIANITY  AND   EVOLUTION 

simply  a  scientific  one.  For  the  purpose  of  our  argu- 
ment it  would  make  no  difference  if  the  theory  were 
as  complete  as  the  theory  of  the  tides.  Every  one 
knows,  more  or  less,  what  has  been  done  by  Professor 
G.  H.  Darwin  with  regard  to  the  theory  of  the  tides. 
It  is  not  our  purpose  to  describe  his  theory  of  tidal 
evolution,  nor  to  sketch  the  history  of  investigation 
with  regard  to  the  tides  from  the  time  of  Newton 
onwards.  It  is  a  fascinating  story  ;  but  the  point  in 
view  at  present  is  this,  that  when  you  have  completed 
the  mechanical  theory  of  anything  the  explanation! 
is  not  ultimate.  We  are  not  of  those  who  are  con- 
stantly looking  about  for  imperfections  in  a  mechani- 
cal or  other  theory  in  order  to  find  a  chink  through 
which  the  theistic  argument  may  enter.  Such  a 
process  would  be  a  hopeless  task.  If  that  were  our 
position,  the  argument  for  theism  would  soon  be  a 
fugitive  and  vagabond  on  the  face  of  the  earth  ;  each 
advance  of  science,  each  discovery  of  law  w^ould  simply 
drive  the  theistic  argument  to  seek  a  new  refuge.  On 
{  the  contrary,  our  position  is  that  each  new  discovery  is 
I  a  fresh  testimony  to  theism,  and  each  new  law  found 
I  in  phenomena  is  only  a  fresh  argument  for  God, — f oi* 
fv^  intelligence  as  the  source  of  order  and  the  only  ground 
\  of  law\  Our  argument  so  far  has  been  to  the  effect 
that  the  simplicity  assumed  by  evolutionists  as  the 
starting-point  of  evolution  will  not  work.  What  is 
required,  even  on  their  own  theory,  is  the  .^-implicity 
of  many  elements  in  a  related  whole,  and  such  a 
unity  is  rational. 

It  is  to  be  remembered  also  that  the  task  of  evolu- 
tion is  to  deal  with  the  process  of  evolution  as  a  real 


EVOLUTION   AND   LAW  27 

process,  to  describe  real  changes  which  take  place,  or 
have  taken  place,  or  will  take  place  in  a  real  world. 
There  are  some  sciences  in  which  no  error  need  be 
introduced  by  our  beginning  with  abstractions.  It 
does  no  harm  in  geometry  to  assume  points  which 
have  position  and  not  magnitude,  lines  which  have 
length  and  no  breadth,  and  other  abstractions  which 
have  no  place  in  a  concrete  world  ;  for  in  applying 
our  mathematical  deductions  to  a  real  world  we  make 
allowances  and  supply  the  additional  concrete  condi- 
tions which  our  abstractions  formerly  neglected.  Nor 
does  it  entail  any  serious  consequences  when  in 
mechanics  we  assume  a  perfectly  rigid  body,  a  perfectly 
rigid  lever,  a  perfect  gas,  or  any  other  assumption  of 
the  same  kind  ;  for  we  know  all  the  time  that  there 
are  no  such  bodies  to  be  found.  If  we  were  compelled 
to  take  account  of  every  movement  of  a  crowbar,  no 
calculus  at  our  command  is  sufficient  for  the  purpose. 
We  recognise  that  our  physical  and  dynamical  theories  ' 
are  only  of  limited  application,  and  we  do  not  try  to 
deduce  the  phenomena  of  a  real  world  from  them. 
We  recognise  that,  though  the  orbits  of  the  planets  ap- 
proximate to  an  ellipse,  there  are  many  perturbations. 
For  the  sake  of  simplicity  in  our  mathematical  and 
mechanical  science  we  neglect  many  elements,  but 
when  we  apply  our  science  to  actual  concrete  condi- 
tions we  have  to  bring  back  the  elements  we  formerly 
neglected.  In  physics  we  neglect  chemical  conditions, 
and  in  chemistry  we  neglect  vital  conditions  ;  but  no 
problem  is  merely  physical  or  mathematical.  But 
for  a  complete  explanation  we  have  to  take  all  condi- 
tions into  account. 


28        CHRISTIANITY  AND   EVOLUTION 

But  this  method  is  one  which  the  evohitionist  may 
not  use.  He  has  a  larger  work  than  that  of  the 
physicist,  or  the  chemist,  or  the  physiologist,  or  that 
of  the  worker  in  any  special  department.  He  has 
undertaken  to  explain  everything,  and  to  show  how 
change  began,  and  how  change  went  on  from  stage 
to  stage,  necessarily  and  inevitably.  From  one  stage 
to  another  the  process  must  be  such  as  to  admit  of 
no  alternative.  Chance  must  be  eliminated,  and  the 
result  must  be  necessary.  It  will  not  do  to  use  the 
method  which  has  been  found  so  useful  in  mathematics 
and  physics.  For  we  do  not  try  to  deduce  the  pro- 
perties of  matter  from  mathematical  laws.  From  the 
law  of  gravitation  we  do  not  try  to  deduce  the  particu- 
lar states  of  the  matter  under  gravitation.  It  may  be 
solid,  liquid,  gaseous  ;  but  in  whatever  state  it  may  be, 
it  is  under  the  law  which  prescribes  that  the  attraction 
varies  directly  as  the  masses  and  inversely  as  the 
square  of  the  distance.  But  from  this  law  we  can  infer 
nothing  as  to  the  state  of  matter  in  any  place  or  at 
any  time.  It  is  different,  however,  with  evolution. 
It  can  neglect  nothing,  leave  nothing  out  of  account ; 
for  it  has  to  explain  everything.  Its  primitive  nebu- 
losity must  be  more  strictly  defined,  its  absolute 
homogeneity  must  have  some  other  attributes  in 
addition  to  that  absolute  sameness  if  changes  are  to 
flow  from  it.  As  described  by  the  leading  advocates 
of  evolution,  the  condition  of  things  from  which  they 
start  is  simply  an  abstraction,  to  be  compared  with  the 
points  of  geometry  and  the  rigid  bodies  of  mechanics. 
These  no  doubt  are  useful  things  in  their  way,  but 
their  usefulness  has  only  a  limited  scope. 


EVOLUTION  AND   LAW  29 

Similarly  the  pejs|stence  of  force  is  a  barren  notion 
until    it  is  transformed  into  the  particular  enerc^ies 
of  the  concrete  world  in  which  we  live.     The  difficulty 
is  to  make  the  transition,  and  certainly  Mr.  Herbert 
Spencer  has  not  made  it.     He  labours  as  in  the  very 
fire  to  bring  his  abstraction   into  relation   with  the 
concrete  world.    He  cannot  deduce  differences  without 
assuming  the  differences  he  seeks  to  deduce.     His  law 
of  the    "  InstabiHty   of   the    Homogenaotts"  is   self- 
contradictory ;    for    the   two  terms   of  the   so-called 
conception   will  not    unite.      If   the   homogeneous  is 
homogeneous  it  is  stable,  and  if  it  is  unstable  it  is 
not  homogeneous.      Also  when  we  read  his  chapter 
on  the  "  Multiplication  of  Effects,"  we  see  it  might  as 
well  have  the  name  of  the  multiplication  of  causes. 
''  When  a  uniform  aggregate  is  subject  to  a  uniform 
force  we  have  seen  that  its  constituents,  being  differ- 
ently conditioned,  are  differently  modified.    But  while 
we    have    contemplated    the   various    parts    of    the 
aggregate  as  thus  undergoing  unlike  changes,  we  have 
not    yet   contemplated   the    unlike    changes    simul- 
taneously produced  on  the  various  parts  of  the  incident 
force.     These  must   be  as  numerous  and  important 
as  the  others.      Action  and  reaction  being  equal  and 
opposite,  it  follows  that  in  differentiating  the  parts 
on  which  it  falls  in  unlike  ways  the  incidental  force 
must  itself  be  correspondingly  difierentiated.     Instead 
of  being  as  before  a  uniform  force,  it  must  thereafter 
be  a  multiform  force— a  group  of  dissimilar>rces." 
(First  Princijdes,  p.  431.) 

Mr.  Spencer  proceeds    to   illustrate  his  principle 
We  take  one  of  his  illustrations  :  ''  When  one  body 


30        CHRISTIANITY  ^AND   EVOLUTION 

is  struck    against    another,    that   which    we    usually 
regard  as  the  effect  is  a  change  of  position  or  motion 
in  one  or  both  bodies.     But  a  moment's  thought  shows 
that   this  is  a  very  incomplete  view  of  the  matter. 
Beside   the   visible   mechanical  result   sound  is   pro- 
duced ;  or,  to  speak  accurately,  a  vibration  in  one  or 
more  bodies,  and  in  the  surrounding  air.     Moreover, 
the  air  has  not  simply  been  made  to  vibrate,  but  has 
had  currents  raised  in  it  by  the  transit  of  the  bodies. 
Further,  if  there  is  not  that  great  structural  change 
which  we   call    fracture,    there   is  a   disarrangement 
of  the  particles  of  the  two  bodies  around  their  point 
of  collision;    amounting    in   some    cases  to  a  visible 
condensation.     Yet  more,  this  condensation  is  accom- 
panied  by   disengagement   of   heat.     In   some   cases 
a   spark — that    is,     light — results    from    the    incan- 
descence of   a  portion  struck  off;    and  consequently 
this   incandescence  is  associated  with  chemical  com- 
bination.     Thus    by    the    original    mechanical    force 
expended   in   the   collision,    at  least  five,    and   often 
more,  different  kinds  of  forces  have  been  produced  " 
(pp.   432,   433).     Out  of  one  original  uniform  force 
we  seem  to  get  a  multitude  of  effects,   and  the  law 
of  the  multiplication  of  effects  seems  established. 

Is  it  really  so  ?  Can  all  these  effects  be  considered 
as  the  result  of  one  cause  ?  It  is  Mr.  Spencer's 
manner  to  try  to  get  first  a  simplicity,  and  then  to 
get  a  complexity  out  of  it.  What  is  the  simplicity 
here  ?  He  has  first  assumed-  two  bodies  and  a 
collision  between  them.  Then  he  fixes  our  thought 
on  the  bare  collision,  and  will  allow  us  to  think  of 
nothinsr  else.     But  the  collision  cannot  be  considered 


EVOLUTION  AND    LAW  31 

alone  in  such  a  case.  It  is  a  problem  of  two  bodies, 
not  of  a  single  uniform  force.  Then  he  assumes  the 
constitution  of  the  atmosphei-e ;  other  assumptions 
follow,  with  their  results.  The  changes  he  describes  ' 
are  not  and  cannot  be  truly  described  as  the  result  ' 
of  one  force.  They  are  the  resultant  of  many  forces, 
and  the  action  of  each  of  them  has  to  be  taken  into 
account  in  order  to  explain  the  resultant.  He  first 
makes  an  artificial  abstraction  of  the  force  expended 
in  the  collision,  and  then  tries  to  trace  out  its  effects. 
The  fact  is,  that  each  effect  described  is  simply  the 
combination  of  the  one  uniform  force  assumed,  and 
the  other  forces  he  has  left  out  of  sight. 

"  Universally,  then,  the  effect  is  more  complex  than  "^ 
the  cause."  Thus  he  states  his  conclusion — a  very 
useful  conclusion  for  his  purpose,  but  one  which  does*^ 
not  seem  to  have  a  logical  justification.  It  does  not 
seem  to  consist  with  the  law  of  causation.  An 
adequate  cause  is  one  which  can  completely  account 
for  the  effect.  One  of  the  gravest  charges  which 
Mr.  Spencer  brings  against  certain  thinkers  is  that 
they  have  not  a  due  regard  to  causation.  But  what 
of  himself  ?  If  the  effect  is  more  complex  than  the 
cause,  whence  has  the  complexity  come  ?  Can  we 
account  for  it  ?  Certainly  the  illustrations  drawn 
from  a  collision  and  from  a  lighted  candle  do  not 
justify  his  universal  law.  The  complexity  is  only 
apparent.  For  in  order  to  produce  the  complexity 
he  is  compelled  to  set  forth  the  collision  , as  taking 
place  in  a  complex  of  relations,  and  it  is  through 
these  relations  alone  that  the  complexity  is  made 
possible.      With  regard  to  the  lighted  candle,  he  is 


''I 


32        CHRISTIANITY  AND    EVOLUTION 

compelled  to  place  it  in  the  midst  of  various  surround- 
ings, and  the  process  of  burning  is  in  relation  with 
each    of   these.     Take   away   the   surroundings,   and 
the  changes  cannot  take  place.     But  surely,  in  any 
possible  view  of  a  cause,  we  must  take  into  account 
all  the  conditions  necessary  for  the  production  of  the 
effect.     If  we  take  these  into  account,  we  shall  be 
constrained   to   say  the  cause  is  as  complex  as  the 
1(  effect.     It  is   not  logical  first  to  place  the  cause  in 
'  isolated  abstraction,  and  to  set  the  effect  in  concrete 
relations,  and  on  the  basis  of  this  illogical  procedure 
gravely  to  set  forth  a  universal  law  to  the  effect  that 
universally  the  effect  is  more  complex  than  the  cause. 
It  is  well  to  call  attention  to  this  so-called  law,  for 
I'    it  meets  us  everywhere  in  the  course  of  the  argument 
for  evolution.     It  lies  at  the  basis  of  Mr.  Spencer's 
view  of  the  persistence  of  force.     It  gives  strength, 
the  only  strength  it  has,  to  the  curious  statements 
about    the    primitive    nebulosity   so    widely   current 
nowadays.     It  meets  us  in  chemistry ;    it  is  present 
/  in  biology  ;  it  is  current  in  the  application  of  evolution 
/    to  psychology,  ethics,  and  religion.     It  is  well  to  face 
.  it  frankly,  and  to  estimate  its  value.     For  it  seems  to 
me  to  be  an  attempt  to  get  something  out  of  nothing, 
and  in  essence  to  be  equivalent  to  the  crudest  notion 
of  creation  ever  present  in  the  minds  of  men.     The 
cause  of   evolution    must  be  at  least  as  complex  as 
the   result   which   has  emerged.       The  principles  of 
cosmical    multiplicity   must   lie   in   the   power   from 
which  all  things  have  proceeded. 


CHAPTER  III 

NATURE  AND  INTELLIGIBILITY 

Additional  factors— Transition  from  physics  to  chemistry — 
Chemical  elements — Their  character,  relations,  adapta- 
tions, periodicity — Rational  character  of  these  relations — 
Nature  is  intelligible,  and  therefore  related  to  intelligence 
—Attempts  at  explanation — The  chemical  elements  exist 
in  the  unity  of  one  system. 

THE  maxim  that  the  effect  is  more  complex  than  I 
the  cause  may  be  briefly  described  as  the  method  I 
of  Mr.  Spencer.  At  all  the  transition  stages  of  his' 
great  system  it  has  impelled  him  to  search  for  a  new- 
starting  period  of  suflicient  simplicity  out  of  which  he 
can  evolve  a  complex  effect.  When  he  begins  to  deal 
with  biology,  it  leads  him  to  accept  the  structureless 
homogeneous  cell  as  the  beginning  of  organic  life, 
and  out  of  it  he  obtains  all  the  complexities  of 
animated  being.  The  unit  of  consciousness  consists 
or  begins  with  a  sudden  nerve  shock.  ''Mind  is 
certainly  in  some  cases,  and  probably  in  all,  re- 
solvable into  nervous  shocks  "  {Psychology,  i.,  sect.  62) ;  ^ 
and  out  of  a  simple  nerve  shock  he  tries  to  build  up 
mind.  The  primal  simplicity  of  the  phenomena  of 
religion  he  finds  in  ancestor  worship.  He  has  a  way, 
too,  of  manufacturing  intuitions  as  he  needs  them. 
We  come  to  expect,  as  we  turn  from  one  of  his  treatises 

33  3 


34        CHRISTIANITY  AND    EVOLUTION 

to  another,  that  at  the  opeiimg  of  each  we  shall  find  a 
simple  cause  and  a  number  of  complex  effects.  We  an- 
ticipate what  is  coming.  The  only  surprise  that  awaits 
us  is  the  precise  kind  of  simplicity  which  Mr.  Spencer 
will  postulate.  Some  kind  he  is  sure  to  have,  but 
whether  it  is  an  available  kind  is  another  question. 

We  may  have  to  look  at  some  of  those  simplicities 
of  his  further  on.  Meanwhile  let  us  try  his  method 
at  an  early  stage.  How  does  his  homogeneous  stand 
related  to  the  chemical  elements?  We  learn  from 
Clerk  Maxwell  that  these  chemical  elements  are 
indestructible,  and  cannot  be  made  to  decay.  They 
are  as  they  were.  We  can  call  them  all  by  the  name 
of  matter,  because  they  have  properties  in  common ; 
but  each  one  of  them  has  its  own  peculiarities,  and 
also  its  peculiar  relation  to  all  the  others.  Dealing 
with  the  classification  of  the  sciences,  Mr.  Spencer 
speaks  thus  :  "  Theoretically  all  the  concrete  sciences 
are  adjoining  tracts  of  one  science,  which  has  for  its 
subject-matter  the  continuous  transformation  which 
the  universe  undergoes.  Practically,  however,  they 
are  distinguishable  as  successively  more  specialised 
parts  of  the  total  science — parts  further  specialised  by 
the  introduction  of  additional  factors  "  {Psychology^ 
vol.  i.,  p.  137).  "  The  new  factor  which  difTerentiates 
chemistry  from  molecular  physics  is  the  heterogeneity 
of  the  molecules  with  whose  redistributions  it  deals  " 
(p.  140).  The  description  may  be  accepted  as  so  far 
true  as  regards  the  distinctions  between  these  two 
sciences.  But  does  Mr.  Spencer  also  make  a  dis- 
tinction in  nature  corresponding  to  the  distinction 
between  physics  and  chemistry  ?     "  Physics,"  he  tells 


NATURE   AND   INTELLIGIBILITY        35 

US  truly,  "  deals  with  changes  in  the  distribution  of 
matter  and  motion  considered  apart  from  unlikeness 
of  quality  in  the  matter."  But  this  may  be  inter- 
preted in  two  ways.  It  may  mean  that  we  neglect 
or  do  not  take  into  account  any  unlikeness  of  quality 
in  the  matter,  while  all  the  time  we  know  that  the 
unlikeness  is  there.  It  may  also  mean  that  we  deny 
any  unlikeness  of  quality,  and  proceed  as  if  it  were 
altogether  uniform.  We  have  not  been  able  to  gather 
from  Mr.  Spencer's  writings  which  of  these  is  meant 
by  him.  Sometimes  he  seems  to  mean  tlie  one,  some- 
times the  other.  From  his  doctrine  of  homogeneity 
he  seems  to  postulate  a  matter  without  any  unlike- 
ness of  quality,  in  which  unlikeness  would  by-and-by 
appear.  That  is,  however,  an  assumption  Avhich 
has  not  yet  been  proved,  which  chemists  say  has 
been  disproved.  "  We  might  perhaps  be  inclined  to 
conceive  a  chemical  process  in  the  following  manner  : 
substances  consist  of  indifferent  matter,  which  during 
any  chemical  process  simply  becomes  invested  with 
different  properties  from  those  which  it  originally 
possessed,  without,  however,  itself  undergoing  any 
real  alteration.  This  conception  was,  as  a  matter  of 
fact,  for  a  long  time  prevalent ;  but  the  following  laws 
empirically  discovered  are  in  discordance  with  it :  if 
one  substance  is  transformed  into  another,  then  the 
masses  of  these  two  substances  always  bear  a  fixed 
ratio  to  each  other ;  such  a  transformation  of  one 
substance  into  another  of  different  mass  can  only 
take  place  according  to  the  first  law  when  a  second 
substance  participates  in  the  reaction.  The  following 
law,  therefore,  is  in  intimate  connection  with  that 


36       CHRISTIANITY  AND   EVOLUTION 

given  above  :  if  several  substances  react  together, 
then  these  masses,  as  well  as  those  of  the  new,  bodies 
formed,  always  bear  fixed  proportions  to  each  other." 
{Outlines  of  General  Chemistry,  by  Wilhelm  Ostwald, 
English  translation,  p.  4.)  Physics  knows,  however, 
that  it  has  to  deal  with  elements  of  unlike  qualities, 
though  it  lays  stress  mainly  on  qualities  which  they 
have  in  common.  It  knows  that  within  limits  all 
gases  obey  Boyle's  law,  and  curves  have  been  con- 
structed showing  the  paths  of  deviation  from  that 
law  taken  by  each  particular  gas.  It  recognises 
also,  according  to  Avogadro's  law,  that  "in  equal 
volumes  of  different  gases  there  is  under  the  same 
conditions  the  same  number  of  molecules."  It 
recognises  also  different  substances,  and  endeavours 
to  register  the  different  temperatures  at  which  each 
particular  body  passes  from  the  gaseous  into  the 
liquid  state.  But  on  the  whole,  and  generally, 
physics  abstracts  from  the  particular  unlikenesses 
of  quality  between  the  different  bodies,  and  leaves 
that  to  be  dealt  with  by  its  own  particular  science. 
But  the  distinction  between  the  sciences  is  simply 
a  matter  of  convenience.  It  does  not  represent  a 
division  in  the  nature  of  things. 

The  new  factor  in  chemistry  is  simply  that  factor 
which  physics  found  it  convenient  to  neglect;  but 
each  atom  of  matter  dealt  with  in  physics  had  also  its 
chemical  characters  and  relations.  We  find,  indeed, 
that  Mr.  Spencer  did  make  an  attempt  to  deal  with 
the  question  from  this  point  of  view.  In  the  first 
edition  of  the  First  Frinciples  there  was  a  chapter  on 
"  The  Conditions  Essential  to  Evolution,"  which  docKS 


NATURE  AND   INTELLIGIBILITY        37 

not  appear  in  the  subsequent  editions  of  the  work. 
In  it  he  said :  "If  it  be  assumed  that  what  we  call 
chemical  elements  are  absolutely  simple  (which  is, 
however,  a  hypothesis  having  no  better  warrant  than 
the  opposite  one),  then  it  must  be  admitted  that  in 
respect  of  the  number  of  kinds  of  matter  contained  in 
it  the  earth  is  not  more  heterogeneous  than  it  was  at 
first — that  in  this  respect  it  would  be  as  heterogeneous 
were  all  its  undecomposable  parts  uniformly  mixed, 
as  it  is  now,  when  they  are  arranged  and  combined 
in  countless  different  ways.  But  the  increase  of 
heterogeneity  with  which  we  have  to  deal,  and  of 
which  alone  our  own  senses  can  take  cognisance,  is 
that  produced  from  unity  of  distribution  to  variety 
of  distribution.  Given  an  aggregate  consisting  of 
several  orders  of  primitive  units  that  were  unchange- 
able, then  these  units  may  be  so  uniformly  dispersed 
among  each  other  that  any  portion  of  the  mass  shall 
be  like  any  other  portion  in  its  sensible  properties  ; 
or  they  may  be  so  segregated,  simply  and  in  endless 
combinations,  that  the  various  portions  of  the  mass 
shall  not  be  like  each  other  in  their  sensitive  proper- 
ties." (First  edition,  pp.  335,  336.)  We  do  not  mean  to 
dwell  on  this  statement.  We  quote  it  merely  for  its 
historic  interest,  and  for  the  proof  it  gives  that  Mr. 
Spencer  had  once  present  to  his  mind  the  problem  of 
the  existence  of  a  homogeneity  made  up  of  a  number 
of  different  kinds  of  units.  Whether  he  has  found 
it  would  not  work  we  cannot  say ;  but  we  ought  to 
take  his  final  statement  as  in  his  view  the  only  adequate 
one,  and  to  deal  with  it. 

We  shall  therefore  not  deal  with  that  discarded 


38       CHRISTIANITY  AND   EVOLUTION 

chapter,   thoiigli    the    difficulty  remains.       We   shall 
look  at  the  chemical  aspects  of  the  case,  and  see  what 
a  wondrous  world  chemistry  opens  to  our  view — what 
a  rational  world  of  order,  adjustments,  adaptations  it 
is.     "There   are   difterent   elements,"    says  Faraday, 
"with   the    most    manifold    powers   and    the    most 
opposite  tendencies.     Some  are  so  lazy  and  inert  that 
a  superficial  observer  would  take  them  for  nothing  in 
the  grand  resultant  of  powers;  and  others,  on  the 
contrary,  possess   such   violent  properties   that  they 
seem  to  threaten  the  stability  of  the  universe.     But  on 
a  deeper  examination  of  the  rule  which  they  play,  one 
finds  that  they  agree  with  one  another  in   a  great 
'    scheme  of  harmonic  adaptation.     The  power  of    no 
single   element   could    be    changed    without  at    once 
'^"  (I&troymg'the  liarmonious  balance,  and  plunging  the 
whole  into  ruin."     (Quoted  by  Professor  Bowne,  in 
The   Philosojylty   of  Herbert   Sj^encer,   pp.    225,    22r3. 
Phillips  &  Hunt :  New  York.)     There  are  two  possible 
ways   of   dealing   with    this   scheme   of    harmonious 
adaptation.     We  may  accept  it   as  a  fact,  and  deal 
with  it  as  ultimate ;  or  we  may  ask  for  an  explanation 
of  it.     In  the  former  event  we  may  proceed  to  deal 
with  the   various   elements,    seek  to  ascertain   their 
properties,  and  their  relations  to  one  another  and  to 
the  whole,  and  ask  no  ultimate  questions  about  them. 
This  is  precisely  what  the  science  of  chemistry  has 
done,  and  is  doing.     Tt  takes  the  different  elements, 
and  it  finds  that  they  resist  further  decomposition. 
It   enumerates   these   elements.     It  has  found  that 
the   total   mass   of    the   substances   taking   part   in 
any  chemical  process  remains  constant,  and  that  the 


NATURE  AiVD   INTELLIGIBILITY        39 

substances  consist  of  very  small  particles  of  difierent 
kinds,  which  alter  their  arrangement  and  not  their 
nature  during  any  chemical    process.     It  is  driven 
to  assume  that  the  atoms  of    every  pure    substance 
are  all  alike  among  themselves.     If  every   atom  of 
any  given  substance  is  like  every  other  atom,  then  all 
the  relations  of  mass  in  chemical  compounds  must  be 
regulated  by  the  masses  of  the  several  atoms.     "  All 
substances  consist   of   discrete  particles  of  finite  but 
very  small  size — of  atoms.    Undecomposable  substances 
or  elements  contain  atoms  of  the  same  nature,  form, 
mass.     If  chemical  combination  takes  place  between 
several  elements,  the  atoms  of  these  so  arrange  them- 
selves that  a  definite  and   usually  small  number  of 
atoms  of  the  combining  element  form  a  compound 
atom  which  we  call  a  molecule.     Every  molecule  of  a 
definite  chemical  compound  (chemical  species)  contains 
the  same  number  of  elementary  atoms  arranged  in  the 
!<ame  way.     If  the  same  elements  can  unite  to  form 
different  compounds,  the  elementary  atoms  composing 
the  molecules  of  the  latter  are  either  present  in  different 
numbers,  or,  if  their  number  be  the  same,  they  are 
diff'erently  arranged."     (Ostwald,  pp.  7,  8.) 

Thus  we  have  to  deal  not  with  the  permutations 
and  combinations  of  sixty-seven  (the  number  of 
elements  known  at  present)  diff'erent  bodies  taken  in 
any  order,  but  with  something  far  more  wonderful 
and  far  more  complex.  The  various  elements  insist 
on  conditions  in  choosing  partners.  With  some  they 
refuse  to  combine  at  all,  and  they  will  never  unite  (y 
witli  any  except  on  certain  terms,  and  these  conditions 
are  fixed  and  unchangeable. 


40       CHRISTIANITY  AND   EVOLUTION 

There  is  nothing  arbitrary  either  in  the  elements 
or  in  the  conditions  under  which  they  act.  The 
proportions  in  which  elements  unite  together  are 
definite  and  constant,  and  a  given  compound  always 
consists  of  the  same  elements  united  in  the  same 
proportions.  If  the  elements  combine  together  in 
several  proportions,  the  several  proportions  in  which 
the  one  element  unites  with  the  other  invariably  bear 
a  simple  relation  to  one  smother.  This  is  the  law  of 
combination  in  multiple  proportions.  The  proportions 
in  w^hich  two  elements  combine  with  a  third  also 
represent  the  proportion  in  which,  or  in  some  simple 
multiple  of  which,  they  will  themselves  combine.  This 
is  the  law  of  reciprocal  proportion. 

These  three  laws,  which  have  been  deduced  entiiely 
from  experimental  observations,  may  be  considered 
as  themselves  the  consequences  of  the  atomic  theory. 
Assume  the  atomic  theory,  and  these  laws  can  be 
explained.  It  is  not  necessary  to  discuss  the  atomic 
theory  here,  or  even  to  describe  it  at  any  length. 
The  values  of  the  atomic  weights  are  determined  only 
relatively — that  is,  in  reference  to  the  atomic  weight 
of  one  of  the  elements  assumed  as  unity.  The 
relative  weights  of  many  of  the  atoms  have  thus  been 
determined,  and  the  result  reveals  a  scheme  of  great 
beauty  and  simplicity  ;  for  it  appears  that  the  pro- 
perties of  the  elements  are  periodic  functions  of  their 
atomic  weights.  "If  all  the  elements  are  arranged 
in  the  order  of  their  atomic  w^eights  in  a  series, 
their  properties  will  so  vary  from  member  to  member 
that  after  a  definite  number  of  elements  have  been 
passed  either    the   first  or   very  similar  will  recur " 


NATURE  AND   INTELLIGIBILITY        41 

(Ostwald,  p.  35).     In  virtue  of  this  law,  and  making 
use  of  the  regularities  disclosed  by  it,  MendelejefF  was 
able  to  predict  the  properties  of  unknown  elements 
from  those  of  their  neighbours  in  the  table  of  atomic 
weights  he  had  drawn  up.     "  He  gave  especially  a 
somewhat  detailed  description  of  scandium,  gallium, 
germanium,  and  their  components,  none  of  which  were 
known  at  the  time  he  wrote  his  memoir ;  and  to  him, 
as  well  as  to  science  in  genei'al,  has  been  accorded  the 
triumph  of  seeing  these  predictions  for  the  most  part 
fulfilled  on  the  subsequent  discovery  of  the  elements  " 
(p.  37), — a  work  to  be  compared  with  that  of  Leverrier 
and  Adams  in  their  discovery  of  the  unknown  planet. 
As  we  follow   the   guidance  of   the   chemists   the 
scheme   of  harmonic  adaptation  becomes  ever  more 
wonderful ;  but  we  have  taken  quite  enough  for  the 
problem  now  in  hand.     The  harmonious  adaptation 
is  there,  and  every  one  can  see  it  who  chooses  to  look. 
If  the  relation  of  equality  so  impressed  Clerk  Maxwell 
as  to  cause  him  to  give   utterance   to   the   remark 
already  quoted,  what  shall  we  say  of  the  relations 
now  disclosed  ?     Shall  we  just  accept  them  as  facts, 
work  out  their  results,  and  say  nothing  further  about 
them  ?     That  is  one  way,  and  a  very  useful  way  it 
is.     It  is  quite  a  competent  thing  for  a  chemist  to 
do.     He  may  legitimately  decline  to  be  troubled  with 
ultimate   questions   on  the   plea   that   he  has  quite 
enough  to  do.     It  is  not  a  legitimate  procedure  on 
the  part  of  the  evolutionist,  unless  he  means  to  give 
up  his  task  at  the  outset.     Here  is  the  problem  set  to 
him.     Here  are  sixty-seven  difierent  kinds  of  bodies, 
each  of  which  possesses  ceiiain   properties,  each  of 


42       CHRISTIANITY  AND  EVOLUTION 

which  is  distinct  from  the  rest,  and  yet  rehited  to 
them  in  certain  definite  ways :  how  are  we  to  account 
for  them  ?     They  are  simply  given.     We  cannot  make 
them  or  unmake.     If  they  were  ever  other  than  they 
now  are,  that  time  is  long  past.     They  were  there 
when  that  process  of  change  which  men  call  evolution 
began,  and  they  are  present  and  operative  in  every 
further  change :    what,  then,  are   we   to   say   about 
them  ?     They  exist  in  rational  relations,  they  form 
combinations  which  can  be  thought,  and  these  com- 
binations  increase   till   they   form    a    world.       Why 
should  they  always  unite  in  definite  proportions,  and 
these  proportions  exist  in  an  intelligible  form  ?     Shall 
we  say  they  are  so,  and  that  we  can  give  no  further 
account   of    the   matter?      That    is    an    intelligiblel 
position.     The  position,  however,  cannot,  we  repeat, 
be  taken  by  any  one  who  professes  to  give  a  rational! 
account  of   the  w^orld.     If  he  takes  these  elements | 
simply  as  given,  then  he  has  failed.     If  he  tries  to 
explain  them,  then  the  explanation  must  be  adequate. 
The  persistence  of  force,  the  instability  of  the  homo- 
geneous, will  not  account    for    the  elements  in   the 
scheme,  or  for  the  scheme  itself,  as  we  have  already 
seen.     "  Abstract  notions,"  said  Bishop  Butler,  "  can 
do  nothing  " ;  and  the  persistence  of  force  is  simply  an 
abstract  notion  that  can  do  nothing  till  it  parts  with 
its    abstraction    and  gets  itself   translated  into   the 
concrete  energies  of  the  world  as  we  know  it.     How 
did  the  order,  the  intelligibility,  the  rationality  of  the 
scheme  get  into   the  atoms  ?      One  can  understand 
how  the  order,  the  intelligibility,  the  rationality  got 
into  the  works  on  chemistry  lying  now  on  the  table  ; 


NATURE   AND   INTELLIGIBILITY        43 

for  the  rationality  is  in  Ostwald,  in  Williamson,  in 
Armstrong  first,  and  in  the  books  next ;  but  the 
order,  the  rationality,  the  intelligibility  of  the  atoms 
and  the  system  they  serve  to  produce  are  vastly 
greater  than  those  of  the  systems  in  the  books.  Are 
we  to  say  that  the  order  of  the  univei-se  is  in  no 
May  related  to  intelligence  ?  That  is  a  large  order. 
Is  it  a  great  or  an  unjustifiable  assumption  to  make, 
that  intelligibihty  is  related  to  intelligence?  We 
know  that  the  relation  exists  in  our  own  case.  The 
intelligibility  of  the  world  is  related  to  the  intelligence 
which  understands  it.  The  intelligibility  of  a  book 
has  at  least  two  references — one  to  the  author  of  it, 
and  another  to  the  reader  of  it.  Shall  we  say  that 
the  intelligibility  of  the  world  has  only  one  reference,  ^ 
namely,  to  the  reader  of  it  ?  On  what  grounds  shall 
we  make  the  assertion  1  It  can  be  only  on  the  ground 
that  we  can  explain  the  intelligibility  apart  from 
intelligence. 

What  has  to  be  accounted  for  is  the  unity  of  all 
these  chemical  elements  in  one  system.  As  conceived 
by  science  it  is  a  rational  system.  We  shall  not 
attempt  to  measure  the  toil,  the  perseverance,  the 
intelligence  of  the  successive  generations  of  chemists 
who  have  slowly  built  up  the  magnificent  temple 
known  by  the  name  of  chemistry.  No  one  questions 
the  fact  that  intelligence  has  built  up  science ;  but 
it  is  to  be  observed  that  science  has  not  made  the 
facts,  nor  the  order,  nor  the  system :  it  has  simply 
interpreted  what  it  found.  The  order,  the  system, 
the  rationality  are  there,  in  the  facts  disclosed  to 
them  in  the  chemical  elements  and  their  relations. 


(A- 


44       CHRISTIANITY  AND   EVOLUTION 

They  did  not  make  the  facts,  they  found  them.  They 
assumed  the  rationality  of  nature,  and  they  found 
on  examination  that  it  was  there.  What  right  had. 
men  to  assume  the  rationality  of  nature  ?  Why 
should  they  have  presupposed  that  the  u'rational  was 
untrue,  that  the  absurd  was  impossible  1  and  why 
should    the    assumption    turn    out    to    be    correct  ? 

iThe  only  answer  is  that  nature  is  intelligible, 
because  intelligence  was  present  in  it  from  the 
beginning. 

This  form  of  the  argument  is  of  a  different  kind 
from  the  argument  from  final  causes.     Purpose  we 
shall  have   to   look   at  by-and-by.      But  at  present 
we  are  engaged  with  efiicient  causes,  with  the  facts 
of  order,  of  intelligibility,  of  interpretability  3  and  one 
proposition   is   that    order   implies    intelligence.     So 
strongly  is  this  felt  by  many  minds  at   the  present 
hour,  that   w^e  have  any  number  of   hypotheses   to 
I  account  for  it.     We  have  Professor  Clifford's  hypo- 
/  thesis  of  mind-stuff:    "a  moving  molecule  of  inor- 
/;  ganic  matter  possesses  a  small  piece  of  mind-stuff." 
/j  We   have    the  supposition   of   the   cell-soul,  of  un- 
?/   conscious   will,    of    unconscious   intelligence,   of    the 
y    double-faced   unity,   and   of   many   similar   ways   of 
bringing  in  intelligence  as  the  source  of  order.     The 
necessity  is  felt,  and  the  schemes  for  bringing  in  in- 
telligence in  some  form  at  some  stage  are  vouched  for 
by  the  various  hypotheses.     The  need  is  sufficiently 
apparent.     Not  to  speak,  at  this  stage,  of  the  fact 
t^at  intelligence  has  somehow  emerged,  we  content 
ourselves  with  the  need  of   accounting   for   the  in- 
telligibility of  the  chemical  system.     To  account  for 


NATURE  AND  INTELLIGIBILITY        45 

its  rational  order  apart  from  energising  reason  seems 
a  hopeless  task. 

We  might  here  avail  ourselves  of  the  help  of  Mr. 
Spencer  did  we  know  how  to  use  it.  We  might  use 
that  part  of  liis  philosophy  which  affirms  the  existence 
of  a  Powmi  which  is  manifested  in  the  universe,  which 
he  calls  ''  an  infinite  and  eternal  Energy  from  which 
all  things  proceed"  {Principles  of  Sociology,^.  843). 
He  tells  us  also  "  that  the  Power  manifested  through- 
out the  universe  distinguished  as  material  is  the  same 
power  which  in  ourselves  wells  up  under  the  form 
of  consciousness  "  (p.  839).  We  also  believe  in  that 
Power.  But  that  Power  appears  in  Mr.  Spencer's 
system  on  very  rare  occasions.  The  actual  changes 
in  the  universe,  which  he  calls  by  the  name  of  evolu- 
tion, are  in  the  hands  of  deputies.  The  formula  of 
evolution  reveals  as  much.  "  Evolution  is  an  integra-  / 
tion^of  matter  and  concomitant  dissipation  of  motion,' 
during  which  the  matter  passes  from  an  indefinite,  \ 
incoherent  homogeneity  to  a  definite,  coherent  hetero-  j 
geneity ;  and  during  which  the  retained  motion  under- ' 
goes  a  parallel  transformation "  {First  Princi2yles, 
p.  396).  It  may  be  that  matter  and  motion  are  them- 
selves only  symbolic,  as  Mr.  Spencer  says  they  are. 
But  the  fact  remains  that  they  are  the  only  symbols 
through  which  the  unknowable  Power  is  permitted  by 
Mr.  Spencer  to  act.  All  the  process  of  evolution  is 
worked  out  by  Mr.  Spencer  on  these  terms  and  by 
these  symbols.  It  is  limited  by  them,  and  can  use  no 
other.  Thus  we  can  get  no  help  from  Mr.  Spencer  for  / 
the  solution  of  our  limited  problem.  Granted  that  the 
unknowable  Power  is  the  source  of  that  complex  order 


46       CTiniSTIANITY  AND   EYOLUTION 

which  we  find  in  the  chemical  system,  yet  that  does 
not  carry  us  far ;  for  we  have  no  explanation  of  that 
integration  of  matter  which  we  have  observed  in  the 
chemical  elements.  They  do  not  belong  to  the  present 
constitution  of  things.  Nor  have  we  any  explanation 
of  the  fact  that  these  elements  exist  in  relations  which 
can  be  thought.  We  get  Power^from  Mr.  Spencer, 
but  we  get  it  simply  as  unknowable,  and  that  is  a 
form,  or  want  of  form,  which  we  cannot  use.  If, 
however,  Mr.  Spencer  postulates  a  Power  behind  the 
process  of  evolution,  if  he  can  affirm  the  existence  of 
an  infinite  and  eternal  Energy  from  which  all  things 
proceed,  there  is  no  reason  why  we  should  not  follow 
so  good  an  example.  We  also  have  a  right  to  assume 
a  Power  behind  or  within  the  chemical  elements, 
which  will  help  us  to  account  for  the  orderly  and 
complex  relations  in  which  they  exist.  We  already 
are  acquainted  with  a  power  of  that  kind.  We  know^ 
intelligence  as  the  source  of  order  ;  we  are  acquainted 
mth  the  way  in  which  a  principle  of  intelligence 
may  be  impressed  on  a  number  of  efficient  causes,  and 
may  cause  them  to  exist  as  an  intelligible  system. 
At  present  we  are  not  discussing  the  seat  of  the 
intelligence  impressed  on  a  material  system.  The 
intelligence  may  be  within  the  system,  or  it  may 
be  without  the  system  ;  it  may  be  immanent  or 
.  transcendent ;  the  discussion  is  quite  irrelevant  to 
/I  the  main  question,  which  is  intelligence  as  the  source 
vlof  order.  We  have  a  vera  causa  adequate  to  the 
production  of  the  result,  and  the  alternative  seems 
to  lie  between  this  explanation  and  no  explanation. 
But,  then,  the  system  of  chemistry  does  manifest 


NATURE   AND   INTELLIGIBILITY        47 

intelligence.  In  this  fact  lies  our  advantage,  and  wo 
mean  to  make  full  use  of  it,  and  to  press  it  home. 
We  have  adjustments,  adaptations,  relations,  which 
reveal  themselves  to  the  person  who  attends  to  them, 
and  these  are  not  merely  mechanical.  The  argument 
becomes  more  stringent  and  more  incisive  as  we  pass 
beyond  the  merely  chemical  world  into  the  wider 
world  which  it  subserves.  The  more  complex  the 
arrangements  become,  the  greater  does  the  demand 
for  intelligence  become.  One  step  beyond  the  atoms, 
and  we  come  to  the  phenomena  presented  by  water. 
It  is  but  a  step,  and  yet  what  a  step  !  Oxygen  and 
hydrogen  are  the  constituent  elements  of  water. 
They  combine  in  certain  proportions,  which  are  in- 
variable. The  molecule  of  water  is  relatively  stable, 
and  its  two  elements  can  be  separated  only  when 
work  is  done  on  them.  Yet  this  material  of  water 
evolved  at  one  step  has  many  of  the  most  wonderful 
properties — properties  which  fit  it  to  play  a  great 
part  in  the  economy  of  the  universe.  Take  its  point 
of  maximum  density,  and  observe  how  it  is  related 
to  the  part  Avhich  it  plays  in  the  world.  From  that 
point  4°  C.  it  expands  when  heated,  and  expands  also 
when  cooled.  It  takes  more  heat  to  warm  it  than 
any  other  body,  and  can  therefore  give  more  heat  out 
when  it  cools.  Archdeacon  Wilson  asks  what  would 
an  architect  give  for  a  heating  apparatus  which  would 
convey  heat  from  one  part  of  the  world  to  another, 
and  itself  remain  cool.  Yet  he  says  aqueous  vapour 
is  doing  it  every  day  of- our  lives.  But  all  these 
things  flow  from  the  properties  of  water !  That  is 
exactly  what  we  are   saying.     These   properties  are 


48       CHRISTIANITY  AND   EVOLUTION 

given,  with  all  their  results,  and  they  are  in  relation 
to  the  material  universe  in  which  they  are.  They, 
however,  raise  the  question  of  how  they  became  what 
they  are.  The  properties  of  oxygen  and  hydrogen 
are  unlike  the  properties  of  water.  They  have 
separately  properties  which  it  has  not,  and  it  has 
properties  which  they  have  not.  We  get  no  explana- 
tion out  of  the  physical  powers  by  which  water  had 
its  origin.  Even  when  we  have  traced  its  meaning, 
we  are  still  at  a  loss  for  the  explanation.  Is  it  not 
evident  that  here  again  we  must  have  recourse  to 
intelligence  as  the  source  of  order  1 

As  we  follow  our  teachers  in  science  from  one 
science  to  another,  and  watch  the  revelation  of  order 
more  and  more  involved  and  intricate,  yet  all,  in  the 
end,  embraced  in  the  unity  of  one  system,  we  are  lost 
in  admiration  and  in  awe.  The  rationality  of  the 
system  becomes  the  more  apparent  as  we  advance. 
The  wQild  is  a  ra^ionaLworld,  and  w^e  see  no  reason  on  I 
that  account  to  deny  rationality  to  jtheJPower  from\ 
which  all  things  proceed.  If  we  grant  intelligence  to 
that  power,  then  evolution  becomes  luminous ;  refuse 
to  grant  it,  and  we  must  simply  regard  the  order  as 
an  ultimate  fact,  and  say  no  more  about  it. 

But  it  may  be  said  that  here  we  are  postulating  a 
cause  less  complex  than  the  effect,  and  are,  in  short, 
acting  on  the  Spencerian  maxim  that  the  cause  is 
always  less  complex  than  the  effect.  It  is  not  so,  for 
intelligence  is  in  itself  not  simple,  but  complex ;  and 
besides,  the  objection  does  not  apply  to  intelligence, 
because  of  the  very  nature  and  work  of  it.  It  is  the 
very  nature  of  intelligence  to  bring  many  unrelated 


NATURE   AND   INTELLIGIBILITY         49 

elements  into  a  synthetic  unity.  Even  our  own 
intelligence  brings  all  the  objects  of  its  experience 
into  the  unity  of  one  space  and  one  time.  Intelli- 
gence can  bring  many  elements  into  the  unity  of 
one  system.  If  intelligence  of  the  limited  order  we 
know  in  ourselves  can  impress  itself  on  a  number  of 
unrelated  things,  and  make  them  exist  in  the  unity 
of  one  system,  what  may  not  an  infinite  intelligence 
be  able  to  accomplish  ! 


•  CHAPTER   IV 

THE  STRIFE  AGAINST  PURPOSE 

Ls  the  issue  raised  by  evolution  new  or  old  ?— Scope  of  evolu- 
tion— Is  evolution  self-explanatory  ? — Fiske  on  teleology, 
against  and  for :  order  and  purpose — Efficient  and  final 
causes — Caprice— Spinoza  on  final  causes— Mathematics 
— rurposiveness — The  same  facts  and  laws  appear  from 
the  point  of  view  of  cause  and  of  purpose — Chance  or 
purpose. 

WE  are  to  devote  this  chapter  to  the  inquiry 
whether  the  issue  raised  by  evolution  is  one 
which  is  new,  or  is  the  issue  one  which  has  been  tried 
over  and  over  again  during  the  history  of  human 
thought  ?  We  admit  at  once  that  the  theory  of  evolu- 
tion has  cast  new  light  on  the  universe,  and  has  made 
the  problem  at  once  more  complex  and  more  simple. 
We  have  to  reckon  with  evohition  in  every  depart- 
ment. Du  Prel  says  :  "In  the  progress  of  modern 
science  no  principle  has  proved  so  fruitful  as  that  of 
evolution.  All  branches  compete  with  one  another  in 
its  use,  and  have  brought  about  by  its  aid  the  most 
gratifying  results.  Qeology  interprets  the  significance 
of  superimposed,  hardened  strata  of  the  earth's  crust 
in  the  sense  of  a  history  of  the  earth's  development ; 
biology,  in  union  with  the  study  of  fossils,  arranges  the 
living  and  petrified  specimens  of  plants  and  animals  in 


THE   STRIFE   AGAINST  PURPOSE       51 

their  order,  and  constructs  a  history  of  the  evolution 
of  oi'ganic  Hfe  ;  philology  prepares  a  genealogical  tree 
of  languages,  ancTSncls  in  it  signs  which  throw  light 
on  prehistoric  times  and  reveal  facts  forgotten  for 
thousands  of  years;  anthropology  discovers  in  the 
form  and  expression  of  human  beings  rudimentary 
signs  that  point  to  a  theory  of  development  from 
lower  forms ;  and  finally  histoiy  re  veals  the  evolution 
of  civilisation  in  far-distant  historic  times ;  and  in  all 
these  branches  it  becomes  apparent  that  we  only  then 
understand  phenomena  when  we  have  comprehended 
their  becoming."  (Quoted  from  A  Review  of  Evolu- 
tioiucl  Ethics,  by  Charles  Williams,  pp.  274,  275.) 
The  description  is  not  exaggerated.  All  workers  in 
science  now  simply  assume  evolution,  on  the  hypothesis 
of  evolution  they  proceed,  by  the  questions  it  raises 
research  and  investigation  are  dii'ected,  and  by  the 
light  of  it  every  fresh  discovery  is  read.  Thus  by 
the  method  it  prescribes,  by  the  questions  it  asks,  and 
by  the  results  it  has  won,  evolution  holds  the  field. 

While  we  clearly  admit  all  this,  we  have  still 
something  to  say.  There  is  still  the  question  toU 
be  asked,  What  is  implied  in  evolution  ?  Is^  it  af 
sejf -explau; 1 1  o]  y  ])rocess  1  Is  it  a  process  which  can 
dispense  with  a  marshalling  and  directing  agency? 
Is  it  a  system  or  a  method  w^hich  can  get  on  without 
the  guidance  of  intelligence,  or  proceed  without  the 
assumption  of  purpose  ?  We  may  take  the  statement 
of  the  issue  from  Mr.  Fiske  :  "  From  the  dawn  of  philo- 
sophic discussion.  Pagan  and  Christian,  Trinitarian 
and  Deist  have  appealed  to  the  harmony_pervading 
nature  as  the  surest  foundation  of  their  faith  in  an 


52        CHRISTIANITY  AND    EVOLUTION 

intelligent  and  beneficent  Enler  of  the  universe. 
We  meet  with  the  argument  in  the  familiar  writings 
of  Xenophon  and  Cicero,  and  it  is  forcibly  and 
eloquently  maintained  by  Voltaire  as  well  as  by  Paley, 
by  Agassiz  as  well  as  by  the  authors  of  the  Bridge- 
toater  Tr-eatises.  One  and  all  they  challenge  us  to 
explain,  on  any  other  hypothesis  than  that  of  creative 
design,  these  manifold  harmonies,  these  exquisite 
adaptations  of  means  to  ends,  whereof  the  world 
is  admitted  to  be  full,  and  which  are  especially 
conspicuous  among  the  phenomena  of  life.  TJntil  the 
establishment  of  the  doctrine  of  evolution,  the  glove 
thus  thrown,  age  after  age,  into  the  arena  of  philosophic 
controversy,  was  never  triumphantly  taken  up.  It 
was  Mr.  Darwin  who  first,  by  his  discovery  of  natural 
selection,  supplied  the  champions  of  science  with  the 
resistless  weapon  by  which  to  vanquish,  in  this  their 
chief  stronghold,  the  champions  of  theology."  {Cosvilc 
Philoso2)hi/,  vol.  ii.,  pp.  396,  397.)  Mr.  Fiske  was 
enthusiastic  and  very  confident  when  he  wrote  those 
words.  About  twenty  years  ago  some  men  were 
enthusiastic  about  evolution.  They  felt  they  had 
found  the  key  to  make  every  mystery  plain,  to  solve 
every  problem,  and  they  spent  a  good  deal  of  time  in 
proving  how  triumphant  they  were.  Some  people  also 
were  in  a  panic.  They  felt  as  if  the  old,  old  con- 
troversy had  come  to  an  end,  that  they  were  left  to  a 
universe  in  which  there  was  no  shaping  intelligence, 
no  directing  agency,  nothing  akin  to  themselves  in 
the  vast  spaces  of  the  universe.  By-and-by  calmer 
counsels  prevailed.  Enthusiasms  wore  out,  and  panic 
died  away.     As  they  became  better  acquainted  with 


'i 


THE   STRIFE   AGAIXST  PURPOSE         53 

the  claim  and  scope  of  evolution,  they  came  to  see 
that  matters  were  very  much  as  of  old.  Professor 
Huxley  came  to  see  and  to  say  that  theology  had  not 
received  its  death-blow,  and  Mr.  Fiske  lived  to  write 
as  follows  :  "  The  teleological  instinct  in  man  cannot  | 
be  suppressed  or  ignored.  The  human  soul  shrinks 
from  the  thought  that  it  is  without  kith  or  kin  in  all 
this  wide  universe.  Our  reason  demands  that  there 
shall  be  a  reasonableness  in  the  constitution  of  things. 
This  demand  is  a  fact  in  our  psychical  nature  as 
positive  and  as  irrepressible  as  our  acceptance  of 
geometrical  axioms  and  our  rejection  of  whatever 
controverts  such  axioms.  No  ingenuity  of  argument 
can  bring  us  to  believe  that  the  infinite  Siistainer  of 
the  imiverse  will  put  us  to  permanent  intellectual  con 
fusion.  There  is  in  every  earnest  thinker  a  craving 
after  a  final  cause ;  and  this  craving  can  no  more 
be  extinguished  than  our  belief  in  objective  reality. 
Nothing  can  persuade  us  that  the  universe  is  a 
farrago  of_jionsense.  Our  belief  in  what  we  call  the 
evidence  of  our  senses  is  less  strong  than  our  faith  in 
the  orderly  sequence  of  events :  there  is  a  meaning 
which  our  minds  could  fathom  were  they  only  vast 
enough."     {The  Idea  of  God,  pp.  137,  138.) 

It  is  curious  to  look  back  for  twenty  years,  and 
to  read  the  literature  of  that  time  over  again.  The 
tone  of  triumph  is  as  marked  on  the  one  side  as 
the  note  of  depression  and  of  pain  is  on  the  other. 
To-day,  except  in  some  quarters,  the  triumph  and  the 
panic  have  both  subsided,  as  it  has  done  in  former 
instances  of  the  same  kind.  We  may  note  the  same 
kind   of   elation  and  depression   following   on  every 


54        CinUSTIAXITY  AXD    EVOLUTION 

.  great  discovery  in  science.  And  it  seemed  to  be 
founded  on  the  notion  that  wherever  the  presence  of 
law  was  discovered  there  was  also  proved  the  absence 
of  God.  Strange  to  say,  the  discovery  of  gravitation 
was  held  to  be  a  disproof  of  the  existence  of  God. 
Physicists  said  it,  and  theologians  feared  it.  In 
connection  with  physics,  in  connection  with  tho 
advance  of  chemistry,  with  geology,  and  with  the 
advance  of  almost  every  science,  there  has  been  a 
period  of  elation  and  of  depression.  So  with  evolu- 
tion, which,  if  true,  is  the  largest  advance  yet  made 
by  the  mind  of  man,  and  consequently  enthusiasm 
rose  to  a  great  height,  and  depression  fell  correspond- 
in  gl}^  low. 

/  The  issue  raised  is  really  the  old  issue  between  the 
/  atomists  of  Greece  and  those  who  postulated  mind 
as  a  true  cause.  It  is  the  issue  between  Lucretius 
on  the  one  hand,  and,  say,  Cicero  on  the  other.  It  is 
raised  also  in  its  most  classical  form  by  Spinoza ;  and 
it  could  not  but  be  raised  wherever  order,  regularity 
have  been  discovered.  The  difference  to-day  is  that 
the  issue  is  raised  with  more  knowledge  on  either 
side.  On  the  one  hand,  science  has  a  wider  know- 
ledge of  law,  a  more  accurate  understanding  of 
physical  causation,  a  more  rigid  adherence  to  the 
persuasion  that  there  is  nothing  in  the  universe  which 
is  not  under  law,  and  law  and  order  have  a  wilder 
meaning.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  theology  has  come 
to  understand  better  what  it  means  by  God.  It  has 
been  able  to  separate  from  the  idea  of  God  every- 
thing like  caprice,  arbitrariness,  whimsicality.  From 
its  idea  of   God   it   has   banished  those  elements  of 


THE   STBIFE   AGAINST  PUBPOSE         55 

uncertainty  which  di-ove  Lucretins  to  distraction  and 
tortured  the  higher  mind  of  Greece.  Both  sides  have 
come  to  see  that  Liw,  order,  i-egularity  are  indis- 
pensable ;  and  the  question  has  come  to  be,  What  is 
implied  in  the  thought  of  an  orderly  universe,  moving 
under  law  1  Can  order  explain  itself  ?  Can  a  system 
of  efficient  causes  account  for  itself  1 

It  surely  ought  not  to  be  difficult  to  come  to  an 
understanding.  Theologians  can  surely  say  with 
TY.^jfl^,ll  that  theology  as  well  as  "  science  demands  the  / 
radical  extirpation  of  caprice,  and  the  absolute  reliance 
upon  law  in  nature."  Theology  surely  has  no  interest 
in  the  maintenance  of  caprice.  She  is  conscious 
tliat  her  position  is  misrepresented  by  Leon  Dumont, 
if  he  means  to  say  that  her  view  is  that  which  he 
denounces.  "  If  the  existence  of  a  superior  intelli- 
gence can  be  demonstrated  by  physical  proofs,  it  is  not 
by  tlie  spectacle  of  order  and  regularity,  but  merely 
by  abnormal  and  contradictory  facts,  in  a  word,  by 
m.iracle."  Another  says  :  "  The  scientific  sense  of  the 
term  law  is  utterly  opposed  to  that  of  will.  Will  in  the 
only  intelligible  sense  of  which  we  have  any  knowledge, 
namely,  human  will,  is  vengeful,  arbitrary,  variable, 
capricious."  Theologians  have  an  interest  in  making 
our  scientific  men  know  that  by  will  they  do  not 
mean  caprice,  that  by  purpose  they  do  not  mean 
arbitrariness,  i  The  will  they  postulate  as  the  ultimate 
sourc^of  things  is  a  Avill  which  is  the  cause  of  order 
and  law  in  the  universe,  a  will  which  is  steadfast  and 
unchangeable,  conscious  of  itself  and  its  purpose, 
foreseeing  the  end,  and  taking  means  to  bring  it 
about.     When  we  speak  of  purpose,  we  do  not  mean 


56        CHRISTIANITY  AND   EVOLUTION 

intermeddling  with  things  for  the  sake  of  caprice. 
When  we  speak  of  purpose  in  the  universe,  w^e  just 
imply  that  the  universe  has  a  meaning,  that  the 
system  of  efficient  causes  is  in  the  grasp  of  a  final 
cause. 

The  controversy  which  we  have  with  such  men  as 
jVIr.  Spencer,  Mr.  Fiske  in  his  cosmic  philosophy,  is 
merely  that  they  have  an  inadequate  notion  of 
causation,  that  they  attribute  to  the  effect  more  than 
there  is  in  the  cause.  They  shut  us  out  from  any 
consideration  of  purpose,  and  compel  us  to  try  to 
deduce  all  things  from  the  system  of  efficient  causes, 
even  when  these  are  plainly  inadequate  for  the 
purpose.  Why  should  we  be  compelled  to  try  to 
understand  the  universe  by  a  process  which  shuts  out 
more  than  one  half  of  the  best  elements  of  our  think- 
ing ?  We  know  no  reason  save  the  dread  which  the 
scientific  man  has  of  caprice.  But  we  have  seen  that 
caprice  can  have  no  place  in  an  infinite,  eternal, 
and  unchangeable  Mind,  who  knows  itself  and  its 
purpose.  \  Why  should  we  be  forced  to  say  where  we 
see  a  system  of  causes  working  out  an  intelligible  end 
that  this  end  was  neither  foreseen  nor  jnte^nded  ?  \  But 
perhaps  we  ought  to  look  at  the  classical  exposition  of 
the  subject. 

(In  the  first  book  of  the  Ethics,  Spinoza  develops 
the  thesis  that  all  things  are  predetermined  by  God, 
not  through  His  free  will  or  absolute  fiat,  but  from 
the  very  nature  of  God  as  infinite  power.  Having 
determined  that  all  possible  things  are  real,  and  all 
real  things  are  necessary,  in  the  appendix  he  makes 
a  strenuous  attack  on  the  teleological  exposition  of  the 


THE  STRIFE  AGAINST  PURPOSE        57 

world:  that  God  directs  all  things  to  a  definite  goal. 
"For  it  is  said  that  God  made  all  things  for  man,  and 
man  that  he  might  worship  Him."  He  sets  himself 
first  to  show  how  this  view  obtains  general  credence, 
and,  second,  he  points  out  its  falsity.  Men  are 
conscious  of  their  desires  and  volitions,  and  uncon- 
scious of  the  causes  which  disposed  them  to  wish  and 
desire.  Men  do  all  things  for  an  end,  and  therefore 
they  only  look  for  a  knowledge  of  the  final  causes  of 
events ;  and  when  these  are  learned  they  are  content, 
as  having  no  cause  for  further  doubt.  "  Further,  as 
they  find  in  themselves  and  outside  themselves  many 
means  which  assist  them  not  a  little  in  their  search 
for  what  is  useful — for  instance,  eyes  for  seeing,  teeth 
for  chewing,  herbs  and  animals  for  yielding  food,  the 
sun  for  giving  light,  the  sea  for  breeding  fish,  etc. — 
they  come  to  look  on  the  whole  of  nature  as  a  means 
for  obtaining  such  conveniences.  Now,  as  they  are 
aware  that  they  found  such  conveniences  and  did  not 
make  them,  they  think  they  have  cause  for  believing 
that  some  other  being  has  made  them  for  their  use. 
As  they  look  upon  things  as  means,  they  cannot  believe 
them  to  be  self-created ;  and  judging  from  the  means 
they  are  accustomed  to  prepare  for  themselves,  they 
are  bound  to  believe  in  some  ruler  of  the  universe 
endowed  with  human  freedom,  who  has  arranged  and 
adapted  them  for  human  use."  (Elwes'  translation, 
vol.  ii.,  p.  76.)  Spinoza  thinks  that  nature  has  no 
particular  goal  in  view,  and  that  final  causes  are 
human  figments.  There  is  another  standard  of  verity, 
and  that  is  the  standard  set  up  by  mathematics, 
which  considers  solely  the  essence  and  properties  of 


58        CHPJSTIANITY  AXD   EYOLUTTOX 

fisiires  without  resfard  to  their  final  causes.  When 
the  notion  of  final  cause  is  dismissed,  along  with  it 
go  all  those  conceptions  which  presuppose  the  idea  of 
purpose,  such  as  goodness,  badness,  order,  confusion, 
warmth,  cold,  beauty,  and  deformity.  These  are  rooted 
in  the  fortuitous  interests  and  the  varying  tastes  of 
the  individual,  and  are  mere  abstract  notions  framed 
for  the  explanation  of  the  nature  of  things. 

These  are  some  of  the  maxims  by  which  Spinoza 
sought  to  destroy  the  idea  of  purpose.  Not  since 
Lucretius  had  such  an  assault  been  made  on  teleology. 
The  influence  of  Spinoza's  assault  can  be  traced,  and 
it  lias  been  operative  from  his  day  to  ours.  At  the 
same  time,  it  may  be  questioned  whether  Spinoza  has 
put  the  case  fairly,  or  rightly  set  forth  the  distinction 
between  mathematical  and  other  knowledge.  He 
admits  that  men  ''come  to  look  on  the  whole  of 
nature  as  a  means  for  obtaining  such  conveniences," 
and  men  "found  these  conveniences  and  did  not 
make  them";  in  other  words,  there  was  some  objective 
justification  for  their  taking  that  view.  At  present 
we  are  not  concerned  with  the  adequacy  of  Spinoza's 
representation  of  the  teleological  judgment.  It  is 
true  that  he  has  misrepresented  it ;  but,  even  on  liis 
own  showing,  there  is  a  correspondence  between  the 
nature  of  the  world  and  man's  way  of  looking  at  the 
world  teleologically.  This  is  implied  in  the  statement, 
"they  found  these  conveniences  and  did  not  make 
them  " ;  in  other  words,  this  way  of  looking  at  things 
is  related  to  reality. 

His  statement  applies  with  much  more  force  to 
matliomatics.     At  first  we  do  not  know  whether  our 


THE   STRIFE   AGAIXST  PURPOSE         59 

mathematical  judgments  have  any  relation  to  a  real 
world.     They  may  be  figments  of  the  imagination  ; 
for  in  all  geometrical  figures  I  actually  make  a  bound- 
ing of  space  by  a  ride  of  my  own,  and  I  do  not  know 
that  anything  real  corresponds  to  that  bounding.     I 
assume  that  space  may  be  bounded ;  but  whether  it 
really  can  be  thus  bounded  I   do  not  know  until  I 
ascertain.     I  imagine  a  point  to  move  at  the  same 
distance  from  a  fixed  point,  and  I  call  the  boundary 
thus  traced  out  a  circle.     From  it  I  can  deduce  any 
number  of  propositions.     It  enables  me  to  say  that 
the  line  joining  the  vertices  of  all  triangles,  having 
the   same   base    and   the    same  vertical  angle,  is    a 
circle.     We  can  deal  with  conic  sections  in  the  same 
way.     At  first  men  could  not  say  of  what  use  such 
studies  might  be.     The  old  geometers  proceeded  with 
such  investigations,  and  never  asked  of  what  use  their 
propositions  and  deductions  might  be.     They  worked 
out  the  properties  of  the  parabola,  the  ellipse,  and  the 
hyperbola,  and  they  never  asked  where  there  were 
any  bodies  in  nature  whose  movements  corresponded 
to   the   curves   whose    properties   they   investigated. 
They  did  not  think  that  real  bodies  in  space  might 
move    in   ellipses,   nor   that   a   central   force   varied 
according  to  the  inverse  square  of  the  distance.     For 
all  they  knew  these  curves  might  or  might  not  have 
a  reference  to  reality.     It  was  a  science  of  imagination, 
based  on  the  intuition  of  space  and  time,  and  on  the 
laws    of     deductive    logic.       And    mathematics    has 
not  furnished  the  standard  of  verity  which  Spinoza 
demanded.      For   in  the  first  instance  mathematics  j 
reveals  onlv  the  nature  of  the  human  mind  with  its 


60        CHRISTIANITY  AXD   EVOLUTIOX 

intuitions,  its  power  of  reasoning,  and  its  conformity 
to  the  laws  of  logic.  Mathematics  shows  how  the 
human  mind  works  when  under  few  and  simple 
conditions.  It  is  a  witness  to  the  power  and  the 
rationality  of  the  human  mind,  and  that  is  all  that 
can  be  said  about  it. 

"It   is  quite  different  if  I  meet  with  order  and 
regularity  in  complexes  of  things  external  to  myself, 
enclosed  within  real  boundaries,  as,  e.g.,  in  a  garden 
the  order  and  regularity   of   tlie   trees,   flower-beds, 
and  walks.     These  I  cannot  expect  to  derive  a  priori 
from  my  bounding  of  space  made  after  a  rule  of  my 
own ;  for  this  order  and  regularity  are  existing  things 
which  must  be  given  empirically  in  order  to  be  known, 
and  not  a  mere  representation  of  myself  determined 
a  2'>riori  according  to  a  principle."     (Kant,  Kritik  of 
Judgment,  Bernard's  translation,  p.  205.)     Thus  the 
question  is,  How  are  we  related  to  reality  ?     Mathe- 
matics regards  only  what  is  possible  ;  and  after  we  have 
elaborated  it,  the  further  question  arises.    How  far 
does  reality  conform  to  mathematics  ?     We  have  still 
to  ask,  How  far  do  things  empirically  given  conform 
to  our  way  of  looking  at  them  1     If  concrete  things, 
real  things  in  a  real  world,  behave  as  our  ideal  points 
behave  when  they  describe  the  triangles,  circles,  conic 
.  sections   of  our  mathematics,  then  may  we  not  say 
/  that  an  intelligence  is  at  work  in  the  world  akin  to 
Ij  the  intelligence  which  was  at  work  in  the  construction 
\  of  our  mathematics  ?     If  our  intuition  and  our  logic 
are  realised  in  nature,  and  if  nature  works  out  our 
mathematics  in  a  grander,  more  thorough  way  than 
we   can,    then   surely   the   inference   is   quite  plain. 


THE   STRIFE   AGAINST  PURPOSE        61 

Nature  is  the  work  of  an   intelligence    that   knows  /( 
mathematics. 

Is  teleology,  then,  hostile  to  science  ?  Let  us  see 
what  the  scientific  interest  is.  The  scientific  interest 
is  in  any  given  subject  to  find  out  not  only  what  it  is, 
but  why  it  is  so  and  so.  This  interest  is  satisfied  when 
we  can  point  out  the  causes  through  which  it  has 
become.  Science  does  not  inquire  into  the  origin  of 
causes,  nor  into  the  ground  of  their  uniyersal  worth  : 
it  is  satisfied  when  the  applicability  oFlihe  given 
causes  to  produce  this  particular  result  is  shown. 
What  science  presupposes  is  a  given  manifoldness 
of  things,  substances,  atoms,  forces,  etc.,  which  have 
definite  and  defined  qualities,  and  these  sO  related  to 
one  another  as  to  make  the  result  necessary.  When 
two  masses  in  space  are  at  a  particular  distance  from 
one  another,  their  movements  necessarily  follow  from 
their  mass  and  their  distance.  When  two  bodies 
strike  against  one  another,  the  resulting  movement 
is  determined  by  their  weight,  their  velocity,  their 
elasticity.  Causes  therefore,  according  to  science,  are 
things  with  their  properties  and  forces,  and  these 
are  given.  When  these  are  given,  results  necessarily 
follow;  and  necessity  in  nature  corresponds  to  that 
inner  necessity  with  which  we  are  acquainted,  the 
necessity  by  which  a  conclusion  follows  from  given 
premises.  The  necessity  of  nature  is  also  an  intel- 
lectual necessity. 

It  is  to  be  observed  also  that  the  point  of  departure 
in  science  is  always  a  defined  group  of  things  which 
vrork  and  are  worked  on.  Out  of  a  thing  considered 
in  itself  no  change  can  come ;  forces  are  the  expression 


62        CHRISTIAXITY  AND   EVOLUTIOX 

of  the  changes  of  related  substances  ;  all  causes  for 
science  are  external  causes.  Work  done  presupposes 
a  manifoldness  of  things  in  defined  relations.  From 
the  given  condition  at  this  moment  we  work  back  to 
its  condition  some  time  before,  and  then  comes  a  point 
at  which  we  must  stop.  Science  has  found  its  limit. 
Our  intuitions,  our  logical  necessities  have  their 
counterpart  in  nature.  May  not  our  way  of  looking 
at  things  as  means  and  ends  have  its  counterpart 
in  nature  just  as  our  way  of  looking  at  things  as 
cause  and  consequence  has  1  May  not  purpose  also 
be  a  liner  and  more  unique  kind  of  necessity  ? 
I  The  idea  of  purpose  no  doubt  arises  out  of  our 
iypluntary  and  practical  activity..  Our  conscious 
Vctivity  is  determined  by  the  thought  of  the  future. 
This  thought  influences  our  will,  our  will  determines 
our  activity,  which  is  directed  towards  the  realisation 
of  our  thought,  and  a  course  of  conduct  arises.  This 
relation  to  a  future  event  to  be  realised  in  conduct 
is  the  distinctive  characteristic  of  purpose.  Purpose 
is,  however,  not  merely  subjective ;  it  is  not  a  mere 
wish  which  does  not  issue  in  action  :  it  sets  itself  to 
lind  means  to  realise  itself ;  it  quickens  the  intelli- 
irence,  and  sets  itself  to  make  use  of  real,  efficient 
causes,  and  so  arrange  them  as  to  bring  about  the 
foreseen  result.  Purpose  remains  mere  wish  until 
it  can  link  itself  to  the  real  working  causes  of  the 
world,  and  make  use  of  or  make  a  mechanism  to 
give  it  effect.  Purpose,  first  a  thought  in  the  muid, 
becomes  active,  and  sets  the  mind  and  will  to  work ; 
it  sets  the  mechanism  of  the  body  to  work,  and  so 
finally  the  mechanism  of  the  mind  is  controlled,  and 


THE   STRIFE   AGAINST  PURPOSE         G3 

made  to  act  in  order  to  bring-  about  a  i-esult  whicli 
mechanism  could  never  of  itself  have  produced.  Pur- 
pose, tlien,  has  a  real  place  as  far  at  least  as  human 
action  is  i-egarded.  Everywhere  we  see  a  purpose 
impressed  on  systems  of  efficient  causes.  We  see 
machines,  ships,  steam  engines,  telephones,  telegraphs, 
everywdiere  at  work,  and  they  are  possible  because 
s}'stenis  of  efficient  causes  are  receptive  of  purpose. 
Thei-e  are  two  w^ays  of  considering  a  steam  engine. 
We  may  look  at  it  as  a  system  of  efficientcaus£§tJknd 
investigate  the  properties  and  relations  of  the  various 
elements  contained  in  it,  and  try  to  understand  the 
mechanical  theory  of  the  steam  engine.  We  work 
synthetically  from  the  causes  to  the  result.  But  we 
may  legitimately  work  fi-om  another  point  of  view, 
and  take  the  result  as  our  point  of  departure.  We 
may  ask  through  which  combination  of  causes  was 
this  result  produced  ;  and  from  this  point  of  view  the 
result  appeai-s  as  pui-pose,  and  the  working  causes 
ajipear  as  means  by  w^iich  the  purpose  w^as  realised. 
We  may  look  at  the  solar  system,  and  regard  the 
stability  of  the  system  as  the  result  of  the  move- 
ments of  the  j^lanets  in  the  same  direction,  and  so 
on  ;  but  it  is  also  a  legitimate  way  to  look  at  the 
stability  of  the  system  first,  and  at  all  the  co-ordinated 
movements  as  means  which  serve  to  realise  that 
end.  Are  w^e  told  that  the  postulating  of  such  a 
purpose  is  hypothetical  ?  But  w^e  cannot  get  rid  of 
the  hypothetical  element.  One  coui-se  of  procedure 
says,  if  such  and  such  causes  are  given,  then  the 
result  must  be  so  and  so ;  and  the  other  course  says, 
if  this  result  has  come,  then  the  causes  must  be  so 


64       CHRISTIANITY  AND    EVOLUTION 

and  so.  The  same  laws  and  causes  come  into 
observation  from  both  points  of  view.  If  we  look  at 
an  event  as  a  realised  purpose,  we  bring  also  into 
view  the  system  of  causes  which  was  used  to  realise 
the  end,  and  the  system  of  causes  is  the  same  as 
that  which  brings  about  the  event  considered  merely 
as  an  event  apart  from  purpose.  Were  our  knowledge 
more  thorough,  were  it  only  complete,  we  might  read 
the  order  of  the  universe  backw^ards  and  forwards — 
backwards  to  a  system  of  efficient  causes,  and  for- 
wards to  a  defined  and  predetermined  end.  But  our 
knowledge  is  far  from  complete,  and  therefore  we 
object  to  an  arbitrary  decision  on  the  part  of  many, 
a  decision  which  shuts  us  out  from  a  fruitful  way  of 
looking  at  the  universe,  merely  because  we  do  not 
know  enough  to  carry  out  that  view  in  its  application 
to  all  the  details  of  the  universe. 

We  may  not  be  able  to  say  what  is  the  purpose  of 
an  eclipse ;  w^e  may  rest  content  with  the  knowledge 
that  in  certain  relations  of  the  movements  of  the 
earth,  the  moon,  and  the  sun,  eclipses  of  the  moon  or 
the  sun  will  happen  periodically.  That  is  merely  to 
say  that  our  knowledge  is  not  great  enough  for  us  to 
set  all  the  events  of  the  universe  in  the  light  of 
purpose.  It  might  be  possible  for  us  to  deny  efficient 
causation  on  the  same  ground,  because  there  are 
many  spheres  in  which  we  have  not  yet  been  able  to 
say  what  the  causation  really  is.  But  the  denial  of 
purpose  in  nature  is  simply  an  appeal  to  ignorance ; 
or  if  our  adversaries  wish  to  be  scornful,  they  "call  it 
anthropomorphism.  And  they  ask  us,  Are  we  to 
conceive  the  power  which  rules  the  universe  working 


THE  STRIFE   AGAINST  PURPOSE       65 

after  the  fashion  of  a  man  ?  We  have  dealt  with 
anthropomoq^hism  elsewhere  {Is  God  Knowahle  ? 
chap,  iii.),  and  we  shall  not  repeat  here  what  we  have 
formerly  written.  Is  not  the  mathematical  thinking 
of  the  universe  done  after  the  fasbion  of  a  man  1 
Are  not  the  ellipses,  the  parabolas  of  the  Greek 
geometers  patterns  according  to  which  the  planets 
move  ?  Is  not  the  necessity  of  nature  paralleled  by 
the  necessity  of  logic  ?  Both  in  nature  and  in  logic 
what  is  absurd  is  impossible.  The  system  of  efficient 
causes  which  we  find  at  work  in  the  world  is  just  as 
anthropomorphic  as  the  system  of  final  causes  is. 
The  spectacle  of  a  human  intelligence  w^orking  for  a 
foreseen  end,  finding  out  what  causes  can  be  disposed 
and  in  what  way  for  the  accomplishment  of  that 
end,  is  as  real,  as  grand,  as  much  related  to  nature 
and  reality  as  is  the  same  intelligence  working  out 
its  geometry,  its  algebra,  its  calculus  by  the  laws  of 
logic,  deducing  its  great  propositions  from  a  few 
elementary  axioms.  If  we  accept  the  logical  necessity 
of  the  universe,  even  though  it  be  anthropomorphic, 
why  on  that  ground  deny  its  purposiveness  1 

Given  a  certain  state  of  matters,  how  may  we 
explain  it  ?  Given  a  human  work,  be  it  a  machine, 
a  song,  a  book,  a  theory  of  gravitation  or  of  evolution, 
and  we  can  explain  it  by  a  reference  to  the  author, 
his  intelligence,  and  his  purpose.  We  may  take  into 
account  the  material  of  which  the  machine  is  com- 
posed, as  we  take  into  account  the  paper,  type,  ink, 
etc.,  of  which  the  book  is  composed  ;  we  may  inquire 
into  the  qualities  and  laws  of  the  given  material ;  but 
in  the  end  we  say  the  explanation  of  the  product  is 

5 


(jQ       CHRISTIANITY  AND   EVOLUTION 

the  author.  In  evolution  the  matter  to  be  explained 
is  the  universe.  Is  it  best  explained  by  purpose  or 
by  mechanism  ?  As  we  have  seen,  mechanism  cannot 
explain  it.  Most  certainly  the  primitive  nebulosity 
cannot  explain  it;  for  the  nebulists  are  confronted 
with  the  following  dilemma  :  either  the  nebula  was 
originally  more  than  a  nebula,  or  it  has  been  added 
to,  in  the  course  of  its  development,  from  a  source 
beyond  itself.  The  effect  cannot  be  greater  than  the 
cause.  If  the  primitive  nebulosity  has  become  the 
ordered  cosmos  with  all  its  inhabitants,  art,  science, 
philosophy,  morality,  religions  must  all  have  been 
either  in  the  nebula  at  first,  or  added  to  it  from 
without  by  a  power  adequate  to  the  result.  Power, 
either  within  the  nebula  or  from  without,  there 
must  have  been,  and  power  of  a  kind  fitted  to  bring 
about  the  end.  Let  it  be  observed  that  the  chain 
of  ordered  causes  and  results  is  the  same,  whether 
we  contemplate  it  from  the  point  of  view  of  physical 
causation  or  from  the  point  of  view  of  purpose.  In 
the  one  case  we  contemplate  it  as  bare  result,  in  the 
other  case  we  look  at  it  as  intended,  and  the  ordered 
causes  are  grouped  together  with  a  view  to  accomplish 
the  end.  In  the  last  event  we  have  a  cause  sufiicient 
to  bring  about  the  result ;  in  the  former  case  we  have 
no  account  whatever  of  the  order,  adaptation,  and 
method  of  the  universe.  We  must  go  back  to  the 
fortuitous  concourse  of  atoms,  and  trust  to  chance — 
to  chance,  now,  be  it  remembered,  not  as  a  name  for 
a  cause  the  operation  and  nature  of  which  we  do  not 
know  now,  but  may  hope  to  know  by-and-by,  but  to 
chance  looked,at  as  a  real  cause.     It  may  be  allowed 


THE   STRIFE  AGAINST  PURPOSE       67 

to  speak  of  chance  as  an  element  in  a  calculation  of 
probabilities  simply  to  express  ignorance ;   but  it  is 
not  allowable  to  spe_ak_of  chance  as  a  substitute  TorV 
causation,  and  to  this  we  are  brought  if  we   denyh 
purpose  in  the  universe. 

But  we  give  the  universe  over  to  confusion  when  I 
we  deny  purpose.  "  You  would  not  see  evidence  of  I 
purpose,  we  are  told,  much  less  of  higher  wisdom  or 
transcendent  cleverness,  in  the  conduct  of  a  man  who,  | 
to  kill  a  hare,  fired  a  million  pistols  in  all  directions 
over  a  vast  meadow  j  or  who,  to  enter  a  locked  room,  . 
brought  ten  thousand  random  keys,  and  made  trial 
of  them  all ;  or  who,  to  have  a  house,  built  a  city, 
and  turned  the  superfluous  houses  over  to  the  mercy 
of  wind  and  weather."  And  to  this  we  are  brought 
by  our  antagonism  to  what  Mr.  Spencer  calls  the 
Carpenter  theory.  Notwithstanding  the  description 
of  Lange  just  given,  Mr.  Spencer  writes  :  "  There  is 
an  antagonistic  hypothesis  which  does  not  propose 
to  honour  the  unknown  Power  manifested  in  the 
universe  by  such  titles  as  '  the  Master  Builder,'  or 
'  the  great  Artificer ' ;  but  which  regards  this  un- 
known Power  as  probably  working  after  a  method 
quite  difierent  from  that  of  human  mechanics.  And 
the  genealogy  of  this  hypothesis  is  as  high  as  that 
of  the  other  is  low.  It  is  begotten  by  that  ever- 
enlarging  and  ever-strengthening  belief  in  the  presence 
of  law  which  accumulated  experiences  have  gradually 
produced  in  the  human  mind.  From  generation  to 
generation  science  has  been  proving  uniformities  of 
relation  among  phenomena  which  were  before  thought 
either  fortuitous  or  supernatural  in  their  origin — has 


e 


68       CHRISTIANITY  AND  EVOLUTION 

'     been   showing   an  established  order  and  a  constant 
causation  where  ignorance  had  assumed  irregularity 
and   arbitrariness.      Each    farther  discovery  of   law 
has  increased  the  presumption  that  law  is  everywhere 
conformed  to."     {Essays,  vol.  i.,  p.  240.)     Lange  and 
Professor  Huxley  would  overthrow  design  by  likening 
the  survival  of  the  fittest  to  the  chance  shot  which  out 
of  a  million  happened  to  kill  the  hare.     Mr.  Spencer 
would  overthrow  it  by  showing  that  law-  everywhere 
/  prevails.     But    the   idea   of    law   and   uniformity   is  \ 
j    also   quite  consistent  with  the  idea  of   purpose.     In    \ 
fact,  purpose  excludes  arbitrariness  and  irregularity,    | 
.and  any  assertion   to    the   contrary  is  simply  itself 
capricious. 


CHAPTER  V 

EVOLUTION  AND    CREATION 

Histoiy  of  the  earth — Evolution  as  seen  in  geologic  eras — 
Continuity  of  the  process — Succession — Advance  and 
preparation  for  advance — Physics  and  geology— Some 
unsettled  questions — Professor  Caird  on  evolution  from 
two  points  of  view — At  the  beginning  or  at  the  end, 
which  ? — Is  the  issue  arbitrary  arrangement  versus  evolu- 
tion ? — No  :  creation  by  slow  process  is  creation — Illustra- 
tions— Mechanics  and  purpose  once  more. 

THAT  teleology  is  not  hostile  to  efficient  causes 
we  have  already  seen  reason  to  believe.  Still 
less  does  it  conflict  with  efficient  causes  combined  in  a 
system.  In  fact,  as  we  advance  along  the  line  of  march 
which  science  has  taken,  the  idea  of  teleology  becomes 
more  and  more  luminous,  until  in  ethics  and  theology 
it  becomes  indispensable.  We  quite  admit  that  the 
idea  is  anthropomorphic,  that  it  does  not  quite  enable 
us  to  view  all  things  sub  specie  eternitatis.  We  admit 
that  we  are  unable  to  rise  to  the  great  height  of  one 
who  is  present  at  all  the  operations  of  the  world,  for 
whom  beginning  and  end  are  not,  to  whom  all  time 
is  a  nunc  stans.  But,  then,  that  objection  applies  to 
every  one  who  is  compelled  to  think  under  the  con- 
ditions of  space  and  time,  and  applies  equally  to  those 
who  affirm   causation  of  any  kind.      Efficient  causes 


?0       CHRISTIANITY  AND  EVOLUTION 

also  come  under  the  condition  of  before  and  after; 
and  if  to  think  of  efficient  causation  is  valid  and 
legitimate,  final  causation  is  also  valid  and  legitimate. 

We  might  therefore  start  with  the  state  of  the 
earth  as  it  now  is,  and  might  ask  what  are  the 
conditions  under  which  rational  life  can  exist  at  the 
present  time.  We  might  analyse  these  conditions, 
and  the  analysis  would  give  us  at  least  the  various 
sciences  in  the  order  in  which  they  now  exist.  The 
present  condition  would  give  us  the  previous  conditions, 
biological,  geological,  chemical,  physical,  ranged  in 
order  and  complexity,  as  each  was  analysed  into 
simpler  and  simpler  elements,  and  not  one  of  the  laws 
of  nature  would  need  to  be  altered  in  order  to  make 
the  arrangement.  Nothing  is  changed  save  the 
point  of  view.  The  difference  is  that  we  do  not  start 
with  the  nebula,  and  endeavour,  by  successive  dif- 
ferentiations and  integrations,  to  get  out  of  it  more 
than  is  in  it.  We  start  with  the  present  state  of  the 
world  as  an  intended  result,  and  look  on  all  the 
successive  stages  of  the  life-history  of  the  earth  as 
means  for  the  accomplishment  of  the  end. 

True,  we  are  at  a  disadvantage  here ;  for  the 
world  is  not  finally  made  yet.  It  is  only  making, 
and  we  can  only  dimly  guess  at  the  final  outcome. 
But,  then,  all  schemes  of  thought  are  open  to  the 
same  objection.  Evolution  itself,  in  the  hands  of 
Mr.  Spencer,  can  only  faintly  guess  at  the  final  end 
for  which  evolution  works.  And  Hegel's  theory  of 
evolution  seemed  to  regard  the  Prussian  of  the 
nineteenth  century  as  the  final  outcome  of  the  toil 
of  the  Idea.     We  may  hold,  therefore,  although  we 


EVOLUTION  AND   CREATION  71 

do  not  know  the  final  outcome  of  things,  that  the 
power  which  has  brought  the  nebula  to  the  stage 
where  life  with  its  thought,  its  morality,  and  religion 
exists  in  the  earth,  will  continue  to  work  in  such  a 
way  as  to  bring  it  to  further  issues  yet,  and  to  an  end 
worth  all  the  cost. 

Apart  from  the  thought  of  an  end,  we  really  get ! 
no  sufficient  account  of  the  various  stages  of  the  life- ' 
history  of  the  earth.  The  path  which  the  course  of 
things  has  taken  seems  really  indeterminate.  It  does 
not  seem  natural  to  say  that  it  must  have  taken  the 
course  it  did,  otherwise  force  would  not  have  per- 
sisted. The  persistence  of  force  does  not  explain  the 
direction  in  which  it  persisted.  Force  persists  quite 
as  much  in  the  moon  as  on  the  earth,  as  much  in  the 
Sahara  as  in  the  city  of  London,  as  much  in  the  sand 
on  the  sea-shore  as  in  Westminster  Abbey.  At  every 
point  of  transition  the  difficulty  arises.  Why  should 
the  force  take  this  particular  path  ?  and  apart  from 
intelligent  direction  and  selection  we  get  no  answer. 

If  the  nebula  theory  as  a  whole  finds  it  difficult  to 
pass  from  the  indeterminate  to  the  determinate,  that 
part  of  it  which  applies  to  our  own  planet  has  ex- 
perienced equal  perplexity.  We  have  no  agreement 
among  scientists  about  the  time  when  the  earth  broke 
off  from  the  central  mass,  nor  when  the  earth  began 
to  cool,  nor  when  life  became  possible  on  its  surface. 
The  question  is  of  importance  for  evolution;  for 
evolution  needs  time,  and  a  good  deal  of  it.  Apart, 
however,  from  these  difficulties,  which  we  may  look  at 
again,  we  may  say  geology  makes  out  a  magnificent 
case  for   evolution.       Starting  from   the  earth  as  a 


rz 


CHRISTIANITY  AND   EVOLUTION 


molten  mass  with  a  cei;tain  motion  in  its  orbit  and 
a  certain  rotation  around  its  axis,  we  look  at  it  as 
cooling  according  to  the  rules  under  which  bodies  still 
lose  their  heat.  It  is  subject  to  the  usual  stresses 
which  take  place  in  a  body  which  grows  solid  as  it 
cools.  A  crust  is  formed,  and  an  atmosphere  surrounds 
it,  and  the  older  rocks  are  made.  "  We  can  imagine  a 
scum  or  crust  forming  at  the  surface ;  and  from  what 
we  know  of  the  earth's  interior,  nothing  is  more  likely 
to  have  constituted  that  slaggy  crust  than  the  material 
of  our  old  gneisses.  As  to  its  bedded  character,  this 
may  have  arisen  in  part  from  the  addition  of  cooler 
layers  below,  in  part  from  the  action  of  heated  water 
above,  and  in  part  from  pressure  or  tension ;  while 
wherever  it  cracked  or  became  broken  its  interstices 
would  be  injected  with  molten  matter  from  beneath. 
All  this  may  be  conjectured,  but  it  is  based  on  known 
facts,  and  it  is  the  only  probable  conjecture.  If 
correct,  it  would  account  for  the  fact  that  the  gneissic 
rocks  are  the  lowest  and  oldest  that  we  reach  in  any 
part  of  the  earth."  {Salient  Points  in  the  Science  of 
the  Earth,  pp.  17,  18,  by  Sir  J.  William  Dawson.) 

Geology  takes  up  the  study  of  the  earth,  and/ 
traces  for  us  its  evolution.  It  reveals  to  us  a  period] 
of  its  history  when  there  was  no  life  on  its  surface  \ 
it  shows  the  earth  gradually  cooling  down,  becoming 
more  and  more  differentiated  and  integrated  under 
physical  laws  the  working  of  which  is  known  ;  it 
traces  the  formation  of  rocks,  the  sepai-ation  of  land 
and  water,  the  formation  of  an  atmosphere,  and 
the  gradual  formation  of  these  conditions  which 
make  life   possible.     It  reveals   to   us  how    complex 


EVOLUTION  AND   CREATION  73 

are  these  conditions,  how  exquisite  are  the  correhi- 
tions,  how  manifold  the  relations  which  were  needed 
that  this  end  might  be  accomplished.  The  slightest 
difference  in  these  correlations  would  make  life  for 
ever  impossible.  Then  it  shows  us  the  beginnings 
of  life.  Life  begins  in  the  simplest  possible  form. 
It  goes  on  from  more  to  more.  Some  forms,  indeed, 
remain  unchanged  almost  from  the  beginning  until 
now.  We  have  still  M'ith  us  the  alg^,  the  mosses, 
crustaceans,  niplluscs,  and  coi-als  of  the  palaeozoic 
period  ;  and  types  which  correspond  to  those  forms 
of  life  which  characterise  the  mesozoic  and  the 
tertiary  periods.  Under  the  guidance  of  science 
we  see  life  pressing  out  in  all  directions,  forming 
new  combinations,  new  types,  until  the  possibility 
of  organic  modifications  seems  exhausted,  and  a  form 
of  being  appears  who  develops  a  new  power  of 
adaptation  and  does  not  need  to  modify  himself 
organically  in  order  to  adapt  himself  to  the  changing 
environment.  Were  we  present  at  all  the  stages  of 
the  process,  we  should  surely  see  that  all  the  changes 
were  gradual,  that  the  process  was  slow  and  con- 
tinuous. Very  likely  there  was  nothing  abrupt, 
nothing  catastrophic;  everything  was  prepared  for, 
and  every  change  introduced  without  violence. 

We  take  the  story  of  geology  from  our  scientific 
masters,  and  accept  it  as  they  give  it.  We  follow 
them  with  no  misgiving  as  they  unfold  for  us  the 
magnificent  evolution  of  the  earth's  progress  through- 
out geologic  time.  We  know  of  the  difficulties  and  dis- 
agi^eements  between  the  physicists  and  the  geologists. 
We  know  that  the  uniformitarian  in  geology  denjands 


74       CHRISTIANITY  AND   EVOLUTION 

that  the  forces  acting  on  the  surface  of  the  globe  have 
been  in  all  times  the  same,  both  in  kind  and  degree, 
with  those  now  in  operation;  and  we  know  that  if 
this  is  so,  a  larger  amount  of  time  is  needed  than 
tlie  physicist  can  grant.  Geologists,  however,  while 
agreed  as  to  the  kind  of  forces  in  operation,  are  not 
all  uniformitarian  with  regard  to  the  amount  and 
rate  of  work  which  these  forces  exerted  in  former 
times  ;  for  if  the  theory  of  tidal  evolution  be  true,  then 
the  tides  once  exerted  a  force  on  the  earth  which  was 
immeasurably  greater  than  they  exert  now.  If  the 
earth  was  ever  a  molten  mass,  then  the  process  of 
cooling,  with  all  the  consequent  stresses  and  strains, 
must  have  caused  effects  greater  by  far  than  have 
been  experienced  since  man  was  upon  the  earth. 

The  assumption,  then,  that  the  forces  operative  now 
were  operative  throughout  all  time  in  the  same  degree 
must  be  departed  from,  and  with  it  also  will  go  the 
vast  periods  of  time  which  Lyall  and  Darwin  demanded 
as  the  primary  condition  of  their  theory.  We  are  not 
careful,  however,  to  insist  on  these  difficulties.  We  leave 
the  diiferences  between  physicist  and  geologist  to  be 
settled  between  them  and  by  them.  We  refer  to  them 
here  for  the  sake  of  uttering  a^  caveat  against  the 
dogmatism  of  science.  The  uniformitarian  dogma  in 
geology  and  the  partial  theories  of  physicists  have 
been  used,  not  by  the  masters  themselves,  but  by 
some  others,  for  the  purpose  of  making  attacks  on 
theology  and  ethics,  and  it  is  therefore  well  to 
point  out  that  these  attacks  are  premature.  There 
are  unsettled  questions  about  the  rigidity  of  the 
earth,  the  rate  of  geologic  change,  and  the  date  of 


EVOLUTION  AND   CREATION  75 

the  introduction  of  man  on  the  earth;  and  we  arev 

often    brought    face   to   face   with   apparently   irre-  l/Jx^\j|2,^ 

concilable    opinions,  held    dogmatically  by   physicists  11 

on  the  one  hand  and  by  geologists  on  the  other,  and  i 

yet   the  controversial  tyro  uses   these  irreconcilable  / 

views  as  if  they  were  in  agreement  with  each  other, 

and  thinks  he  has  shown  that  theology  is  absurd  and 

religion  irrational.  (JOn   the  contrary,  we   say  that 

theology  is  prepared  toreceive  whatever  science  has 

been  able  to  prQy§. ;  9,nd  if  evolution  is  the  law  of 

life,  theology  wiH  accept  evolution  as  it  has  accepted 

gravitation.     We  accept  the  fact  that  physical  laws 

are  permanent,  but  we  ask  our  scientific  masters  to 

show  us  what  were  the  conditions  under  which  the 

laws  were  exhibited ;  and  if  the  conditions   change, 

then  the  effects  will  also  change. 

For  the  purposes  of  my  argument  it  is  not  necessary, 
however,  to  make  much  of  these  irreconcilable  views. 
Let  us  accept  the  general  course  of  the  evolution  of  the 
earth's  history  as  known.  Let  us  assume  that  the 
order  was,  as  is  outlined  to  us  by  physics  and  geology 
so  far  as  they  are  agreed,  first  a  world  without 
life,  next  aj5£orld_withJ[ife,  then  life  more  and  more  '^ 
developed,  until  we  come  to  the  complex  life  of 
the  present  hour ;  then  the  question  arises, — the  only 
question  that  has  really  any  significance  in  the  present 
argument, — How  are  we  to  interpret  this  order  ?  Are 
we  to  take  our  point  of  view  from  the  beginning  or 
from  the  end  ?  Are  we  to  say  with  Professor  Caird  1 — 
"  A  principle  of  development  necessarily  manifests 
itself  most  clearly  in  the  most  mature  form  of  that ;  (JSv.^^ 
which  develops ;  as  we  take  our  definition  of  man. 


76       CHRISTIANITY  AND   EVOLUTION 

not  from  the  embryo  or  the  infant,  but  from  the 
grown  man,  who  first  shows  what  was  hidden  in  both. 
.  .  .  When,  indeed,  we  turn  back  from  the  developed 
organism  to  the  embryo,  from  the  man  to  the  child, 
we  find  that  a  study  of  the  process  of  genesis  casts  no 
little  light  upon  the  nature  of  the  being  which  is  its 
result.  The  man  becomes  in  a  higher  sense  intel- 
ligible when  we  trace  him  back  to  the  child.  But 
primarily,  and  in  the  first  instance,  it  is  the  developed 
organism  that  explains  the  germ  from  which  it  grew ; 
and  without  having  seen  the  former,  we  could  have 
made  nothing  of  the  latter.  No  examination  of  the 
child  could  enable  us  to  prophesy  the  man,  if  we  had 
not  previously  had  some  experience  of  mature  man- 
hood ;  still  less  would  an  examination  of  the  seed  in 
the  embryo  reveal  to  us  the  distinct  lineaments  of  the 
developed  plant,  or  animal,  or  man.  Nor  would  our 
insight  be  greatly  helped  by  a  knowledge  of  the  environ- 
ment in  which  the  process  of  development  was  to  take 
place.  .  .  .  Development  is  not  simply  the  recurience 
of  the  same  effects  in  similar  circumstances,  not  simply 
the  maintenance  of  an  identity  under  a  variation 
determined  by  external  conditions.  Hence  it  is  impos- 
sible, from  the  phenomena  of  one  stage  of  a  developing 
being,  to  derive  laws  which  will  adequately  explain  the 
whole  course  of  its  existence.  The  secret  of  the  peculiar 
nature  of  such  a  being  lies  just  in  the  way  of  regular 
transition  in  which,  by  constant  interaction  with 
external  influences,  it  widens  the  compass  of  its  Hfe, 
unfolding  continually  new  powers  and  capacities — 
powers  and  capacities-  latent  in  it  from  the  first,  but 
not    capable  of  being  foreseen  by  one  who  had  seen 


EVOLUTION  AND   CREATION  11 

only  the  beginning.  It  follows  that,  in  the  fii-st 
instance  at  least,  we  must  read  development  backward 
and  wot  forward,  we  must  find  the  key  to  the  meaning 
of  the  first  stage  in  the  last ;  though  it  is  quite  true 
that,  afterwards,  we  are  enabled  to  throw  new  light 
upon  the  nature  of  the  last,  to  analyse  and  appreciate  | 
it  in  a  new  way,  by  carrying  it  back  to  the  first."  | 
{Evolutio7i  of  Religion,  vol.  i.,  pp.  43-5.) 

Thus  we  see  there  are  two  ways  of  interpreting  I 
evolution.  Limiting  our  view  at  piesent  to  the  globe 
on  which  we  live,  and  looking  at  the  history  of  the  | 
earth  as  now  read  by  science,  are  we  to  take  our  stand 
at  the  present  time,  or  are  we  to  go  back  to  the 
primeval  molten  globe  ?  Taking  our  stand  at  the 
beginning,  we  shall  be  under  the  necessity  of  bringing 
out  of  the  globe  all  that  [has  since  evolved.  We  shall 
need  an  explanation  of  the  tendency  and  direction 
which  its  history  really  took.  It  will  not  suffice  to 
show  that  such  and  such  events  have  happened.  We 
have  taken  on  ourselves  the  burden  of  showing  from 
the  nature  of  the  globe  that  they  could  not  have 
happened  otherwise.  We  must  be  prepared  to  show 
that  every  stage  of  the  process  from  the  beginning 
until  now  admits  of  no  alternative.  That,  however,  is 
a  burden  too  heavy  for  science  to  bear.  The  general 
laws  of  matter  will  never  account  for  particular 
effects;  and  the  particular  arrangements  are  just 
the  things  which  need  to  be  explained.  Causes  and 
consequences  have  to  be  translated  into  a  system  of 
means  and  ends,  if  we  are  to  have  any  intelligible 
luiderstanding  of  the  process. 

The  issue  is  often  put  thus  :  Arbitrary  arrangement 


78       CHRISriAXITY  AXD   EVOLrTION 

j  versus  evolution.     But  we  do  not  accept  the  issue  in 
these  terms,  for  there  is  no  connection  between  arbi- 
trariness and  design.     Speaking  of  the  solar  system, 
Mr.  Spencer  says:  "  When  gra\itation  came  to  dispense 
with  these  celestial  steersmen,  there  w^as  begotten  a 
belief,  less  gross  than  its  parent,  but  partaking  of  the 
same  essential  nature,  that  the  planets  were  launched 
in  their  orbits  from  the  Creator's  hand"  {Essays,!., 
p.  240).     Dr.  Romanes  puts  the  issue  thus:  "Now  it 
would  be  proof  positive  of  intelligent  design  if  it  could 
be  shown  that  all  species  of  planets  and  animals  were 
created — that  is,  suddenly  introduced  into  the  complex 
conditions  of  their  life  ;  for  it  is  quite  inconceivable 
that    any   cause   other   than    intelligence    could    be 
competent  to  adapt  an  organism  to  its  environment 
suddenly.     On   the   other   hand,  it   would    be    proof 
presumptive     of    natural    selection    if    it    could    be 
shown   that    one    species  became  slowly  transmuted 
into  another — i.e.,  that  one  set  of  adaptations  may  be 
gradually  transformed  into   another   set   of   adapta- 
tions according  as  changing   circumstances   require. 
This  would  be  proof  presumptive  of  natural  selection, 
because  it  w^ould  then  become  amply  probable    that 
natural   selection  might   have  brought  about  many, 
or  most,  of  the  cases  of  adaptations  which  we  see ; 
and  if  so,  the  law  of  parsimony  excludes  the  rival 
hypothesis   of   intelligent    design.      Thus   the    whole 
question  as  between  natural  selection  and  supernatural 
I  design  resolves  itself  into  this  :  Were  all  the  species  of 
I  plants  and  animals  separately  created,  or  were  they 
Vglowly  evolved  ?     For  if  they  were  specially  created,  the 
evidence  of  supernatural  design  remains  irrefuted  and 


EVOLUTION  AND   CREATION 


79 


irrefutable  ;  whereas,  if  they  were  slowly  evolved,  that 
evidence  has  been  utterly  and  for  ever  destroyed."   {The 
Scientific  Evidences  of  Organic  Evolution,  pp.  12,  13.) 
Reserving  at  present  the  question  of  the  adequacy 
of    natural    selection,    we   ask,    Is    the    issue   fairly 
put    by    Dr.    Eomanes?     Why   should    supernatural 
design    be   regarded    as    possible    only   if    it    works 
suddenly  and  witib_ a  stroke?  or  why  should  super- 
natural design  be  limited  only  to  Sj^ial  creationsj 
Supposing  natural  selection  true,  what  is  it  but  another, 
way  of  indicating  design  ?     We  are  not  concerned  at 
present  with  the  ways  in  which  the  design  argument 
was  "once  put.     It  may  have  been  stated  inadequately 
or  erroneously,  according  to  the  knowledge  and  ways  of 
thinking  at  the  time.   Science  has  ever  claimed  the  right 
of  restating  its  theories,  the  right  of  making  them  more 
general  and  more  consistent  with  fact.     Why  should 
theology  be  debarred  from  the  same  privilege  ?    Science 
has  often  stated  her  case  foolishly,  and  theology  may 
have  done  so  also  ;  and  were  we  to  play  at  the  game  of 
resuscitating  past  ineptitudes,  it  is  hard  to  say  whether 
science  or  theology  has  most  to  answer  for.     Let  us 
admit  the  doctrine  of  organic  evolution,  and  we  say 
that  Dr.  Eomanes  has  supplied  us  with  an  argument 
for  design  much  more  magnificent  than  that  based  on 
special  creation,  the  evidence  for  which  he  says  has 
been  utterly  and  for  ever  destroyed.     He  simply  says 
that  the  evidence  for  design  is  destroyed  by  that  which 
shows  the  presence  of  a  vaster  design ;  for  design  is{. 
all  the  greater  and  the  more  intelligent  just  in  pro-1 
portion  to  the  comj^lexity  of  the  means  and  the  length  1 1 
of  time  it  takes  to  bring  it  about.     Professor  Huxley 


^AJ^ 


80       CHRISTIANITY  AND   EVOLUTION 

puts  it  thus  :  "  Suppose  that  any  one  had  been  able  to 
show  that  the  watch  had  not  been  made  dh^ectly  by 
any  person,  but  that  it  was  the  result  of  the  modifica- 
tion of  another  watch  which  kept  time  but  poorly,  and 
that  this  again  had  proceeded  from  a  structure  which 
could  hardly  be  called  a  watch  at  all,  seeing  that  it 
had  no  figures  on  the  dial  and  the  hands  were  rudi- 
mentary, and  that,  going  back  and  back  in  time,  we 
come  at  last  to  a  revolving  barrel  as  the  earliest 
traceable  rudiment  of  the  whole  fabric  ;  and  imagine 
that  it  had  been  possible  to  show  that  all  these 
changes  had  resulted  from  a  tendency  in  the  structure 
to  vary  indefinitely,  and,  secondly,  from  something  in 
the  surrounding  world  which  helped  all  variations  in 
the  direction  of  an  accurate  time-keeper,  and  checked 
all  those  in  other  directions  :  then  it  is  obvious  that 
the  force  of  Paley's  argument  is  gone."  {Origin  of 
Species,  Appendix.) 

On  the  contrary,  it  would  appear  all  the  greater,  in 
proportion  as  a  rudimentary  watch,  which  by  constant 
modification  could  produce  other  watches,  is  incom- 
parably more  wonderful  than  any  watch  made  directly 
by  a  person.  Our  friends  seem  to  think  that  they 
deny  design  when  they  show  that  the  design  is  greater 
and  more  wonderful  than  human  designs  ever  are. 
As  we  ponder  on  Professor  Huxley's  illustration,  it 
grows  more  wonderful  under  our  vision.  We  have  in 
the  rudimentary  watch  a^tendency  to  vary  indefinitely, 
but  that  tendency  is  kept  in  one  direction  only  by 
something  in  the  outward  world.  And  Professor 
Huxley  cannot  help  bringing  in  teleology,  even  when  he 
strives  with  all  his  might  to  exclude  it.     The  tendency 


EVOLCTIOX  ANJJ    CREATION  81 

within  c'oiiliolled  l)y  the  tendency  without,  co- 
oidinated  with  a  view  towards  the  production  of 
''  an  accurate  time-keeper "  !  Well,  a  watchmaker 
constructed  the  complicated  system  of  wheels,  levers, 
escapement  for  the  same  useful  end.  Thus  Professor  I 
Huxley  could  not  even  state  the  proposition  which 
denies  teleology  without  the  use  of  language  which 
implied  it.  All  that  he  has  proved  is  that  the  in- 
telligence which  was  needed  to  produce  a  w\atch  which 
evolved  other  watches  was  immeasurably  greater  than 
that  of  Paley's  watchmaker. 

Of  many  other  illustrations  I  shall  refer  only  to 
one ;  and  I  take  it  from  Professor  Lloyd  Morgan, 
whose  works  on  evolution  are  so  valuable  and 
suggestive.  "  Compare  the  engines  of  a  modern  ocean 
steamer  with  even  the  highest  achievement  of  the 
age  of  Watt.  Professor  Shaw,  in  his  paper  on  this 
subject,  gives  a  table  to  show  the  number  of  parts  in 
the  engines  of  a  first-class  Atlantic  hner.  In  that 
table  we  see  that  no  less  than  twenty-three  auxiliary 
engines  minister  to  the  efficiency  of  the  main  engine, 
all  being  definitely  connected  together  into  one 
complex  system.  There  are  no  less  than  thirty-seven, 
separate  levers,  and  a  hundred  and  forty-seven  dis-1 
tinct  valves,  and  the  total  number  of  parts  in  the 
main  and  auxiliary  engines,  including  nuts,  jnns, 
bolts,  studs,  and  so  forth,  all  of  them  necessary  for 
efficiency,  durability,  and  security,  is  something 
like  a  hundred  thousand.  .  .  .  Evolution  is  not  the 
multiplication  of  similar  structures,  but  the  pro- 
duction of  one  more  complex  structure  which  shall  do 
the  work  of  many.     Increase  of  efficiency,  increase 

6 


82       CHRISTIAXITY  AND  EVOLUTION 

of  complexity,  and  increase  of  economy  of  space, 
fuel,  ar.d  material  have  all  gone  hand  in  hand." 
{Springs  of  Conduct,  pp.  159,  160.)  The  whole 
section  is  written  with  clearness  and  method,  and 
is  graphic  and  full  of  interest.  We  seem  to  see  the 
evolving  of  machines.  We  trace  the  steam  engine 
step  by  step,  from  Watt's  somewhat  rudimentary 
engine,  till  we  come  to  the  engine  of  the  Atlantic 
liner.  We  are  glad  to  have  this  illustration  of  evo- 
lution, and  we  might  put  it  alongside  that  of  Professor 
Huxley's  watch,  which  was  supposed  to  be  able  to 
produce  other  watches. 

It  is  just  possible  for  us  to  confine  our  attention 
to  the  series  of  engines  which  is  brought  befoi-e  us 
by  Professor  Lloyd  Morgan.  We  may  fix  our  thought 
on  engine  after  engine,  and  admire  the  successive 
modifications  and  their  great  fitness  for  the  end  in 
view,  just  as  in  nature  we  may  fix  onr  thought  on 
the  successive  modifications  of  living  things  from  the 
algse  up  to  man.  We  may  be  so  interested  in  these 
as  to  ask  no  further  question,  or  may  look  at  them 
as  self-explanatory.  We  may  give  an  explanation 
of  every  improvement  in  the  steam  engine  from 
the  point  of  view  of  the  engine  itself.  We  may 
show  how  each  change  helped  to  make  it  more 
effective,  and  we  may  also  show  its  mechanical 
fitness.  With  all  this  we  may  leave  out  of  sight 
the  one  sufiicient  explanation  of  the  steam  engine. 
The  cause  of  the  engine  is  the  intelligence  of  the 
engineer  ;  every  step  in  the  evolution  was  the  work 
of  intelligence,  working  by  means  and  method,  and 
for  a  foreseen  end.     All  the  mechanics  of  an  engine 


EVOLUTION  AND   CREATION  83 

are  means  to  an  end,  and  the  engine  itself  is  a 
means  for  a  still  further  end,  namely,  swift  and 
safe  communication  between  people  and  people,  and 
this  end  is  for  yet  another  end.  We  have  to  thank 
Professor  Lloyd  Morgan  for  his  illustration.  To  a 
system  of  evolution  which  involves  the  same  kind  of 
causes,  methods,  ends  as  are  manifested  in  the  evo- 
lution of  the  steam  engine  we  can  have  no  possible 
objection.  It  is  just  the  very  kind  of  evolution  we 
are  in  search  of — an  evolution  that  has  reference  to*  a 
mind  that  can  think  and  plan  and  foresee,  devise  ends, 
and  take  means  to  accomplish  the  ends  in  view. 

There  is  no  human  work  which  may  not  be  looked 
at  merely  in  the  light  of  efficient  causes  as  Professor 
Lloyd  Morgan  has  looked  at  machines.  It  is  wonder- 
ful how  much  we  may  explain,  without  even  referring 
to  an  inventor  or  an  author.  A  treatise  on  a  steam 
engine  may  not  mention  the  name  of  Watt  from  first 
to  last ;  it  may  describe  the  elastic  properties  of 
steam,  and  the  laws  of  expansion  and  condensation, 
may  deal  with  the  properties  of  metals,  and  the  forms 
of  cranks,  pistons,  etc.,  and  speak  of  all  these  things 
just  as  we  speak  of  the  law  of  gravitation ;  every  part 
of  the  engine  may  thus  be  explained  on  mechanical 
principles,  and  the  work  which  the  engine  can  do  may 
be  calculated  exactly  to  a  foot-pound :  but  we  know 
that  the  engine  had  an  intelligence  as  its  maker,  and 
a  final  cause  as  its  end. 

In  the  same  way  we  may  study  a  dialogue  of  Plato 
or  a  play  of  Shakespeare.  Take  any  working  edition 
of  a  play  of  Shakespeare,  and  we  may  scarcely  have 
in  it  a  reference  to  the  author.     We  find  notes  on 


-^. 


84       CHRISTIANITY  AND   EVOLUTION 

philology,  which  deal  in  an  impersonal  way  with  the 
history  of  words  and  their  meaning ;  we  lind  gram- 
matical expositions,  which  deal  mainly  with  the  laws 
of  grammar ;  we  may  find  all  the  resources  of  human 
thought  and  ingenuity  tasked  to  ascertain  the  mean- 
ing of  the  play.  In  all  these  things  we  are  dealing 
with  efficient  causes,  and  we  may  give  a  sufficient 
account  of  the  play  from  certain  points  of  view 
without  one  reference  to  the  author.  We  may  take 
it  as  it  stands,  and  seek  to  understand  the  law  of  its 
becoming,  the  conditions  linguistic,  ethical,  social 
which  helped  to  make  it  what  it  is;  and  we  may, 
by  an  enlightened  criticism,  ascertain  its  meaning, 
and  contend  plausibly  that  we  have  really  exhausted 
the  whole  matter  of  the  play.  Still,  there  does 
arise  the  further  question  as  to  the  revelation  of 
the  author  which  is  in  the  play,  and  the  fact  that 
the  meaning  we  find  in  the  play  was  first  put  into 
it  by  a  mind  like  our  own.  We  might  run  the 
parallel  still  more  closely.  We  might  point  out 
that  each  word  in  the  play  has  its  own  character 
and  its  own  particular  history  determined  by  law, 
that  each  grammatical  form  of  sentence  is  ruled  by 
logic,  and  that  the  connection  of  part  and  part  may 
also  be  closely  woven  together  according  to  laws 
which  may  be  formulated;  and  w^e  may  entangle 
the  whole  matter  in  such  a  complex  of  laws  and 
necessities  as  to  find  no  need  for  a  reference  to 
Shakespeare  at  all. 

Now  this  is  exactly  parallel  to  the  procedure  of 
those  who  limit  our  view  of  the  world  to  the  mei'e 
working  of  efficient  causes.     We  welcome  their  earnest 


EVOLUTION  AND   CREATION  85 

toil,  and  we  sit  at  their  feet  while  they  unfold  for 
us  the  wondrous  tale  of  science ;  we  are  grateful  to 
them  as  we  are  grateful  to  an  expositor  of  Plato. 
But  when  we  have  learned  all  that  an  expositor  has 
to  tell  us  of  the  laws  of  grammar,  of  philology,  of 
thought,  we  still  have  the  knowledge  that  these  were 
plastic  in  the  hands  of  Plato,  and  in  the  end  the 
work  is  his  and  his  alone.  In  the  same  way  we 
may  say  to  our  masters  in  science,  after  they  have 
taught  us  all  they  know  about  the  sequences  of 
things  and  the  laws  which  govern  them  :  Is  this  all  ? 
Is  this  web  of  life  and  its  laws  all  you  have  to  tell 
us  ?  Have  you  given  us  any  satisfactory  account  of 
the  meaning  which  you  have  found  in  the  world? 
You  have  explained  to  us  the  evolution  of  the  steam 
engine ;  will  you  allow  us  to  postulate  the  same  kind 
of  cause  for  the  universe  and  the  same  kind  of 
purpose  as  we  know  had  to  do  with  the  evolution  of 
the  steam  engine  ?  If  not,  why  not  ?  Is  it  because 
the  universe  is  so  much  greater  than  the  engine, 
because  the  final  end  is  not  yet  in  sight  ?  Well,  the 
answer  to  that  is,  to  postulate  an  intelligence  equal  to 
the  task.  The  order  and  adaptation  of  the  universe 
are  as  patent  as  those  of  the  engine  ;  but  if  the  order 
and  adaptation  of  the  engine  are  due  to  intelligence, 
why  make  the  order  and  adaptation  of  the  universe 
a  reasoD  for  denying  that  intelligence  had  to  do  with 
the  making  of  it  ?  Consistency  demands  that  we 
should  assert  that  the  engine  evolved  itself. 

These  questions  do  not  arise  in  connection  with  the 
separate  sciences.  They  have  enough  to  do  if  they 
deal  adequately  with  their  own  problems,  just  as  a 


86       CHRISTIANITY  AND   EVOLUTION 

student  will  have  enough  to  do  if  he  is  to  master 
the  principles  of  construction  of  the  steam  engine 
and  the  laws  and  properties  of  the  material  employed 
in  its  construction.  But  we  should  make  short  work 
of  the  contention  of  that  student  who  asserted  that 
the  construction  of  the  engine  is  altogether  due  to 
mechanical  causes.  The  convergence  of  all  these 
into  a  system  has  to  be  explained.  Our  conten- 
tion here  is  that  those  who  wish  to  explain  the 
universe  from  mechanical  causes  alone  are  just  as 
rational  as  the  supposed  student  of  the  steam  engine 
would  be. 

The  evidence  of  intelligence  is  so  much  greater 
that  our  opponents  categorically  deny  it  altogether. 
They  may,  like  Mr.  Spencer,  say  that  they  deny 
intelligence  in  the  interests  of  something  greater  than 
intelligence,  and  then  strive  as  he  does,  through  all  the 
pages  of  the  volumes  of  the  Synthetic  Philosophy,  to 
explain  the  higher  in  terms  of  the  lower ;  they  may 
take  the  order  of  the  universe  as  an  ultimate  fact, 
regarding  which  no  question  is  to  be  asked ;  or  they 
may  couch  their  denial  in  other  terms,  and  urge  it 
for  other  reasons.  But  ultimately  the  argument 
seems  to  come  to  this  :  there  aie  so  many  evidences 
of  intelligence  in  the  universe,  that  we  must  therefore 
infer  the  absence  of  a  guiding  mind. 

In  truth,  the  argument  from  order  to  intelligence 
is  much  more  cogent  than  it  was  in  Paley's  time.  No 
one  ever  strengthened  the  argument  as  Darwin  has 
done.  Evolution  has  widened  it  bej^ond  measure,  and 
the  universe,  its  history  and  its  order,  are  seen  to  be 
\vorthy  of    a  presiding,  guiding  intelligence,  even  of 


EVOLUTION  AND    CREATION  ft7 

an  infinite  order.  Let  us  hope  that  now,  when  the 
rapture  and  the  intoxication  of  the  first  discovery 
of  evohition  have  passed  away,  and  sober  reflection 
lias  come  back,  that  the  denial  of  intelligence  to 
the  source  and  ground  of  the  universe  will  not  be 
persisted  in. 


CHAPTER   VI 

ORGANIC  EVOLUTION 

Statement  by  Professor  Eay  Lankester— New  sets  of  terms 
used  in  biology — Why  are  there  new  terms  ?— Dr.  Bnrdon 
Sanderson — Darwinism — A>,riation, struggle  for  existence, 
natural  selection,  transmission— Anthropomorphic  char- 
acter of  the  process — Malthusianism — Utilitarianism — 
What  is  natural  selection  ?— Comparison  with  the  process 
of  denudation  in  geology  by  Mr.  J.  T.  Cunningham- 
Darwin  on  the  eye — Professor  Huxley's  reproduction  of 
chance — Organic  evolution  likely  true,  but  its  factors  not  , 
yet  discovered. 

THE  task  Avhich  evolution  has  set  itself  may 
be  described  in  the  words  of  Professor  E.  Ray 
Lankester :  "  It  is  the  aim  or  business  of  those  occu- 
pied with  biology  to  assign  living  things,  in  all  their 
variety  of  form  and  activity,  to  the  one  set  of  forces 
recognised  by  the  physicist  and  chemist.  Just  as  the 
astronomer  accounts  for  the  heavenly  bodies  and  their 
movements  by  the  laws  of  motion  and  the  property  of 
attraction,  as  the  geologist  explains  the  present  state 
of  the  earth's  crust  by  the  long-continued  action  of 
the  same  forces  which  at  this  moment  are  studied 
and  treated  in  the  form  of  '  laws  '  by  physicists  and 
chemists ;  so  the  biologist  seeks  to  explain  in  all  its 
details  the  long  process  of  the  evolution  of  the  in- 
numerable forms  of  life  now  existing,  or  which  have 


ORGANIC   EVOLUTION  89 

existed  in  the  past,  as  a  necessary  outcome,  an  auto- 
matic product,  of  these  same  forces."  {Encyc.  Brit., 
voL  xxiv.,  p.  799«.)  Again :  *•  It  was  reserved  for 
Charles  Darwin,  in  the  year  1859,  to  place  the  whole 
theory  of  organic  evolution  on  a  new  footing,  and  by 
his  discovery  of  a  mechanical  cause  actually  existing 
and  demonstrable  by  w^hich  organic  evolution  must 
be  brought  about  to  entirely  change  the  attitude  in 
regard  to  it  of  even  the  most  rigid  exponents  of 
the  scientific  method"  (p.  8016).  "The  history  of 
zoology  as  a  science  is  therefore  the  history  of  the 
great  doctrine  of  living  things  by  the  natural  selection 
of  varieties  in  the  struggle  for  existence,  since  that 
doctrine  is  the  one  medium  whereby  all  the  phenomena 
of  life,  whether  of  form  or  function,  are  rendered 
capable  of  explanation  by  the  law^s  of  physics  and 
chemistry,  and  so  made  the  subject-matter  of  a  true 
science  or  study  of  causes "  (p.  799a).  Professor 
Lankester  has  not  explained  why  in  biology  he  and 
those  who  agree  with  him  have  introduced  a  new  set 
of  terms — terms  which  are  not  used  in  physics  or 
chemistry.  In  physics  and  in  chemistry  men  do  not 
speak  of  "advantage,"  of  "utility,"  of  "interest." 
But  in  the  article  quoted  Professor  Lankester  says : 
"  Darwin's  theory  had  as  one  of  its  results  the  refor- 
mation and  the  rehabilitation  of  teleology.  According 
to  that  theory,  every  organ,  every  part,  colour,  and 
peculiarity  of  an  organism,  must  either  be  of  benefit 
to  the  organism  itself,  or  have  been  so  to  its  ancestors ; 
no  peculiarity  of  structure  or  general  conformation, 
no  habit  or  instinct  in  any  organism,  can  be  supposed 
to  exist  for  the   benefit   or   amusement   of   another 


90        CHRISTIANITY  AXD    EVOLUTION 

oro-anism,  not  even  for  the  delectation  of  man  himself. 
Necessarily,  according  to  the  theory  of  natural  selec- 
tion, structures  either  are  present  because  they  are 
selected  as  useful,  or  because  they  were  still  inherited 
from  ancestors  to  whom  they  were  useful,  though  no 
longer  useful  to  the  existing  representatives  of  these 
ancestors."     (P.  8025.) 

We  know  that  men,  even  of  the  mental  stature  of 
Professor  Pay  Lankester,  sometimes  do  not  co-ordinate 
their  notions,  or  ask  whether  one  part  even  of  a 
short  article  is  quite  consistent  with  another.  If  the 
phenomena  of  biology  have  been  "rendered  capable 
of  explanation  by  the  laws  of  physics  and  chemistry," 
whence  this  new  set  of  terms  unused  and  unre- 
cognised by  these  sciences  1  We  do  not  say  in 
chemistry  that  any  combination  must  be  of  benefit 
either  to  the  molecule  or  its  atoms ;  nor  in  mechanics 
do  we  speak  of  ''interest,"  "advantage,"  "benefit." 
Do  the  terms  used  by  Professor  Lankester  correspond 
to  facts  presented  by  biology  1  Can  the  theory  of 
Darwin  be  even  stated  without  the  use  of  language, 
which  introduces  new  conceptions  not  needed  by 
physics  or  chemistry?  Of  course  every  physical 
body  must  be  consistent  with  chemical  and  physical 
laws ;  but  it  is  not  necessary  for  us  to  say  that 
organisms  must  be  capable  of  explanation  by  them. 
If  the  phenomena  of  life  are  to  be  explained  by 
chemical  and  physical  laws,  clearly  we  are  shut  out 
from  the  use  of  language  implying  conceptions  which 
liave  no  place  in  these  sciences.  Would  it  not  be 
well  to  recognise  this,  and  either  refrain  from  the  use 
of  lanffuaire  fitted  to  mislead,  or  to  admit  that  there  is 


ORGANIC   EVOLUTION  91 

something  in  life  not  to  be  explained  by  physical  and 
chemical  laws  ?  If  we  reduce  the  phenomena  of  life 
to  physical  and  chemical  laws,  they  have  vanished ;  if 
we  recognise  their  distinctive  characteristics,  then  they 
are  no  longer  explicable  by  chemical  and  physical 
laws. 

In  his  address  to  the  British  Association  Dr. 
Burdon  Sanderson  said  :  "  The  methods  of  investi- 
gation being  themselves  physical  or  chemical,  the 
organism  itself  naturally  came  to  be  regarded  as 
a  complex  of  such  processes  and  nothing  more.  In 
particular  the  idea  of  adaptation,  which,  as  I  have 
endeavoured  to  show,  is  not  a  consequence  of  organism, 
but  its  essence,  was  in  a  great  measure  lost  sight  of." 
Again :  "  The  specific  energy  of  a  part  or  organ  ...  is 
simply  the  special  action  which  it  normally  presents, 
its  norma  or  rule  of  action  being  in  each  instance  the 
interest  of  the  organism  as  a  whole,  of  which  it  forms 
a  part."  Could  any  statement  be  further  removed 
from  the  language  of  physics  or  chemistry?  "The 
interest  of  the  organism  "  as  a  whole  gives  the  norma 
or  rule  to  each  organ ;  and  yet  even  Dr.  Burdon 
Sanderson  says  in  the  same  address :  "  The  leading- 
notion  was  that,  however  complicated  the  conditions 
under  which  vital  energies  manifest  themselves,  they 
can  be  split  into  processes  which  are  identical  in 
nature  with  those  of  the  non-living  world ;  and  as  a 
corollary  to  this,  that  the  analysing  of  a  vital  process 
into  its  physical  and  chemical  constituents,  so  as  to 
bring  these  constituents  into  measurable  relations 
with  physical  or  chemical  standards,  is  the  only  mode 
of  investicratinof  them  which  can  lead  to  satisfactorv 


92        CHRISTIANITY  AND   EVOLUTION 

results."  The  statement  is  historical,  but  from  the 
general  tenor  of  the  address  it  would  seem  to  be  the 
view  which  Dr.  Sanderson  himself  holds.  If  this  be 
the  only  method  which  can  lead  to  satisfactory  results, 
then  the  task  of  investigation  might  well  end;  for 
when  vital  energies  are  split  into  processes  like  those 
of  the  non-living  world  the  essential  nature  of  the 
matter  in  hand  is  lost  in  the  splitting. 

While  the  organism  in  itself  does  not  create  energy 
or  matter,  yet  the  transformation  of  energy  and  matter 
in  living  organisms  is  quite  difterent  from  that  which 
takes  place  in  inanimate  matter,  and  to  endeavour  to 
explain  the  one  by  the  other  is  to  lose  sight  of  the 
initial  difference.     "  The  difference  between  the  vital - 
istic  and  mechanical  schools  might  indeed  be  regarded 
as  one  of  words  ;  it  is,  however,  one  of  ideas.    As  one 
of  the  speakers  said,  the  tendency  of  the  official  physio- 
logy of  the  text-book  and  the  laboratory,  the  lecture- 
room  and  the  examination-hall,  has  been  to  narrow 
its  field  to  the  investigation  that  requires  the  precise 
instruments  of  physics  and  chemistry,  and  to  ignore 
the  fruitful  field  now  successfully  tilled  by  the  zoologist 
and  the  botanist,  whose  results  are  expressible  only  in 
the  terminology  of  intelligent  speech,  not  in  grains, 
centimeters,  seconds,  or  degrees.      This  is  the  cause 
of  the  aridity  of  so  much  modern  physiology,  almost 
divorced  from  the  study  of  protoplasmic  life,  of  ex- 
perimental embryology,  and  of   heredity."     (Marcus 
Hartog,  in  Speaker,  Sept.  3rd,  1893.)     The  truth  of 
the  charge  brought  by  Mr.  Hartog  is  very  evident, 
and  this  comparative  barrenness  is  due  to  the  belief 
lield   liy    many,    and   formulated   by   Professor    Eay 


OnaANIC   EVOLUTION  93 

Laiike.ster,  that  the  laws  of  chemistry  and  ph^'sics  are 
capable  of  explaining  the  phenomena  of  life.  But 
when  the  ideas  of  struggle,  of  advantage,  of  vitality, 
and  other  ideas  of  the  same  order  enter  in,  we  have 
passed  from  mechanics,  and  have  entered  a  sphere 
wherein  new  phenomena  reign,  and  these  phenomena 
have  laws  peculiar  to  themselves.  They  may  use  the 
powers  of  chemistry  and  physics,  but  they  use  them 
in  their  own  way  and  for  new  ends  and  purposes. 

But  we  may  try  to  obtain  a  real  view  of  what  Mr. 
Darwin  has  done,  and  seek  to  understand  what  natural  | 
selection  is,  and  does,  and  can  do.  It  is  not  necessary  i 
for  us  to  trace  the  history  of  this  great  conception,  or 
to  dwell  on  the  fact  that  there  were  evolutionists  before 
Darwin.  Such  histories  there  are  in  abundance  :  for 
example,  in  the  articles  on  "  Evolution  "  by  Professor 
Huxley  and  Professor  Sully,  in  the  latest  edition  of 
the  Encydoimdia  Britannica.  Darwin  and  Wallace^ 
however,  turned  an  abstract  speculation  into  a  work- 
ing hypothesis.  They  were  able  to  show  how  evolution 
might  be  brought  about.  They  were  able  to  point  to 
causes  actually  at  work  in  the  play  of  organic  life 
around  us,  and  that  if  similar  causes  were  at  work 
for  a  long  period  back  then  the  web  of  life  might  be 
understood  and  explained.  As  stated  by  Mr.  A.  E. 
Wallace  the  great  principles  of  Darwinism  are  these. 
Two  main  classes  of  facts  are  apparent  to  us  when  we 
look  at  life  and  its  manifestations.  The  first  is  the 
enormous  increase  of  organisms.  They  tencFto  in- 
crease in  geometrical  ^progression,  while  their  means 
of  subsistence  tend  to  increase  in  arithmetical 
progression.      Hence  there   must   be   a  struggle  for_ 


94        CIIIUSTIANITY  AND   EVOLUTION 

existenfig,.  for  the  number  of  the  offspring  greatly 
exceeds  the  number  of  the  parents.  They  compete 
with  each  other,  they  are  destroyed  also  by  cold  and 
heat,  rain  and  snow,  floods  and  storm.  "  There  is 
thus  a  perpetual  struggle  among  them  which  shall 
live  and  which  shall  die  ;  and  this  struggle  is  tremen- 
dously severe,  because  so  few  can  possibly  remain 
alive"  {Darwinism,  p.  11).  Along  with  the  struggle 
there  is  a  second  class  of  facts,  which  is  summed  up 
under  the  names  of  variation  and  ti-ansmission.  There 
are  variations,  for  all  individuals  of  a  species  are  not 
alike ;  if  they  were  alike,  there  would  b3  no  grounds 
for  the  survival  of  one  rather  than  another.  But 
individuals  do  vary,  and  vary  in  many  ways.  Some 
may  be  stronger,  swifter,  more  healthy,  more  cunning, 
may  have  a  colour  which  gives  them  a  better  chance 
of  hiding,  may  have  keener  sight,  and  any  beneficial 
variation  will  help  the  individual  in  the  struggle,  and 
the  fittest  willjbe  sure  to  survive. 

Beneficial    variations    will    be    transmitted    from 
one   generation   to   another,   and   the  eftect  will  be 
,f  cumulative.      Natural    ^election     will     secure    that 
I   the   variation   best    suited    to   its    environment   will 
V  survive  ;    and  as  the  action  of  natural   selection  is 
constant,  new  variations  will  be  selected ;  and  thus, 
in  each  generation,  the  fittest  will  survive,  and  so  long 
as  the  variations  are  beneficial  they  will  go  on  and 
will  accumulate.     Natural  selection,  acting  on  varia- 
tions which  somehow  arise,  accumidating  the  variations 
and  transmitting  them  from  generation  to  generation, 
is  held  to  account  for  the  origin  and  survival  of  all 
tlie  organic  species  now  in  existence  on  the  earth. 


ORGANIC   EVOLUTIOy 


95 


Now  it  Avoiild  be  idle  to  deny  the  great  merit  ol" 
Darwin's  work,  or  the  reality  of  the  process  which 
he  describes.  Organisms  are  produced  in  such 
abundance  that  it  is  impossible  they  can  all  survive. 
Some  of  the  plants  and  animals  which  are  constantly 
being  produced  must  perish,  and  those  perish  which 
are  least  adapted  and  those  survive  which  are  best 
adapted  to  the  conditions  of  existence.  Natural 
selection  is  just  the  process  1jy  which  the  fittest  are 
picked  out  and  the  least  fit  are  left  to  perish. 

So  far  all  is  clear  and  intelligible.  But  it  is 
interesting  to  notice  how  much  of  ourselves  and  our 
nature  we  have  thus  read  into  nature.  We  have 
indeed,  under  the  guidance  of  Darwin  and  Wallace, 
explained  nature  in  terms  of  human  natuie.  We 
do  not  object ;  for  man  is  always  the  middle  term  in 
oar  interpretation  of  the  world.  We  expect  nature 
to  be  rational,  to  respond  to  our  intelligence  and  to 
our  methods,  and  we  find  the  correspondence  does 
exist  and  is  real.  We  do,  however,  object  to  the 
constant  denunciation  of  anthropomorphism  by  men 
who  are  the  most  anthropomorphic  of  any.  The  term 
natural  selection  is  in  Darwin's  own  words :  "  This 
preservation  of  favourable  differences  and  variations, 
and  the  destruction  of  those  which  are  injurious,  I 
have  called  natural  selection,  or  the  survival  of  the 
fittest."  The  term  itself  is  borrowed  from  that 
progressive  selection  practised  by  man  in  the  rearing 
of  domesticated  animals  and  cultivated  plants.  Slight 
differences  may  be  accumulated  in  one  dii-ection  during 
many  generations  until  what  looks  like  a  new  species 
is   produced.      ''The  key,'*   says  Darwin,   "is  man's 


)4i0A/ 


96        CHRISTIANITY  AND   EVOLUTION 

power  of  accumulative  selection  ;  nature  gives  succes- 
sive variations  ;  man  adds  them  up  in  certain  directions 
useful  to  him."  This  kind  of  language  is  readily 
understood,  and  every  one  may  at  once  see  what  is 
meant.  It  seems  that  the  variations  are  already 
giyen,  and  man  selects  those  varieties  which  tend  in 
a  certain  direction,  and  leaves  them  free  to  breed 
together.  The  breeder  takes  advantage  of  the  ten- 
dency to  variation,  and  also  of  the  tendency  to  the 
accumulation  of  variations ;  but  he  is  unable  to 
explain  the  variation  or  the  accumulation.  It  is  to 
be  observed  also  that,  so  far  as  the  action  of  the 
breeder  is  concerned,  we  have  had  recourse  to  a 
selecting  agency  beyond  the  organism  itself.  The 
purpose  is  in  the  mind  of  the  breeder,  and  not  in 
the  organism  or  the  environment. 

What  the  breeder  eftects  by  conscious  selection, 
the  struggle  for  existence  is  supposed  to  effect  in 
organic  beings  iu  a  state  of  nature.  Man  selects 
what  is  useful  to  man ;  Nature  selects  what  is  for 
the  good  of  the  individual  or  the  species,  in  the 
competition  with  rivals.  It  is  difficult  to  pass  from 
man's  conscious  selection  to  natural  selection ;  if  we 
do,  however,  let  us  observe  in  passing  how  anthropo- 
morphic we  are.  We  may  acknowdedge  that  the 
process  is  similar  in  both  cases.  Looking  away  for 
the  moment  from  man's  selecting  care,  we  observe 
that  the  process  consists  in  leaving  those  forms 
which  have  certain  peculiarities  free  to  breed  to- 
gether. Other  forms  are  removed  by  the  agency  of 
the  breeder.  But  there  is  also  a  selective  breeding 
due  to    the  kilhng    out    of    competing    forms  by  the 


J  \  'Y-^./^A^n^  u  wjw  1A^»  y    |^  '  -^^^-v,^ 


y  V^v-'  N/v- 


ORGANIC   EVOLUTION  97 

struggle  for  existence.  "  As  man,"  says  Darwin, 
"can  produce  a  great  result  with  his  domestic  animals 
and  plants  by  adding  up  in  any  given  direction 
individual  differences,  so  could  natural  selection,  but 
far  more  easily  from  having  incomparably  longer 
time  for  action."  We  note  in  passing  the  likening  I 
of  nature's  work  to  man's,  and  we  also  note  that 
results  are  ascribed  both  to  nature's  work  and  to  man's, 
which  they  are  not  competent  to  produce.  Darw^in 
admits  that  man  "  can  neither  originate  varieties  nor 
prevent  their  occurrence."  "  He  can  only  preserve 
and  accumulate  such  as  do  occur."  He  assumes  that 
man  can  accumulate,  and  proceeds  to  assume  that 
natural  selection  can  also  accumulate.  "  It  may 
metaphorically  be  said  that  natural  selection  is  daily 
and  hourly  scrutinising  throughout  the  world  the 
slightest  variations,  rejecting  those  that  are  bad  and 
adding  up  all  that  is  good."  Yes  ;  hut  in  the  sequel 
we  pass  from  the  metaphor,  and  we  are  made  to 
believe  that  we  have  referred  the  origin  of  species 
to  purely  natural  causation.  When  we  examine,  the 
metaphor  somewhat  closely,  we  find  that  all  we  have 
got  from  Mr.  Darwdn  is  this  :  beings  with  the  most  ' 
serviceable  variations  survive  in  the  struggle  for 
existence. 

Professor  Huxley,  in  his  animated  and  interesting 
paper  contributed  to  the  Life  of  Darwin,  says :  "  The 
suggestion  that  new  species  may  result  from  the 
selective  action  of  external  conditions  upon  the  varia- 
tions from  their  specific  type  which  individuals  present 
— and  which  we  call  '  spontaneous  '  because  we  are 
ignorant  of  their  causation — is  as  wholly  unknown  to 

7 


98       CHRISTIANITY  AND   EVOLUTION 

tlie  historian  of  scientific  ideas  as  it  was  to  biological 
specialists  before  1858.  But  that  suggestion  is  the 
central  idea  of  the  Origin  of  Sjyecies,  and  contains 
the  quintessence  of  Darwinism."  (Vol.  ii.,  p.  195.) 
"That  which  we  were  looking  for  and  could  not  find 
was  a  hypothesis  respecting  the  origin  of  known 
organic  forms,  which  assumed  the  operation  of  no 
causes  but  such  as  could  be  proved  to  be  actually  at 
w^ork.  We  wanted  not  to  pin  our  faith  to  that  or 
any  other  speculation,  but  to  get  hold  of  clear  and 
definite  conceptions  which  could  be  brought  face  to 
face  with  facts,  and  have  their  validity  tested.  The 
Origin  provided  us  with  the  working  hypothesis  we 
wanted.  Moreover,  it  did  the  immense  service  of 
freeing  us  for  ever  from  the  dilemma.  Refuse  to 
accept  the  creation  hypothesis,  and  what  have  you 
to  propose  that  can  be  accepted  by  any  cautious 
reasoner?  In  1857  I  had  no  answer  ready,  and  I  do 
not  think  that  any  one  else  had.  A  year  later  we 
reproached  ourselves  with  dulness  for  being  perplexed 
by  such  an  inquiry.  My  reflection,  when  I  first  made 
myself  master  of  the  central  idea  of  the  Origin,  was 
'  How  extremely  stupid  not  to  have  thought  of  that.' 
.  .  .  The  facts  of  variabihty,  of  the  struggle  for 
existence,  of  adaptation  to  conditions  were  notorious 
enough ;  but  none  of  us  had  suspected  that  the  road 
to  the  heart  of  the  species  problem  lay  through  them, 
until  Darwin  and  Wallace  dispelled  the  darkness,  and 
the  beacon-fire  of  the  Origin  guided  the  benighted." 
(P.  197.) 

The  Professor  is  enthusiastic,  and  we  do  not  wonder. 
He  had  "  got  hold  of  clear  and  definite  conceptions 


ORGANIC  EVOLUTION-  99 

which    coiihl   be  brought  face    to   face    with   facts." 

The  conceptions,  as  we  have  seen,  are  not  quite  clear. 

The  appropriate  machinery  was  largely  metaphorical ; 

the  struggle  for  existence   was  exaggerated.     If  we 

want  to  have  any  principle  of  science  or  philosophy 

pushed  to  an  extreme,  we  always  have  recourse  to 

Mr.   Grant  Allen.      "The  baker  does  not  fear  the 

competition  of  the  butcher  in  the  struggle  for  life  ;  it 

is  the  competition  of   other    bakers   that  sometimes 

inexorably  crushes  him  out  of  existence.  ...  In  this 

way  the  great  enemies  of   the  individual  herbivores 

are  not  the  carnivores,  but  the  other  herbivores.  .  .  . 

It  is  not  so  much  the  battle  between  the  tiger  and 

the  antelope,  between  the  wolf  and  the  bison,  between 

the  snake   and    the  bird,   that   ultimately  results  in 

natuial  selection  or   survival   of   the   fittest,    as  the 

struggle  between  tiger  and  tiger,  between  bison  and 

bison,  between  snake  and  snake,  between  antelope  and 

antelope."    (Quoted  in  The  Study  of  Animal  Life,  by 

J.  Arthur  Thomson,  p.  38.)    Thus  Mr.  Grant  Allen,  in 

his  anthropomorphic  way,  takes  the  struggle  between 

baker  and  baker,  and  makes  it  the  typical  struggle  of 

the  universe.     And  the  same  may  be  said  of  natural 

selection.     So  also  we  might  see  the  extension  of  the 

human  analogy  in  the  large  part  which  "  utility  "  has 

played  in  the  Darwinian  theory.     "  Any  being,  if  it 

vary,  however  slightly,  in  any  manner  proiitable  to 

itself,  will  have  a  better  chance  of  surviving,  and  thus 

be  naturally  selected."     Every  structiu-e  either  now 

is  or    was  formerly  of   some   direct    or    indirect    use 

to  its  possessor.     In   fact,  natural  selection  rests  on)' 

"  utility,"  and  this  is  nothing  else  than  the  extension  / 


100      CHRISTIANITY  AND   EVOLUTION 

to    the    organic   world    of  the    national    utilitarian 
ethics. 

Malthusianism  and  utilijtai-ianism  are  main  ele- 
ments in  the  theory  of  Darwin.  The  principle  of 
utiKty,  however,  does  not  seem  to  have  any  relation 
to  the  origin  of  species.  The  selection  of  the  useful 
in  the  struggle  for  existence  does  not  explain  the 
origin  of  new  characters.  Utility  is  after  all  only  a 
relative  conception,  and  it  cannot  possibly  he  the  funda- 
mental principle  of  the  organic  world.  Utility  is  an 
attribute  of  what  is;  a  character  or  quality  must  first 
exist  before  it  can  be  useful.  It  has  no  utility  btfore  it 
existed,  and  it  can  have  none  during  the  period  of  its 
foi'mation.  Utility  leaves  untouched  the  question  of 
the  means  by  which  it  has  been  brought  into  existence. 
"  Selection,  whether  natural  or  artificial,  is  perfectly 
analogous  to  the  process  of  denudation  in  geology.  It 
explains  the  extinction  of  innumerable  forms,  and  the 
consequent  gaps  and  intervals  which  separate  species, 
families,  orders,  etc. ;  just  as  denudation  explains  the 
want  of  continuity  in  the  stratified  rocks.  But 
geologists  have  never  been  blind  enough  to  suppose  that 
the  evolution  of  the  structure  of  a  given  rock  was  due 
to  denudation ;  they  have  always  believed  that  the 
structure  of  each  rock  was  due  to  the  efiects  of  the 
forces  which  have  acted  upon  it  since  its  formation, 
and  they  have  devoted  their  energies  to  tracing  by 
observation  and  experiment  the  effects  of  the  various 
forces."  (Preface  to  Eimer's  Organic  Evolution,  by 
J.  T.  Cunningham,  p.  xxi.) 

With  this  view  of  the  action  of  natural  selection 
Mr.  Darwin  seems  himself  to  agree  :  "  Several  writers 


ORG  A  ma  EVOLUTION'  101 

have  misapprehended  or  objected  to  th-  term  ^  natural 
selection ' ;  some  have  even  imagined  that  natural 
selection  induces  variability,  whereas  it  implies  only 
the  preservation  of  such  variations  as  arise  and  are 
beneficial  to  the  being  under  its  conditions  of  life" 
{Origin  of  Sjyecies,  p.  110).  But  does  Mr.  Darwin 
himself  always  use  the  words  in  this  sense  1  On  the 
contrary,  we  find  that  he  constantly  speaks  of  natural 
selection  as  able  to  "  produce  structures."  Take  his 
description  of  the  evolution  of  the  eye  :  "  When  we 
reflect  on  these  facts,  here  given  much  too  briefly,  with 
respect  to  the  wide,  diversified,  and  graduated  range 
of  structure  in  the  eyes  of  the  lower  animals ;  and  when 
we  bear  in  mind  how  small  the  number  of  all  liviuir 

o 

forms  must  be  in  comparison 'with  those  which  have 
become  extinct,  the  difliculty  ceases  to  be  very  great 
in  believing  that  natural  selection  may  have  converted 
the  simple  apparatus  of  an  optic  nerve  coated  with 
pigment  and  invested  by  transparent  membrane  into 
an  optical  instrument  as  perfect  as  possessed  by 
any  member  of  the  Articulate  Class"  (sect.  275). 
Further  on  there  is  a  marvellous  passage :  "  If  we 
must  compare  the  eye  to  an  optical  instrument,  we 
ought  in  imagination  to  take  a  thick  layer  of  trans- 
parent tissue,  w4th  spaces  filled  with  fluid,  and  with  a 
nerve  sensitive  to  light  beneath,  and  then  suppose 
every  part  of  this  layer  to  be  continually  changing 
slowly  in  density,  so  as  to  separate  into  layers  of 
different  densities  and  thicknesses,  placed  at  different 
distances  from  each  other,  and  with  the  surface  of 
each  layer  slowly  changing  in  form.  Further,  we 
must  suppose  that  there  is  a  power,  represented  by 


102      CHRISTIANITY  AND   EVOLUTION 

natural  selection  or  the  survival  of  the  fittest,  always 
intently  watching  each  slight  alteration  in  the  trans- 
parent layers ;  and  carefully  preserving  each  which, 
under  varied  circumstances,  in  any  way,  or  in  any 
degree,  tends  to  produce  a  distincter  image.  We  must 
suppose  each  new  state  of  the  instrument  to  be  multi- 
plied by  the  million,  each  to  be  preserved  until  a 
better  one  is  produced,  and  then  the  old  ones  to  be  all 
destroyed.  In  living  bodies  variation  will  cause  the 
slight  alterations,  generation  will  multiply  them 
almost  infinitely,  and  natural  selection  will  pick  out 
with  unerring  skill  each  improvement.  Let  this 
process  go  on  for  millions  of  years,  and  during  each 
year  on  millions  of  individuals  of  many  kinds  ;  and 
may  we  not  believe  that  a  living  optical  instrument 
might  thus  be  formed,  as  superior  to  one  of  glass  as 
the  works  of  the  Creator  are  to  those  of  man  ? " 
(Sect.  277.)  "  Reason  tells  me  that,  if  numerous 
gradations,  from  a  simpler  and  impei'fect  eye  to  one 
complex  and  perfect,  can  be  shown  to  exist,  each 
grade  being  useful  to  its  possessor,  as  is  certainly 
the  case ;  if,  further,  the  eye  ever  varies,  and  the 
variations  be  inherited,  as  is  likewise  certainly  the 
case;  and  if  such  variations  should  be  useful  to 
the  animal  under  changing  conditions  of  life,  then 
the  difficulty  of  believing  that  a  peifect  and  complex 
eye  could  be  formed  by  natural  selection,  though 
insuperable  to  our  imagination,  should  not  be 
considered  as  subversive  of  the  theory"  (sect.  271). 
•'  Formed  by  natural  selection,"  "  natural  selection 
always  intently  watching  each  slight  alteration," 
"natural  selection  will  pick  out  with  unerring  skill 


ORGANIC  EVOLUTION  103 

each  improvement."  Truly  the  functions  performed  by 
Natural  Selection  are  great !  At  one  time  it  watches, 
then  it  picks  out,  then  it  accumulates,  and  lastly  it  has 
a  "  productive  "  power.  At  one  time  Darwin  claims 
nothing  for  it  but  the  power  of  eliminating  the  least 
advantageous  eyes,  and  suddenly  this  claim  changes 
into  a  claim  to  produce  advantageous  eyes.  But'j 
though  natural  selection  may  explain  how  a  particular 
eye  came  to  be  preserved,  it  tells  us  nothing  of  the/ 
formation  of  any  eye. 

We  are  not  concerned  to  deny  the  theory  of  organic  . 
evolution,  nor  even  to  say  that  Darwin's  account  of 
the  evolution  of  the  eye  is  improbable.  What  we 
are  concerned  with  is  the  bearing  of  his  theory  on 
teleology.  And  we  see  that  his  view  is  not  in- 
compatible with  design.  He  cannot  dispense  withv' 
superintendence,  nor  with  an  agency  w^hicli  watches, 
picks  out,  accumulates,  and  forms.  The  question  is, 
To  whom  or  to  what  shall  we  ascribe  this  selecting 
power  ?  To  foresight,  to  forethought,  or  to  what  ] 
One  does  not  care  to  ascribe  to  learned  and  thoughtful 
men  views  which  they  have  earnestly  repudiated.  They 
have  denied  most  emphatically  that  they  believe  in 
"  chance  "  as  a  cause.  They  use  the  word  because  they 
do  not  know  the  causes  of  variation.  Still,  they  use 
the  word,  and  they  use  it  not  only  as  a  name  for  the 
action  of  causes  which  they  do  not  know,  but  they  use  it 
as  if  it  produced  something.  Variation  is  fortuitous. 
A'^ariatioris  are  in  all  directions,  and  those  which 
happened  to  hit  on  a  stable  combination  survived- 
But  this  is  chance.  Variations,  however,  are  not 
indefinite.     If  variations  are  in  definite  directions,  if 


104      CHRISTIANITY  AND   EVOLUTION 

\"  a  whale  does  not  tend  to  vary  in  the  direction  of 
producing  feathers,  nor  a  bird  in  the  direction  of  pro- 
ducing whalebone,"  then  manifestly  natural  selection  is 
lot  incompatible  with  design.  May  we  not  say  that 
latural  selection  is  design  ?  It  may,  indeed,  be  said 
ihat,  though  variation  now  proceeds  in  definite  hues, 
or  in  certain  fixed  directions,  it  was  not  always  so. 
There  may  have  been  a  time  when  Hfe  proceeded 
indefinitely  in  all  directions,  and  reached*  positions 
of  temporary  stable  equilibrium  only  after  a  series  of 
ti'ials  and  errors.  But  that  is  a  mere  speculation, 
and  is  not  worthy  of  the  name  of  science.  Life  has 
had  a  certain  bent  from  the  beginning  of  life;  it 
has  proceeded  along  certain  lines,  and  has  grown  in 
certain  directions,  and  the  bent  and  set  are  just  the 
very  things  to  be  accounted  for. 
t  The  issue  to-day  is,  we  repeat,  not  between  "  evo- 
lution "  and  what  our  friends  are  pleased  to  call 
"  special  creation."  It  is  between  evolution  under  the  1 
guidance  of  intelligence  and  purpose,  and  evolution 
as  a  fortuitous  result.  "  According  to  teleology,  each 
organism  is  like  a  rifle  bullet  fired  straight  at  a  mark  ; 
according  to  Darwin  organisms  are  like  grape  shot,  of 
which  one  hits  something  and  the  rest  fall  wide. 
For  the  teleologist  an  organism  exists  for  the  con- 
ditions in  which  it  was  found ;  for  the  Darwinian  an 
organism  exists,  because  out  of  many  of  its  kind  it 
is  the  only  one  which  has  been  able  to  persist  in  the 
conditions  in  which  it  was  found."  (Huxley,  On  the 
Origin  of  Species,  Appendix.)  We  do  not  accept 
this  account  of  teleology ;  nor  do  we  know  whence 
Professor  Huxley  derived  the  notion.     At  all  events, 


ORGANIC  EVOLUTION  105 

what  teleology  demands  is  that  we  do  recognise  those 
adaptations  to  purpose  which  are  so  manifest  in  the 
universe,  of  which  also  the  works  of  Darwin  are  so 
full.     It  is  not  necessary  to  teleology  to  suppose  that 
''  each  organism  is  fired  straight  at  a  mark."     What 
is  necessary  is  that  the  organism  hits  the  mark.     If 
the  hitting  of  the  mark  is  accomplished  by  a  persistent 
process  prolonged  throughout  the  centuries,  implying 
completeness    of    arrangement    and    adjustment    of 
means  to  ends  in  a  complicated  series,  then  the  result 
is  not  against  teleology ;  on  the  contrary,  it  simply 
heightens  our  view  of  the  skill  of  the  teleologist.      ' 
If   we   can    in  a    measure    understand    the   steps 
of   the   process   and    the   magnitude   of    the   opera- 
tion,   as    Darwin    and    Huxley    enable    us    to    do, 
then    our    wonder    is    made    all    the    greater,    and 
we  fall  prostrate  before  the  unutterable  w^isdom   of 
the    intelligence   which    made   the  world.       Such    a 
teleology   is   not   opposed    to    evolution;    but    it    is 
opposed   to    Professor    Huxley's    "  grape-shot "   view 
of   the  universe.      Yet  in  his  article  in  the  Life  of 
Darwin   Professor    Huxley  is   indignant    with  those 
who  "  charge  Mr.  Darwin  with  having  attempted  to 
reinstate  the  old  pagan   goddess   Chance";    and   he 
adds :  "  Probably  the  best  answer  to  those  who  talk 
of  Darwinism  meaning  the  reign  of  '  Chance  '  is  to 
ask  them  what  t!iey  themselves  mean  by  '  chance.'    Do 
they  believe  that  anything  in  this  universe  happens 
without  reason  and  without  a  cause  ?  ;^  Do  they  really 
conceive  that  any  event  has  no  cause,  or  could  not 
have  been  predicted  by  any  one  who  had  a  sufficient 
insight  into  the  oi^der  of  nature?"  )  {Life  of  Darvnn, 


106      CHPJSTIAXITY  AXD   EVOLUTIOX 

pp.  200,  201.)  ReallvJ*rofesso2jHiixieVj_by  his  descrip- 
tion of  Darwinism  as  a  ••method  of  tr^^^]  nriH  pi-rov  " 
and  of  organisms  as  being  Hke  ••  grape  shot  of  which  one  I 
hits  something  and  the  rest  fall  wide."  has  done  more 
than  anybody  else  to  fasten  the  charge  on  Mr.  Darwin 
of  having  attempted  to  reinstate  the  old  pagan 
goddess  Chance.  He  should  restrain  his  indignation. 
How  does  his  grape-shot  illustration  agree  with  "  the 
one  act  of  faith  in  the  conyert  to  science."  namely, 
'•  the  confession  of  the  nniversality  of  order,  and  of 
the  absolute  validity  in  all  times  and  under  all  cir- 
cumstances of  the  law  of  causation "'  ?  Where  is 
the  causation  in  the  organism  which  hits  and  the 
oro-anisms  which  fall  wide  I  Could  any  one,  however 
^eat  his  insight  into  the  order  of  nature,  have  pre- 
dicted which  one  would  hit  and  which  would  fall 
wide  ?  Why  should  any  organism  hit  anything  in 
the  circumstances  \  Need  we  wonder  that  any  one, 
having  read  Professor  Huxley  on  the  origin  of 
species,  should  come  to  the  conclusion  that  the  essence 
of  Darwinism  was  jtist  this  appeal  to  chance  ?  The 
appeal  to  ''  lucky  accidents "  is  made  so  often  by 
Mr.  Darwin  and  his  followers  that  one  can  hardly 
help  thinking  of  the  '•  lucky  accident  '"  as  ha\-ing  a 
part  to  play  in  the  constitution  of  things. 

Leaving  chance  and  accident  out  of  account  on 
both  sides,  our  contention  is  that  teleology'  gives  us 
the  only  tenable  explanation  of  the  history  of  life  on 
the  earth.  The  evidence  of  organic  evolution  is  so 
vast,  so  varied,  that  most  people  nowadays  must 
accept  the  conclusion  to  which  it  points.  Naturalists 
are  convinced  that  the  plants  and  animals  of  to-day 


w 


ORGAXIC   EVOLUTION  107 

are  descended  from  others  of  a  simpler  sort,  and  that  1  [ 
these  are  descended  from  othei^  yet  more  simple,  /  / 
and  thus  '^e  may  conceivably  go  back  to  the  first 
beginnings  of  life.  The  arguments  of  Darwin  are 
based  on  the  distribution  of  animals  in  space,  their 
successive  appearance  in  time,  on  actual  variations 
in  domestication,  cultivation,  and  in  nature,  on  facts 
of  structure,  and  on  embryology.  The  evidence 
seems  irresistible.  Most  scientific  men  accept  it :  and 
they  have  their  rights,  and  are  bound  to  uphold, 
vindicate,  and  expound  what  they  believe  to  be  true. 
If  organic  evolution,  then,  be  accepted  as  true,  where 
do_we  stand  ?  Have  we  any  interest  in  what  is 
caUed  "special  creations"?  '  If  we  believe  in  in-  I 
telligence  a>s  the  cause  of  order,  then  we  should  ) 
expect  that  all  organic  forms  have  arisen  in  eon-  ( 
formity  -^dth  uniform  laws,  and  not_through  breaches 
of  uniform  law.  We  no  longer  beheve — whatever 
men  (hd  once  believe — that  plants  and  animals  were 
suddenly  thrust  into  the  'complex  conditions  of  their 
Jife  ;  that  the  complex  of  inner  relations  was  suddenly 
and  in  a  moment  adjusted  to  the  complex  of  outer 
relations ;  or  that  the  actual  concrete  Life  of  a  plant 
or  an  animal  was  thus  originated  and  perpetuated. |j 
But  creation  by  evolution  is  still  creation.  1 

Evolution  is  opposed  only  to  a  particular  jtheory  of  ^ 
creation,  and  that  theory  was  as  rnudi"  scientrfic  as 
religious.     There  is  a  theory  of  special  creation  which  i 
can  be  no  longer  held.     The  view  was  that  each  species  j  i 
or  kind  was  dii-ectly  created  by  God  at  the  beginning '  I 
of  the  world,  and  has  gone  on  reproducing  itself  after 
its  kind.     The  clearest  statement  of  this  view  Ls  to  be 


{\Wi 


108      CHRISTIANITY  AND   EVOLUTION 

found  in  the  great  botanist  Linnreus,  who  held  that 
"  there  are  just  so  many  species  as  there  are  different 
forms  created  by  the  infinite  Being ;  and  these 
different  forms,  according  to  the  laws  of  reproduction 
imposed  on  them,  produced  others,  but  always  forms 
like  themselves."  We  have  something  like  the  same 
view  in  Milton's  Paradise  Lost :  lions,  tigers,  stags,  all 
ready-made,  working  their  way  out  of  the  earth, — 

"  The  tawny  lion,  pawing  to  get  free 
His  hinder  parts,"  etc. 

At  the  beginning  of  this  century  the  belief  was 
universal,  both  among  religious  and  scientific  men,  that 
species  were  fixed  and  never  passed  into  each  other. 

I  Now  all  this  is  altered,  and  most  scientific  men  hold  a 

i  doctrine  of  descent,  or  evolution. 

It  is  clear  that  the  doctrine  of  special  creation  as 

I  set  forth,  say,  by  Linnaeus,  is  inconsistent  with  the 
doctrine  of  Darwin.  And  if  organic  evolution  is  true, 
we  have  to  ask.  Are  we  committed  to  the  doctrine 
of  special  creation?  or  rather.  Is  the  doctrine  of 
special  creation  as  above  defined  an  essential  part 
of  theism  or  Christianity  ?  There  was  a  time  when 
men  earnestly  contended  for  the  immutability  of 
species,  and  thought  that  important  consecpiences 
would  follow  from  the  denial  of  it.  But  that  time 
is  past,  and  the  immutability  of  species  happily 
forms  no  part  of  the  creed  of  Christendom,  nor  of  the 

(teaching  of  Scripture ;  for  the  creeds  of  Christendom 
simply  aflSrm  that  God  is  the  Maker  of  the  world  and 
all  that  is  in  it,  and  does  not  say  anything  about 
the  way  and  manner  in  which  He  made  them.     The 


ORGANIC   EVOLUTION  109 

Scriptui-6  says  that  "  Pie  maketh  the  grass  to  grow 
on  the  mountains  "  ;  but  says  nothing  about  whether 
He  caused  it  to  grow  suddenly  or  otherwise,  directly 
or  indirectly.  The  Scriptures  teach  a  doctrine  of 
descent,  and  have  no  hesitation  in  saying  that  all  the 
races  of  men  are  descended  from  one  father,  and  ''  God 
hath  made  of  one  blood  all  the  nations  of  the  earth." 
If  all  the  races  of  men  are  modified  descendants  of 
one  primeval  man,  and  if  descent  with  modification 
can  account  for  all  of  them,  where  is  the  objection 
on  Scriptural  and  theological  grounds  to  accepting 
a  theory  which  simply  extends  to  the  whole  world 
of  organic  life  a  principle  which  theology  has  always 
contended  for  as  true  with  respect  to  man  ?  Theology 
has  had  its  difiiculties  with  regard  to  Traducianism 
and  Creationism  ;  and  the  same  difiiculties,  and  no 
greater,  appear  with  respect  to  evolution  and  special 
creation.  What  is  essential  is  that  we  maintain  and  ^ 
vindicate  the  continued  dependence  of  all  creation  on 
its  Maker,  and  that  if  things  are  made  so  as  to 
make  themselves,  God  is  their  Maker  after  all ;  and 
if  evolution  can  tell  us  anything  of  the  method  of 
creation  and  the  order  in  which  the  different  forms 
of  life  appeared,   then  we  ought  to  rejoice  in  it. 


^ 


CHAPTER   VII 

ORGANIC  EVOLUTION  (Confimicd) 

Biology  before  and  after  Darwin — Phj^sical  continuity  of  life 
— Laws  and  conditions  of  life — Adequacy  or  inadequacy 
of  Natural  Selection  ?— Inter-relations  of  life— Professor 
Geddes  on  anthropomorpLism  of  the  nineteenth  century 
and  of  the  eighteenth — Weismann — Natural  selection  is 
elimination  of  the  unfit — Oscillation  between  natural 
selection  as  negative  and  as  positive — Poulton,  "  that 
selection  is  examination" — Teleology  run  mad— Mimicry 
— Search  after  utility — Mutual  benefit  of  species  in 
co-operation — Illustration — Struggle  for  existence  thus 
modified — Results. 

THE  contrast  between  works  on  biology  which 
were  written  before  the  appearance  of  Darwin's 
Origin  of  ^Sj^ecies  and  those  which  have  appeared 
since  that  great  work  is  most  striking.  There  can 
be  no  doubt  that  biologists  have  got  hold  of  a  most 
fruitful  hypothesis,  and  the  conceptions  introduced 
by  Darwin  have  shed  a  great  light  on  the  sciences 
which  deal  with  life.  Things  which  seemed  to  be  far 
apart  and  isolated  from  one  another  have  suddenly 
been  seen  to  be  closely  connected,  and  structures  and 
organisms  are  seen  to  be  related  to  one  another,  and 
to  be  parts  of  an  intelligible  whole.  The  full  and 
adequate  appreciation  of  the  worth  of  the  facts 
and  of  the  laws  can  be  grasped  completely  only  by 

110 


ORGANIC  EVOLUTION  HI 

those  wlio  are  specially  qualified ;  but  one  who  is  not 
a  specialist  may  apprehend  the  breadth  and  grandeur 
of  the  conception  which  enables  him  to  think  of  all 
life  as  a  unity  and  to  trace  the  innumerable  living 
forms  to  slow  variation   from  a   single  stock.     This 
conception  leaves  the  mystery  of  life  where  it  found 
it:  origins  lie  beyond  the  action  of  this  conception. 
Science  tells  us  that  life  comes  from  life,  and  it  is*  j^^^' 
powerless  to  explain  the  origin  of  life.  Let  life  be  given,  I 
and  science  says  it  can  ti-ace  its  path  of  progress,  and  \ 
understand  some  of  the  laws  which  have  guided  its  ' 
development.     Clearly,  then,  we  must  give  heed  to  the' 
statements  of  science,  and  endeavour  to  apprehend 
their  meaning.     If  all  living  forms  are  to  be  traced 
back   to   some   simple   organism,  and   if   there   is  a 
physical  continuity  of  life,  what  attitude  are  we  to 
assume    with    regard   to   this   claim  ?      What   is   its 
theological  significance  ?    Has  it  any  more  significance 
for  theology  than  the  claim  which  theology  was  wont 
to   make,   and   which   science   sometimes   seemed   to 
deny,   namely,   that   all  the  varieties  of  the  human 
family  are  descended  from  one  pair  ?     If  we  can  say 
that  mankind  is  one  without  falling  into  theological 
ineptitude,  why  may  we  not  admit  that  all   life   is 
one,  and  has  grown  from  the  one  simple  form  to  the 
varied  forms  which  now   teem  upon  the  earth?     If 
the  Negro  and  the  Englishman  are  varieties  of  one 
stock,  why  not  also  the  vertebrate  and  the  inverte- 
brate ? 

It  is  diificult  indeed  to  imagine  the  course  of  de- 
velopment, and  diflicult  also  to  imagine  the  forces 
which  brought  it  about.     Still,  those  who  know  the 


112      CHRISTIANITY  AND   EVOLVTION 

subject  and  have  studied  it  most  thoroughly  tell  us, 
with  growing  confidence,  that  the  growth  of  species 
by  a  process  of  slow  development  is  an  established 
fact.  They  are  entitled  to  speak ;  and  the  evidence 
they  produce  is  of  the  highest  order,  and  we  may 
rest  assured  that  questions  of  biology  will  be  settled 
by  biology,  on  scientific  grounds,  and  on  these  alone. 
It  seems  a  reasonable  claim  so  far.  It  claims  not 
that  it  can  show  how  life  originated,  but  that,  given 
life,  it  has  developed  according  to  certain  laws,  and 
that  these  laws  have  so  far  been  discovered.  There 
does  not  seem  to  be  anything  here  to  which  we  can 
object.  That  life  has  proceeded  according  to  law  is 
as  reasonable  as  is  the  supposition  that  the  solar 
system  is  ruled  by  law.  The  recognition  of  any  law 
in  nature  implies  that  law  rules  everywhere. 

While  there  is  agreement  among  the  masters  as  to 
the  general  doctrine  of  evolution  that  all  the  forms 
of  life  have  been  evolved  from  some  simpler  form  of 
life,  there  is  a  wide  difference  of  opinion  as  to  what 
the  factors  of  evolution  are.  All  are  agreed  as  to 
the  weaving  of  the  web  of  life,  but  by  no  means  are 
they  agreed  as  to  the  factors  or  the  agents  by  which 
the  web  is  woven.  Some,  of  whom  Russel  Wallace 
may  be  taken  as  the  chief  and  the  greatest,  believe 
in  the  adequacy  of  natural  selection,  and  would  shut 
out  all  other  agencies  whatever.  Sexual  selection, 
physiological  selection  he  explains  by  means  of 
natural  selection.  On  the  other  hand,  Herbert 
Spencer  writes  on  the  "  Inadeijuacy  of  Natural 
Selection,"  and  lays  great  stress  on  other  "  factors  of 
evolution."     Darwin  himself  said  in  1876:  "In  my 


ORGAXIC   EVOLUTION  113 

opinion  the  greatest  error  which  I  have  committed 
has  been  not  allowing  sufficient  weight  to  the  direct 
action  of   the  environment,    i.e.,  food,  climate,  etc, 
independently  of    natural   selection "    {Life,  vol.   iii., 
p.    159).      And  Mr.  Spencer  has  always  laid  great 
stress   on    the    direct    action    of    the    environment. 
Almost  all  are  agreed  as  to  the  fact  of  evolution ; , 
but   there  is  a  wide  difference  as  to  the  factors   in 
the  process.     It   is  still   an  open  question  what  are] 
the  primary  factors  in  evolution ;  but  whether  stress 
is  laid  on  the  organism  itself,  or  on  its  function,  or 
on  the  envii'onment,  there  need  be  no  hesitation  in 
saying  how  great  is  the  process,  and  how  wide  an 
outlook  it  has  given  us  over  the  whole  field  of  life. 
It  is  no  longer  possible  for  us  to  think  of  things  and 
of  life  in  the  old  fixed  static  way.     The  adaptations, 
the  inter-relations,   the  incessant    movement   of   life 
revealed  to   us  under  the  guidance  of  biologists  are 
simply  marvellous.     We  may  not  yet  know  fully  how 
these   adaptations   and   inter-relations    are    brought 
about,  but  the  fact  of  their  existence  is  undoubted. 
The  world  is  much  more  wonderful  than  we  know. 
What   can  be  more  wonderful  than  the  relation  of 
the  insect  to  the  flower,  or  the  successive   steps  by 
which  they  have  wrought  out  their  mutual  form  and 
destiny  %     What  more  wonderful  than  the  part  which 
is  played  in  the  world  of  nature  by  these  invisible 
germs,  which  at  some    times  are  destructive   of  the 
more  developed  life,  and  at  other  times  are  indispens- 
able to  its  continuance  ?     It  would  appear  that  with- 
out the  help  of  bacteria  wheat  could  not  be  grown. 
All  the  forms  of  life  seem,  indeed,  to  be  related  to  each 

8 


114     CHRISTIANITY  AND   EVOLUTION 

other  by  innumerable  ties,  and  the  inter-relations  are 
simply  more  marvellous  than  up  to  the  present  time 
have  been  suspected  by  man. 

At  the  same  time,  we  are  not  quite  sure  that  we 
have  yet  got  into  the  sphere  of  pure  science  when  we 
have  substituted  Darwin  for  Paley.  We  have  got 
into  a  larger  world,  a  world  of  more  complex  relations  ; 
but  are  we  not  still  in  the  world  of  anthropomor- 
phism ?  To  quote  Professor  Geddes.,  one  of  the  most 
profound  thinkers  of  our  time,  and  one  whose  scientific 
work  is  of  the  highest  value :  "Taking  a  larger  instance, 
the  substitution  of  Darwin  for  Paley  as  the  chief 
interpreter  of  the  order  of  nature  is  currently  regarded 
as  the  displacement  of  an  anthropomorphic  view  for 
a  purely  scientific  one.  A  little  reflection  will  show 
that  what  has  actually  happened  has  been  merely 
the  replacement  of  the  anthropomorphism  of  the 
eighteenth  century  for  the  anthropomorphism  of  the 
nineteenth.  For  the  place  vacated  by  the  logical  and 
metaphysical  explanation  has  simply  been  occupied 
by  that  suggested  to  Darwin  and  Wallace  by  Malthus 
in  terms  of  the  prevalent  severity  of  industrial  com- 
petition, and  those  phenomena  of  struggle  for  exist- 
ence which  the  light  of  contemporary  economic  theory 
has  enabled  us  to  discern,  have  thus  come  to  be 
temporarily  exalted  into  a  complete  explanation  of 
the  organic  process."  {Chambers  Encyclopcedia,  art. 
"  Biology.")  Professor  Geddes  beheves  in  evolution, 
but  does  not  believe  in  the  struggle  for  existence  and 
natural  selection  as  primary  factors  of  the  process.  For] 
myself  I  have  tried  to  read  with  an  open  mind  what 
has  been  written  on  natural  selection,  and  I  have  not 


ORGANIC   EVOLUTION  115 

been  able  to  see  that  the  writers  in  question  ha\e 
succeeded  in  using  tlie  plirase  in  a  consistent  manner. 
Darwin  and  Wallace  have,  in  fact,  left  the  problem 
of  the  origin  of  variation  alone,  and  have  given  their 
strength  to  the  establishing  of  the  theory  of  the 
origin  of  species  by  means  of  natural  selection.  It  is 
obvious,  however,  that  we  have  not  even  approached 
the  question  of  the  origin  of  species  until  we  have 
some  definite  notion  of  the  causes  of  variation.  In- 
definite variation  affords  no  solution,  and  the  action 
of  natural  selection  can,  as  has  frequently  been 
observed,  produce  nothing. 

Perhaps  the  best  illustration  of  the  way  in  which 
evolutionists  pass  unconsciously  from  the  destructive 
and  eliminative  action  of  natural  selection  to  some- 
thing which  may  be  looked  at  as  positive,  constructive, 
and  productive  may  be  found  in  the  language  of 
Weismann  :  "  To  state  my  meaning  more  clearly, 
Charles  Darwin  and  Alfred  Kussel  Wallace  have 
taught  us  to  understand  by  '  natural  selection  '  that 
process  of  elimination  eftected  by  nature  itself  without 
the  aid  of  man.  Inasmuch  as  far  more  individuals 
are  born  than  can  possibly  live,  only  the  best  are 
fitted  to  survive,  the  best  being  those  which  are  so 
formed  as  to  be  the  '  fittest,'  as  we  say,  for  the 
conditions  of  life  in  which  they  are  placed.  As  in 
each  generation  only  the  fittest  survive  and  propa- 
gate the  species,  their  qualities  only  are  transmitted, 
while  the  less  useful  qualities  of  the  weaker  individuals 
die  out.  Each  successive  generation  will  therefore 
consist  of  individuals  better  organised  than  those  of 
the  preceding  one,  and  thus  useful  characters  will  be 


116     CHRISTIANITY  AND  EVOLUTION 

gradually  intensified  from  generation  to  generation, 
until  the  greatest  possible  degree  of  perfection  is 
reached.  Probably  this  theory  is  far  from  new  to 
many  of  my  readeis.  It  has  been  so  often  explained 
in  various  well-known  works  and  periodicals  that  any 
further  elucidation  is  unnecessary.  What  holds  good 
for  the  individual  as  a  whole,  also  holds  good  for 
each  separate  organ,  inasmuch  as  the  ability  of  an 
animal  to  perform  its  allotted  function  depends  on 
the  efliciency  of  each  particular  organ :  hence  by 
means  of  the  perpetual  elimination  of  the  unfit  every 
organ  is  brought  to  the  highest  perfection.  On  this 
hypothesis,  and  on  this  only,  is  it  possible  to  explain 
the  wonderful  adaptability  of  the  minutest  details  of 
structure  in  animals  and  plants  and  the  development 
of  the  organic  world  through  the  operation  of  natural 
forces.  If  this  view  be  the  true  one,  if  adaptation 
in  all  the  parts  of  living  forms  be  truly  the  result  of 
natural  selection,  then  the  same  process  which  pro- 
duced these  adaptations  will  tend  to  preserve  them, 
and  they  will  disappear  directly  natural  selection 
ceases  to  act."  (Weismann  on  Heredity,  vol.  ii.,  p.  16, 
English  translation.) 

Weismann  has  formerly  defined  natural  selection  as 
a  "process  of  elimination";  that  is  to  say,  a  process 
which  is  destructive  and  negative.  Immediately  it 
changes  in  his  hands  into  a  process  which  is  construc- 
tive and  positive.  Let  us  substitute  the  definition  of 
natural  selection  in  the  last  sentence  for  natural  selec- 
tion itself,  and  see  how  it  reads.  "  If  adaptation  in 
all  its  parts  be  the  result  of  a  '  process  of  elimination,' 
then  the  same  process  which  produced  these  results 


ORGANIC  EVOLUTION  117 

will  tend  to  preserve  them,  and  they  will  disappear 
directly  the  '  process  of  elimination '  has  ceased  to 
work."  It  now  reads  like  nonsense.  There  is  surely 
something  fallacious  in  a  process  of  reasoning  which 
defines  a  term  and  then  changes  the  definition  in  the 
course  of  a  single  paragraph. 

Nor  is  this  procedure  peculiar  to  Weismann.  It  is 
constantly  being  used  by  Russel  Wallace,  and  by  the 
pure  Darwinians  of  every  shade.  "Natural  selection 
has  already  pronounced  a  satisfactory  verdict  upon  the 
vast  majority  of  animals  which  have  reached  matu- 
rity. The  male  which  has  only  just  passed  this  test, 
and  is  nevertheless  accepted  because  of  some  superior 
attraction,  will  soon  succumb,  and  will  leave  far  less 
offspring  than  one  of  equal  or  perhaps  inferior  at- 
tractions which  is  fitted  to  live  for  the  natural  term 
of  his  life.  Natural  Selection  is  a  qualifying  examina- 
tion, which  must  be  passed  by  all  candidates  for 
honours ;  Sexual  Selection  is  an  honours  examination, 
in  which  many  who  have  passed  the  previous  exami- 
nation will  be  rejected."  {The  Colour  of  Animals, 
by  Edward  Bagnall  Poulton,  p.  308.)  We  accept 
Mr.  Poulton's  metaphor,  and  we  wish  that  he  had 
used  natural  selection  in  this  sense  throughout.  To 
examine,  however,  is  a  different  function  from  pro- 
duction, and  throughout  his  book  he  speaks  of  natural 
selection  not  as  examining  but  as  preparing  candidates 
for  examination.  But  we  believe  that  neither  in  Oxford 
nor  in  nature  need  the  examiner  and  the  trainer  be 
the  same  person.  The  examination  reveals  the  fitness, 
it  does  not  make  it ;  and  yet  Mr.  Poulton  continually 
speaks  as  if  the  examination  had  prepared  and  made 


118     GHRISriANlTY  AND   EVOLUTIOX 

the  candidate  who  succeeds  in  passing  it.  There  are 
universities  which  do  not  teach,  they  only  examine ; 
they  simply  test  the  knowledge  of  candidates,  and  leave 
them  to  obtain  that  knowledge  where  they  like.  But 
they  have  no  claim  to  have  made  the  fitness;  they  simply 
say  that  the  candidate  is  fit.  It  would  be  well  if  the 
phrase  "  natural  selection  "  were  used  in  a  consistent 
manner,  and  w^ere  limited  to  the  process  of  elimination 
of  the  "  unfit."  As  it  is  used  it  simply  misleads,  and 
causes  us  to  think  that  we  have  a  true  productive  cause 
when  as  a  matter  of  fact  we  have  none. 

This  double  meaning  of  the  phrase  has  also  other 
consequences  theoretical  and  practical.  For  one  thing, 
it  has  set  men  to  seek  for  possible  advantages  which 
may  accrue  to  the  organism  by  any  slight  organic 
modification.  The  literature  of  Darwinism  abounds 
with  such  processes  of  search  and  discovery.  It  looks 
sometimes  as  if  here  we  had  a  teleology  run  mad. 
No  Bridge  water  treatise  is  so  teleologrcal''as'lihnost| 
any  Darwinian  book  we  may  happen  to  open.  One* 
enthusiastic  disciple  of  the  older  teleology  is  said  to 
have  remarked  that  it  was  striking  that  all  the  large 
rivers  ran  near  large  cities,  and  on  the  assumption 
that  the  large  towns  were  there  first  made  many  wise 
reflections.  The  modern  teleology  has  many  remarks 
quite  as  wise  and  as  relevant.  We  have,  for  example, 
the  following  from  Mr.  Poulton :  "  A  very  beautiful 
and  familiar  illustration  (of  recognition  markings 
in  animals)  is  given  by  Mr.  Wallace — the  white, 
upturned  tail  of  the  rabbit,  by  which  the  young  and 
inexperienced  or  the  least  wary  individuals  are  shown 
the  way  to  the  burrow.  .  .   .  The  tail  of  the  rabbit 


ORGANIC  EVOLUTION  119 

only  becomes  conspicuous  when  it  is  needed  by  other 
individuals  of  the  same  species,  and  when  the  animal 
is  already  alarmed  and  in  full  retreat  for  a  place  of 
security."  {Colour  of  Animals,  p.  212.)  Another  inter- 
pretation quite  as  plausible,  though  lacking  in  the 
conspicuous  element  of  utility  to  the  rabbit,  is  that 
the  tail  of  the  rabbit  is  of  great  advantage  to  the 
dog  who  pursues  it,  for  it  directs  his  path  straight 
to  the  mark  ;  or  to  the  sportsman,  who  knows 
at  once  where  to  shoot.  In  these  instances  the 
possession  of  a  white  tail  is  of  disadvantage  to  the 
rabbit. 

As  we  turn  over  the  pages  of  Mr.  Poulton's  most 
interesting  book,  we  are  filled  with  admiration  of  the 
wisdom,  insight,  and  foresight  of  the  creatures  whose 
colouring  he  describes.  "  I  know,"  he  says,  "  of  no 
more  inspiring  subject  than  the  colour  of  birds'  eggs. 
The  most  superficial  glance  over  a  collection  of  eggs 
reveals  hosts  of  interesting  problems  which  require 
solution.  I  look  forward  to  the  time  when  any 
description  of  colour  and  marking  will  be  considered 
incomplete  unless  supplemented  by  an  account  of  their 
meaning  and  importance  in  the  life  of  the  species." 
(Pp.  66,  67.)  The  assumption  is  that  every  shade  of 
colour  and  every  form  of  marking  have  a  meaning, 
and  are  of  importance  towards  the  life  of  the  species. 
Oil  this  assumption  Mr.  Wallace  and  Mr.  Poulton 
have  proceeded,  and  have  made  their  illustrations. 
T^ius  colours  are  of  direct  physiological  value,  or  they 
give  protective  or  aggressive  resemblance,  or  they  have 
protective  and  aggressive  mimicry,  or  they  give  warn- 
ing, or  they  have  a  significance  of  beauty  in  courtship. 


120     CHRISTIANITY  AND    EVOLUTION 

Thus  the  colours  of  animals  are  always  significant, 
whatever  that  significance  may  be.  Speaking  of 
mimicry,  Mr.  Poulton  says  :  "It  not  only  supjDorted 
the  doctrine  of  evolution,  but  it  afibrded  strong  con- 
firmation of  the  theory  of  natural  selection,  by  which 
Darwin  explained  how  it  was  that  evolution  took 
place.  Every  step  in  the  gradually  increasing  change 
of  the  mimicking  in  the  direction  of  specially  protected 
form  would  have  an  advantage  in  the  struggle  for 
existence,  while  the  elements  out  of  which  the  re- 
semblance was  built  exist  in  the  individual  variability 
of  the  species,  a  variability  which  is  hereditary." 
(P.  220.)  Here  is  the  Darwinian  theory  in  a  nut- 
shell, with  all  its  plausibility  and  with  all  its 
difiiculty.  The  causes  which  produced  the  gradual 
mimicking  are  not  in  the  organism,  nor  in  the 
environment,  nor  even  in  the  relations  between  or- 
ganism ^and  environment.  Mr.  Poulton  quotes  the 
following  from  Mr.  Skertchly,  and  describes  it  as 
extraordinary.  This  theory  "presupposes  («)  that 
danger  is  universal ;  (6)  that  some  butterflies  escape 
danger  by  secreting  a  nauseous  fluid  ;  (c)  that  other 
butterflies  noticed  this  immunity ;  {d)  that  they 
copied  it."  His  own  view  is  that  "  the  mimicry 
alluded  to  in  these  pages  is  of  course  unconscious, 
and  has  been  gradually  produced  by  the  operation 
of  natural  selection."  What  is  it,  then,  which  pro- 
duces mimicry  ?  We  can  learn  from  Mr.  Poulton 
that  mimicry  is  useful  when  it  has  been  produced. 
He  himself  says  that  the  volition  of  an  animal 
could  not  account  for  all  the  details  of  mimetic  re- 
semblance.    Still,  Mr.  Poulton  sometimes  speaks  as  if 


ORGANIC  EVOLUTION  121 

the  volition  of  the  animal  meant  something  in  the 
process  :  "  Such  caterpillars  terrify  their  enemies  by 
the  suggestion  of  a  cobra-like  serpent ;  for  the  head  of 
a  snake  is  not  large,  while  its  eyes  are  small  and  not 
specially  conspicuous.  The  cobra,  however,  inspires 
alarm  by  the  large  eye-like  '  spectacles '  upon  the 
dilated  hood,  and  thus  offers  an  appropriate  model  for 
the  swollen  anterior  end  of  the  caterpillar  with  its 
terrifying  markings."  (P.  259.)  The  mode  of  speech  is 
pecuUar.  May  we  venture  to  ask  about  the  ''  model  " 
and  its  "  appropriateness  "  ?  To  whom  or  to  what  does 
the  model  sit,  and  by  what  means  is  it  imitated  1 
If  w^e  shut  out  the  voHtion  of  the  animal,  what  have 
we  left  ?  It  may  be  answered  that  the  language  used  is 
metaphorical,  descriptive,  pictorial.  But  the  answer 
is  that  we  have  already  had  too  much  of  the  meta- 
phorical in  this  department  of  science,  and  the  theory 
of  natural  selection  has  taken  full  advantage  of  what 
is  merely  metaphorical.  It  has  grown  to  be  a  kind 
of  deus  ex  machina,  which  seems  to  preside  over  all 
changes  of  organisms,  and  which,  belonging  neither 
to  the  organism  nor  its  environment,  but  being  in  a 
manner  above  both,  gives  to  the  evolutionist  all  the 
advantages  of  a  presiding  intelligence  without  its  dis- 
advantages. Natural  selection  is  itself  described  as  a 
metaphor ;  but  as  soon  as  we  begin  to  work  with  it 
its  metaphorical  character  disappears,  and  it  becomes 
intensely  real,  and  is  quite  capable  of  doing  anything. 
It  has  the  character  constantly  ascribed  to  it  both  of 
a  directing  agency  and  of  a  presiding  intelhgence ; 
and  it  does  seem  as  if  both  were  needed  if  evolution 
is  to  be  an  intelligible  process.      "  May  not,"  asks 


122     CHRISTIANITY  A  SB  EVOLUTION 

Mr.  Arthur  Thomson,  "  the  similar  surroundings  and 
habits  of  mimickers  and  mimicked  have  sometimes 
something  to  do  with  their  resemblance  ?  may  it  not 
be  that  the  presence  of  the  mimicked  has  had  a  direct, 
but  of  course  very  subtile,  influence  on  the  mimickers  ? 
is  it  altogether  absurd  to  suppose  that  there  may 
be  an  element  of  consciousness  in  the  resemblance 
between  oriole  and  friar-bird  ?  "  {The  Study  of  Animal 
Life,  p.  61.)  Evidently  to  explain  the  colours  of 
animals  we  need  something  more  than  the  action  of 
natural  selection  upon  casual  changes. 

Mr.  Poulton  describes  well  the  number  of  ways  in 
which  the  puss  moth  defends  itself.  It  resembles  the 
leaves  of  the  willow  and  poplar,  on  w^hich  it  feeds. 
When  disturbed  it  assumes  a  terrifying  attitude 
mimetic  of  a  vertebrate  appearance.  The  effect  is 
heightened  by  two  pink  whips  which  are  swiftly 
protruded  from  the  prongs  of  the  fork  in  which  the 
body  terminates  ;  it  can  also  eject  an  irritant  fluid. 
And  yet,  with  all  these  combined  means  of  defence, 
it  fails  to  defend  itself.  ''  Any  improvement  in  the 
means  of  defence  has  been  met  by  the  greater  in- 
genuity or  boldness  of  foes  ;  and  so  it  has  come  about 
that  many  of  the  best-protected  larvae  are  often  those 
which  die  in  the  largest  numbers  from  the  attacks  of 
enemies.  The  exceptional  standai-d  of  defence  has  been 
reached  only  by  the  pressure  of  an  exceptional  need." 
{Colour  of  Animals,  pp.  277,  278.)  The  last  sentence 
is  unexpected.  If  the  well-protected  larv.'e  are 
often  those  which  die  in  the  largest  numbers  from 
the  attacks  of  enemies,  we  should  have  expected 
Mr.  Poulton  to  have  congratulated  the  victor  on  the 


OUGANIC   EVOLUTION  123 

success  of  the  attack,  and  not  the  vanquished  on  the 
faihire  of  its  attempts  at  protection. 

The  conflict  here  depicted  reminds  one  of  the  race 
betweeii  the  builders  of  armoured  vessels  and  the 
manufacturers  of  guns.  The  heavier  armour  was  met 
by  the  production  of  larger,  more  powerful  guns  j 
and  it  is  now  found  that  any  armour  that  a  ship 
can  carry  may  be  penetrated  by  an  Armstrong  or  a 
Krupp  gun.  The  limit  of  defence  has  been  found  on 
that  line.  The  conflict  between  defence  and  attack 
receives  an  illustration  from  the  work  of  Professor 
Stahl  on  the  conflict  between  snails  and  plants. 
He  shows  that  plants  save  themselves  from  being 
eaten  by  snails  in  fifteen  different  kinds  of  ways,  and 
he  interprets  these  various  kinds  of  protection  as  if 
tliey  had  been  produced  in  order  to  protect  the  plants 
from  snails.  Plants  which  w^ere  sweet  were  eaten, 
aud  a  plant  that  happened  to  be  sour  escaped. 
Natural  selection  preserved  the  sour  plant  and  pro- 
pagated it ;  and,  as  Professor  Geddes  says,  vegetation 
tends  to  grow  sourer  to  all  eternity.  "  To  give  snails 
credit  for  evolving  plants  with  crystals,  sourness,  and 
poison,  to  make  cattle  and  the  like  responsible  for 
tiie  thorns  on  plants,  is  like  giving  snakes  the  credit 
of  evolving  boots  which  protect  our  heels.  In  all 
these  cases  alike  the  possibility  of  some  defensive 
utility  is  undenied,  nor  even  of  some  improvement 
through  selective  agency.  What  is  contended  for  is, 
however,  a  change  in  our  evolutionary  perspective, 
laying  increased  importance  upon  the  definiteness 
and  cumulativeness  of  the  internal  variation,  and 
consequently  a  diminished  stress   upon  the   external 


124     CHRISTIANITY  AND   EVOLUTION 

selection  which  plays  on  this."     {Clufpters  in  Modern 
Botany,  pp.  125,  126.) 

The  theory  that  makes  natural  selection  all-sufficient 
has  thus  bound  itself  to  discover  utilities  everywhere. 
It  assumes  that  every  modification  has  been  of  advan- 
tage to  the  species.  Dr.  Romanes  has  gone  so  far  as 
to  say  for  that  species  alone  :  "  Amid  all  the  millions 
of  mechanisms  and  iustincts  in  the  animal  kingdom 
there  is  no  instance  of  a  mechanism  or  instinct  occur- 
ring in  the  species  for  the  exclusive  benefit  of  another 
species,  although  there  are  a  few  cases  in  which  a 
mechanism  or  instinct  that  is  of  benefit  to  its  possessor 
has  come  also  to  be  utilised  by  other  species.  .  .  .  How 
magnificent  a  display  of  Divine  beneficence  would 
organic  nature  have  afforded  if  all,  or  even  some, 
species  had  been  so  inter-related  as  to  minister  to 
each  other's  necessities  !  "  {Tlie  Scientific  Evidences  of 
Organic  Evolution,  p.  75.)  "  Every  species,"  he  adds, 
"  is  for  itself,  and  for  itself  alone — an  outcome  of  the 
always  and  everywhere  fiercely  raging  struggle  for 
life."  This  was  written  a  dozen  years  ago,  and  we  do 
not  know  whether  Dr.  E-omanes  would  write  the  same 
words  now ;  for  a  good  deal  has  happened  since  then. 
Many  instances  have  been  since  discovered  of  beings 
so  inter-related  as  to  minister  to  each  other's  necessities. 
There  is  the  discovery  of  "  the  intimate  partnership 
known  as  symbiosis,  illustrated  by  the  union  of 
algoid  and  fungoid  elements  to  form  a  lichen,  by 
the  occurrence  of  minute  Algse  as  constant  internal 
associates  and  helpful  partners  of  Eadiolarians  and 
some  Coelenterates."  The  beautiful  chapter  in  Professor 
Geddes'   little    book    Chapters  in  Modern   Botany  in 


ORGANIC  EVOLUTIOX  125 

which  he  describes  the  "  web  of  life  "  contains  many 
examples  of  this  mutual  co-operation,  and  of  the 
mutual  benefit  resulting  from  it.  The  partnership  is 
of  benefit  to  both  parties,  and  each  is  for  the  other. 
Professor  Geddes  quotes  the  following  from  De  Bary : 
"  As  the  result  of  my  researches,  all  these  growths 
(lichens)  are  not  simple  plants,  not  individuals  in  the 
ordinary  sense  of  the  word  ;  they  are  rather  colonies 
consisting  of  hundreds  and  thousands  of  individuals, 
among  which,  however,  one  predominates,  while  the 
rest  in  perpetual  captivity  prepare  the  nutriment 
for  themselves  and  their  masters.  The  master  is  a 
fungus,  a  parasite  which  is  accustomed  to  live  upon 
others'  work ;  its  slaves  are  green  algae,  which  it  has 
sought  out,  or  indeed  caught  hold  of,  and  compelled 
into  its  service.  It  surrounds  them,  as  a  spider  its  prey, 
with  a  fibrous  net  of  narrow  meshes,  which  is  gradu- 
ally converted  into  an  impenetrable  covering ;  but 
w^hile  the  spider  sucks  its  prey  and  leaves  it  dead,  the 
fungus  incites  the  algre  found  in  its  net  to  more 
rapid  activity,  indeed  to  more  vigorous  increase." 
[Chapter's  in  Modern  Botany,  p.  115.) 

This  is  one  instance  of  what  Dr.  Romanes  desired,  of 
beings  so  inter-related  as  to  minister  to  each  other's 
necessities.  Do  not  the  w^orks  of  Darwin  abound  with 
instances  of  the  same  kind  ?  If  insects  have  made 
flowers,  and  flowers  have  made  insects,  have  we  not 
another  instance  of  the  same  kind  %  \  As  a  matter  of 
fact,  animal  life  is  dependent  on  vegetable  life,  and 
vegetable  has  to  lift  the  food  of  animals  to  a  higher 
chemical  level,  or  animal  life  could  not  exist.  This, 
however,  may  be  an  instance  of  what  Dr.  liomanes 


126     CHRISTIANITY  AND  EVOLUTION 

calls  "  being  utilised  by  another  species."  But  it  could 
not  have  been  utilised  unless  there  was  a  fitness  for  use. 
But  the  same  thing  cannot  be  said  of  the  co-operation 
between  the  bull's  horn  Acacia  and  the  ants  which 
tenant  it.  There  is  a  partnei  ship  between  the  ants  and 
the  tree :  the  tree  provides  food  and  shelter  for  the  ants, 
and  the  ants  defend  it  from  its  enemies.  Instead  of 
the  fiercely  raging  struggle  for  existence  of  which  Dr. 
Eomanes  speaks,  and  of  the  mere  individualism  and 
selfishness  of  species  which  he  describes  as  characteristic 
of  every  species,  another  view  is  gaining  ground — viz., 
that  which  looks  on  nature  as  a  gigantic  system  of 
mutual  co-ojDerationj  each  thing  and  species  not  for  it- 
self, but  for  others  as  well.  The  individual  for  the  species 
and  the  species  for  the  genus  is  a  view  which  seems  to 
be  making  way,  as  men  are  getting  better  acquainted 
with  the  intricate  inter-relations  of  the  web  of  life. 

Co-operation  demonstrably  abounds  ;  and  if  it  can  be 
shown  to  be  true,  we  might  again  find  that  Dr.  Komanes 
has  been  brought  over  to  the  side  of  beneficent  design 
as  a  verifiable  hypothesis.  "  The  tendency  of  the  day 
is  to  recognise  that  most  plants  require  the  aid  of  some 
lower  organisms  for  assimilating  nitrogen.  Thus 
B.  Frank,  who  has  been  working  for  years  in  that 
direction,  has  proved  that  the  beech  can  thrive  only 
when  a  mantle  of  Mycorhiza -fungi  develops  over  its 
roots,  and  that  these  fungi  are  not  parasites  living 
upon  the  substance  of  the  roots,  but  real  feeders  of 
the  beech.  They  obtain  their  food  from  the  soil,  and 
while  so  doing  they  yield  a  part  of  it  to  the  roots  of 
the  tree.  Further  experiments  of  the  same  botanist 
have  now  shown  that  the  same  is  true  for  the  pine, 


ORGANIC  EVOLUTION  127 

which  can  only  tlirive  in  a  soil  already  containing 
germs  of  the  little  fungi,  and  when  its  roots  become 
covered  with  the  mantle  of  fungi,  while  it  leads  but  a 
precarious  existence  in  the  opposite  case. 

"All  these  are  but  separate  instances  of  a  much  more 
general  fact,  which  only  recently  became  known  under 
the  general  name  of  ^_symbiosis/  and  appears  to  have 
an  immense  significance  in  nature.  Higher  plants 
depend  upon  lower  fungi  and  bacteria  for  the  supply 
of  that  important  part  of  their  tissues,  nitrogen. 
Lower  fungi  associate  with  unicellular  algae  to  form 
that  great  division  of  the  vegetable  world,  the  lichens. 
More  than  a  hundred  different  species  of  algae  are 
already  known  to  live  in  the  tissues  of  other  plants, 
and  even  in  the  tissues  and  cells  of  animals,  and 
to  render  each  other  mutual  services.  And  so  on. 
Associations  of  high  or  low  organisms  are  discovered 
every  day  ;  and  when  the  conditions  of  life  are  more 
closely  examined,  the  whole  cycle  of  life  changes  its 
aspect  and  acquires  a  much  deeper  signification." 
(Prince  Krapotkin  in  Nineteenth  Century^  August 
1893.)  It  is  to  be  hoped,  as  political  economy  is 
changing  its  aspect  in  these  latter  days,  and  is  learn- 
ing to  attach  less  importance  to  competition  and  more 
to  co-operation,  that  those  conceptions  which  biology 
has  derived  from  political  economy  will  also  change. 
As  products  may  increase  in  a  greater  degree  than  the 
people  that  produce  them,  so  it  may  be  in  nature  also ; 
and  the  struggle  for  existence  may  neither  be  so  keen 
nor  so  fierce  as  we  have  supposed  it  to  be.  We  see  in 
many  casts  that  species,  mstead  of  striving  for  itself, 
may  find  its  advantage  in  mutual  co-operation. 


128     CHRISTIANITY  AND   EVOLUTION 

I  do  not  intend  to  say  much  on  variation.  It 
would  appear  that  the  idea  of  indefinite  variation  is 
becoming  antiquated,  and  that  of  definite  variation 
coming  more  and  more  to  the  front.  But  there 
will  apparently  be  some  time  ere  the  laws  of  definite 
variation  can  be  formulated.  Professor  Huxley  says : 
"  The  importance  of  natural  selection  will  not  be  im- 
paired, even  if  further  inquiries  should  prove  that 
variability  is  definite,  and  is  determined  in  certain 
directions  rather  than  in  others  by  conditions  inherent 
in  that  which  varies"  {Darwiniana,  p.  223).  If  the 
inherent  tendencies  to  variation  be  discovered,  we 
shall  get  rid  of  those  appeals  to  fortuitous  variation 
which  cause  such  perplexity.  These  laws  of  variation 
will  also  help  us  to  a  new  conception  of  order  and 
stability,  and  give  a  new  meaning  to  design.  It  was 
in  the  interests  of  order,  design,  and  purpose  that 
the  doctrine  of  special  creation  was  prized.  But  a 
variation  determined  in  certain  directions  will  restore 
more  than  the  denial  of  special  creations  has  taken 
away.  It  leads  us  on  to  see  the  working  out  of  the 
wonderful  unity  of  plan  in  the  millions  of  diverse 
living  constructions,  and  the  modifications  of  similar 
apparatus  to  serve  diverse  ends.  Such  a  unity  of 
plan  certainly  suggests  the  existence  of  thought 
behind  the  unity  and  manifested  in  it. 
f  Professor  Huxley  has  shown  that  mechanism  and  I 
I  teleology  are  not  mutually  exclusive.  He  has  said 
^  that  a  primordial  molecular  arrangement  may  have 
been  intended  to  evolve  the  phenomena  of  the  universe. 
May  we  not  go  further,  and  say  that  the  existence  of 
a  plan  implies  not  only  a  primordial  arrangement  by 


ORGANIC  EVOLUTION  129 

which  the  plan  can  be  realised,  but  also  that  the 
Power  to  which  the  plan  is  due  is  never  absent 
from  the  working  out  of  it  ?  A  power  present  in  the 
world,  who  works  according  to  a  plan,  and  by  which 
the  plan  can  become  real,  gives  us  something  which 
we  can  understand,  which  also  delivers  us  from  the 
tyranny  of  chance.  The  process  of  realising  the  plan  \ 
embodied  in  nature  has  been  slow,  and  step  by  step ;  \ 
but,  then,  the  end  has  so  far  been  accomplished.  And  \ 
it  is  a  curious  result  to  which  many  have  come,  that 
when  we  have  discovered  so  far  the  means  by  which  the 
plan  has  been  wrought  out,  we  have  therefore  denied,  v 
not  that  there  is  a  plan,  but  that  there  is  a  mind,  a 
reason  which  made  the  plan  and  carried  it  out.  It 
LS  as  if  we  denied  the  existence  of  the  architect  after 
we  had  seen  the  stones  and  the  timber,  the  mason, 
the  hodman,  and  the  joiner  at  work.  Or  is  it  that 
we  deny  the  planning  intelligence  because  the  build- 
ing has  not  sprung  suddenly  into  existence?  The 
wise  Bishop  has  depicted  that  state  of  mind  in  his 
own  inimitable  way :  "  Men  are  impatient,  and  for 
precipitating  things;  but  the  Author  of  nature  appears  V 

deliberate  throughout  His  operations,  accomplishing 
His  natural  ends  by  slow  successive  ^^^^^^^^(^Iwa^o^y, 
Part  II.,  chap.  iv.). 

Our  fiiends  and  teachers  have  shown  us  innumer- 
able adaptations;  they  have  shown  us  that  the 
creatures  work  towards  an  end — an  end  not  foreseen 
by  the  indi\dduals  or  the  species  concerned ;  we 
therefore  hold  that  it  must  have  been  foreseen 
by  some  one,  if  causation  is  to  have  its  due  place. 
We    are   constrained,    on    the    other    hypothesis,   to 

9 


130      CHRISTIANITY  AND  EVOLUTION 

ask  how  unintelligent  laws  can  work  out  intelligible 
and  intelligent  results.  We  can  never  get  an  answer 
to  that  question;  for  the  postulation  of  a  Supreme i 
Intelligence  cannot  be  tested  by  experiment,  because  | 
it  is  assumed  by  all  experiments.  Every  experiment 
assumes  that  we  are  in  a  rational  universe,  a  universe 
the  working  of  which  corresponds  to  the  working  of 
an  intelligence  in  ourselves.  If  the  laws  of  nature 
work  out  intelligent  and  rational  results,  then  reason 
is  at  work  in  them.  We  have  not  put  the  intelligi- 
bility into  the  world ;  we  find  it  there,  and  we  strive 
to  understand  and  to  express  the  working  of  the  world 
in  rational  terms, — an  attempt  which  would  be  for 
ever  vain,  if  the  intelligence  at  work  in  the  world 
were  not  of  the  same  kind  as  the  intelhgence  which 

i  is  at  work  in  ourselves. 

1  It  may  be  true  that  the  intelligence  at  work  in 
the  world  has  not  wrought  in  the  fashion  we  had 
supposed.  Does  that  intelligence  work  by  the  way 
of  evolution,  and  not  in  the  particular  mode  we 
thought  of  1 — for  a  change  of  conception  may  not  be 
the  destruction  of  the  conception.  The  earth  is  a 
part  of  the  solar  system — men  once  thought  it  the 
centre  of  things ;  we  no  longer  think  of  personal 
spirits  as  guides  and  rulers  of  the  stars — we  think  of  i 
matter  under  gravitation  ;  we  have  been  taught  that  | 
species  did  not  arise  through  special  acts  of  creation, 
but  were  developed  one  after  the  other.  Well,  we 
bow  our  heads  in  reverence,  and  say  that  God's 
ways  are  not  as  our  ways,  and  His  thoughts  are  not 
as  our  thoughts;  but  they  are  ways  and  thoughts 
of   God  notwithstanding.     If  we  trace   the    highest 


ORGANIC   EVOLUTION  131 

results  of  the  world  to  the  humblest  and  most  simple 
beginnings,  we  do  not  destroy  the  value  and  interest 
of  anything  when  we  know  how  it  came  about.  The 
more  we  learn  of  the  methods  of  the  world's  develop- 
ment, the  more  is  our  feeling  of  wonder  enhanced, 
and  the  larger  does  our  conception  grow  of  the  Divine 
method;  for  at  every  stage  of  the  process  we  find 
powers  at  work  which  were  not  at  work  in  the  lower 
stage.  From  the  mechanical  we  arrive  at  the 
chemical,  from  the  chemical  to  the  organic,  and  from 
the  organic  we  reach  the  conscious  stage  of  existence. 
We  confessedly  cannot  explain  the  chemical  by  the 
physical,  nor  the  organic  by  the  chemical  and  the 
mechanical,  nor  the  conscious  by  what  is  unconscious. 
If,  then,  we  have  arrived  at  the  goal  of  conscious, 
moral,  social,  religious  life,  we  have  come  to  a  stage  I 
in  which  a  philosophy,  a  science,  a  moral  system,  a  I 
creed  ought  to  be  possible. 


CHAPTER   YIII 

SUPER. OR GANIC  EVOL UTION 

Controversy  regarding  heredity — Spencer  and  Weismann — 
Machinery  of  Evolution  defective — Limits  of  Organic 
Evohition — Man  does  not  modify  himself,  but  modifies 
his  Environment — Survival  of  the  Fittest  explained  by 
Huxley  and  by  Spencer — Evolution  does  not  account  for 
advance — Illustration  of  man's  power  of  modifying  his 
environment— Piesults. 

IT  is  with  some  timidity  that  one  ventures  at  the 
present  time  to  write  the  word  **  heredity."  It 
is  one  of  the  three  great  names  which  occur  in 
connection  with  evohition.  "  VariabiUty/'  "  natural 
selection,"  transmission  or  "  heredity,"  are  words  which 
occur  in  every  statement  of  the  theory  of  evolution, 
and  both  the  meaning  and  causes  of  each  are  keenly 
contested.  At  present  the  contest  is  keenly  waged 
as  to  the  nature  and  the  meaning  and  the  factors  of 
heredity.  The  problem  is,  no  doubt,  a  most  complex 
one,  and  there  are  great  biological  authorities  who 
widely  differ  as  to  what  is  transmitted  and  the 
means  of  transmission.  Are  acquired  qualities — that 
is,  qualities  acquired  in  the  lifetime  of  an  individual 
— transmitted  to  his  offspring  ?  Weismann  and 
Lankester  deny  the  transmissibility  of  acquired 
qualities,   and  contend  that   only   inborn,  germinal, 

132 


SUPER-ORGANIC  EVOLUTION         133 

or  constitutional  variations  are  transmissible ;  while 
Mr.  Herbert  Spencer  emphatically  says  that  "  either 
there  has  been  inheritance  of  acquired  characters,  or 
there  has  been  no  evolution  "  {Contemiiorary  Revieio, 
March  1893,  p.  446).  And  again  he  says:  "A  right 
answer  to  the  question  whether  acquired  characters 
are  or  are  not  inherited  underlies  right  behefs,  not 
only  in  biology  and  ps3'chology,  but  also  in  education, 
ethics,  and  pohtics  "  (May  1893,  p.  730).  The  ques- 
tion, like  many  other  questions,  was  raised  by  Darwin, 
whose  theory  of  pangenesis  had  the  supreme  merit, 
not  of  solving  the  problem,  but  of  showing  how  great, 
complex,  and  intricate  was  the  problem  that  needed 
to  be  solved. 

Not  many  have  believed  in  pangenesis,  but  pan- 
genesis has  set  men  to  inquire  into  the  nature  and 
character  of  inheritance.  What  is  the  relation  between 
successive  generations  ?  What  is  the  character  of  the 
organic  continuity  which  all  alike  recognise  as  a  fact  ? 
Have  the  experience,  character,  and  aquirements  of 
individuals  any  chance  of  being  transmitted  to  their 
offspring  ?  It  seems  best  to  me  to  wait  for  an  answer. 
If  a  man  of  the  scientific  attainments  of  Dr.  Romanes 
can  say,  "  Professor  Weismann  is  not  quite  correct 
in  saying  that  I  adhere  to  the  doctrine  of  the  trans- 
mission of  acquired  characters.  My  position  mth 
regard  to  this  question  is  one  of  suspended  judgment," 
one  less  expert  may  well  be  excused  for  remaining 
in  suspense.  We  may  watch  the  evolution  of  the  con- 
troversy with  interest.  We  may  read  the  writings  of 
Professor  Weismann  as  these  are  printed  from  year  to 
year ;  and  whether  his  main  contention  is  made  out  or 


134      CHRISTIANITY  AND   EVOLUTION 

not,  we  always  gain  some  knowledge  from  him.  We 
may  listen  with  sympathy  to  the  complaints  of  Mr. 
J.  T.  Cunningham  when  he  states  that  he  has  been 
boycotted  by  Nature.  "  Nature,''  he  says,  "  has  em- 
braced the  principles  of  Weismann's  Neo-Darwinism  ; 
and  while  willing  to  devote  plenty  of  space  to  favour- 
able reviews  of  Weismann's  essays  written  by  under- 
graduates, suppresses  without  a  word  of  explanation 
or  apology  contributions  which  argue  against  the 
fashionable  creed "  (Translator's  preface  to  Elmer's 
Organic  Evolution,  p.  xxii.).  And  we  ask  ourselves, 
Has  the  odium  theologicum  been  sviddenly  transferred 
to  science  1  Or  we  may  read  the  mild  and  reason- 
able and  able  summary  of  the  whole  question  in  Mr. 
Arthur  Thomson's  book  The  Study  of  Animal  Life, 
which  is  so  clear  and  lucid  that  a  non-specialist  may 
readily  understand  the  issue.  We  may  read  the 
controversy  between  Herbert  Spencer  and  Professor 
Weismann,  their  statements  and  replies  and  rejoinders 
in  the  Contemporary  Review  of  1893,  and  mark  the 
keenness  of  the  conflict  and  the  fierceness  of  the 
attack  and  defence,  and  be  thankful  that  we  can 
stand  aside  and  take  no  part  in  it.  We  may  wait 
until  the  controversy  is  settled,  and  apparently  the 
issue  may  be  decided  in  the  next  century.  Happily 
for  our  purpose  it  is  not  necessary  to  wait  for  the 
cessation  of  the  controversy.  It  is  enough  for  us 
that  there  is  a  relation  of  organic  unity  between 
the  generations,  and  it  is  not  necessary  for  us  to 
decide  for  bur  purpose  as  to  the  precise  machinery 
by  which  the  organic  continuity  is  maintained.  Mr. 
Spencer  is  bound  to  fight  hard  for  the  transmission  of 


SUPER-ORGAXIC  EVOLUTION        135 

acquired  characters ;  for  it  is  on  that  supposition 
that  he  has  formulated  his  system  of  psychology  and 
ethics,  and  has  propounded  his  scheme  of  reconcilia- 
tion between  a  priori  and  a  posteriori  forms  of  know- 
ledge. We  need  not  here  controvert  his  theory  of 
inheritance  ;  for  on  our  view,  even  if  granted,  it  does 
not  prove  his  case.  No  doubt  Weismann  also,  if  he 
ever  reaches  the  study  of  psychology  and  ethics,  would 
have  his  explanation  from  his  own  point  of  view. 

Meanwhile,  while  the  machinery  of  evolution  is  so 
far  defective,  and  men  are  not  agreed  as  to  what 
heredity  is,  we  may  at  least  assume  as  true  that  the 
results  won  by  organic  modification  have  somehow  been 
preserved.  Things  have  really  made  progress.  Species 
have  been  produced,  and  once  produced  they  beget 
others  in  their  own  likeness.  Life  may  have  gone 
on  irrespective  of  the  experience  of  the  individual,  as 
Weismann  says ;  or  the  experience  and  acquirements 
of  the  individual  have  played  a  respectable  part  in 
evolutionary  progress,  as  Mr.  Spencer  says ;  still,  life 
has  gone  on,  and  has  got  itself  sorted  into  certain 
kinds. 

Organic  modification  is,  however,  an  expensive  pro- 
cess, and  cannot  go  on  for  ever  ;  for  life  to  continue 
to  inscribe  its  experience  in  cells,  be  these  cells  and 
their  functions  as  varied  and  diversified  as  we  please, 
is  a  process  which  has  a  limit.  (  We  know  not,  and 
scarcely  any  one  can  guess,  what  power  and  potency 
may  be  in  a  living  cell,  j  It  may  carry  within  it  the 
potency  of  a  Shakespeare  or  of  a  Newton.  But  our 
aim  at  present  is  to  show  that  the  process  of  organic 
change  has  become  less  and   less  as  life  has  become 


136      CHRISTIANITY  AND  EVOLUTION 

more  and  more  complicated.  Organically  the  difference 
between  unicellular  and  multicellular  beings  seems  to 
be  greater  than  any  subsequent  organic  change.  Nor  l 
have  biologists  yet  been  able  to  account  for  the  traDS- 1 
mission  from  simple  to  -complex  organisms.  Indeed, 
it  is  sometimes  hard  to  justify  the  kind  of  language 
with  which  biologists  describe  certain  beings.  Accord- 
ing to  the  Darwinian  theory  it  is  the  fittest  which 
always  survive.  The  unfit  can  never  survive  on  that 
view.  But  we  constantly  read  of  ''  degeneration,"  and 
sometimes  the  hermit-crab  receives  a  good  deal  of 
abuse  because  it  has  ceased  to  produce  its  own  shell. 
Then  parasites  receive  a  good  deal  of  abuse.  On  the 
Darwinian  theory  all  this  is  quite  unjustifiable.  The 
survival  of  degraded  forms,  as  they  are  called,  and  the 
shift  for  a  living  which  leads  to  parasitism  are  also 
instances  of  the  survival  of  the  fittest. 

On  the  one  hand,  the  principle  of  Darwinism  would 
seem  to  shut  us  out  from  the  use  of  words  like  de- 
generation ;  and  on  the  other  hand,  it  should  also  cause 
us  to  avoid  the  use  of  "  progress,"  and  w^ords  of  a  similar 
meaning.  Our  judgment  on  organisms  must  be  ex- 
pressed in  terms  of  the  theory ;  but  on  these  terms  a 
good  deal  of  DarwiDian  literature  would  require  to  be 
re-written.  For  the  idea  of  progress  w^e  need  some 
other  criterion  than  is  given  us  by  the  "  survival  of 
the  fittest  "  ;  for  many  lower  organisms  survive.  The 
scorpion  has  been  in  evidence  ever  since  the  coal 
measures  have  been  laid  down  ;  and  others  also  survive. 
Have  we  any  explanation  in  the  principle  of  the  sur- 
vival of  the  fittest  of  the  appearance  of  the  higher 
races,  as  we  call  them?  for  the  survival  proves  the 


SUPER-ORGANIC  EVOLUTION         137 

fitness,  and  it  proves  nothing  more.  Professor  Huxley 
is  plain  on  this  matter,  and  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer  is 
also  equally  plain.  Professor  Huxley  says:  "  'Fittest ' 
has  a  connotation  of  '  best ' ;  and  about  '  best '  there 
hangs  a  moral  flavour.  In  cosmic  nature,  however, 
what  is  fittest  depends  upon  the  conditions.  Long 
since  I  ventured  to  point  out  that  if  our  hemisphere 
were  to  cool  again,  the  survival  of  the  fittest  might 
bring  about,  in  the  vegetable  kingdom,  a  population 
of  more  and  more  stunted  and  humbler  and  humbler 
organisms,  until  the  fittest  that  survived  might  be 
nothing  but  lichens,  diatoms,  and  such  microscopic 
organisms  as  those  which  give  red  snow  its  colour  j 
while,  if  it  became  hotter,  the  pleasant  valleys  of  the 
Thames  and  Isis  might  be  uninhabitable  by  any 
animated  beings  save  those  that  flourish  in  a  tropical 
jungle.  They,  as  the  fittest,  the  best  adapted  to  the 
changed  conditions,  might  survive."  {The  Romanes 
Lecture,  1893,  p.  32.) 

Mr.  Spencer  says  :  "  Mr.  Martineau  speaks  of  the 
'  survivorship  of  the  better,'  as  though  that  were  the 
statement  of  the  law,  and  then  adds  that  the  alleged 
result  cannot  be  inferred  '  except  on  the  assumption 
that  whatever  is  better  is  stronger  too.'  But  the  words 
he  here  uses  aie  his  own  words,  not  the  words  of 
those  he  opposes.  The  law  is  the  survival  of  the 
fittest.  Probably,  in  substituting  '  better  '  for  fittest, 
Mr.  Martineau  did  not  suppose  that  he  was  changing 
the  meaning  ;  though  I  dare  say  he  perceived  that  the 
meaning  of  the  word  fittest  did  not  suit  his  argument 
so  well.  Had  he  examined  the  facts  he  would  have 
found  that  the  law  is  not  the  survival  of  the  '  better  ' 


138      CHRISTIANITY  AND  EVOLUTION 

or  the  '  stronger,'  if  we  give  to  those  words  anything 
like  their  ordinary  meanings.  It  is  the  survival  of 
those  which  are  constitutionally  fittest  to  thrive  under 
the  conditions  in  which  they  are  placed ;  and  very  often 
that  which,  humanly  speaking,  is  inferiority,  causes 
the  survival.  Superiority,  whether  in  size,  strength, 
activity,  or  sagacity,  is,  other  things  equal,  at  the 
cost  of  diminished  fertility ;  and  when  the  life  led  by 
a  species  does  not  demand  these  higher  attributes,  the 
species  profits  by  decrease  of  them  and  accompany- 
ing increase  of  fertility.  This  is  the  reason  why  there 
occur  so  many  cases  of  retrograde  metamorphosis 
— this  is  the  reason  why  parasites,  internal  or  exter- 
nal, are  so  commonly  degraded  forms  of  higher  types. 
Survival  of  the  '  better '  does  not  cover  these  cases, 
though  survival  of  the  '  fittest '  does."  (Essays,  vol.  iii., 
pp.  241,  242.)  Many  things  might  be  said  on  these 
two  extracts.  One  thing  to  be  noticed  is  the  use  of 
language  not  derived  from  evolution.  What  is  the 
ground  of  judgment  which  warrants  Professor  Huxley 
in  speaking  of  "humbler  and  humbler  organisms," 
and  Mr.  Spencer  in  speaking  of  a  "  retrograde  meta- 
morphosis" and  of  "inferiority"?  In  the  "survival 
of  the  fittest "  we  have  the  only  criterion  by  which 
we  can  judge,  and  to  use  other  terms  is  to  bring  back 
surreptitiously  principles  which  we  have  discarded. 

There  is  something  else  to  be  said  which  is  more 
relevant.  On  the  theory  as  stated  by  Professor 
Huxley  and  Mr.  Spencer,  there  is  no  provision  for 
progress,  nor  any  machinery  provided  which  even  can 
seem  to  lead  to  that  advance  which  life  has  made 
from   the  protozoa  up  to  man.     The  protozoa  have 


SUPER-ORGANIC  EVOLUTION         139 

survived  because  they  are  the  fittest.  Why,  tlien,  has 
life  advanced  to  other  forras  ?  Surely  a  principle  the 
working  of  which  is  consistent  with  the  survival 
of  all  that  have  survived  cannot  explain  why  some 
forms  have  survived  unchanged  and  others  have 
changed  !  The  same  principle  is  inadequate  for  the 
explanation  of  both.  What,  then,  is  the  principle 
which  has  secured  advance  1  Variability  in  all 
directions  cannot  account  for  it,  for  the  likelihood 
is  that  changes  Avill  cancel  one  another.  Heredity 
will  not  account  for  it,  since  changes  must  be  of  a 
kind  to  survive  before  they  can  be  perpetuated  and 
accumulated.  Shall  we  not  be  driven  back,  by  the 
very  principle  of  the  sur\dval  of  the  fittest,  to  pos- 
tulate some  other  principle  which  wdll  ensure  advance  ? 
Can  w^e  get  that  principle  within  the  organism  itself, 
in  laws  of  growth,  in  the  nature  of  life  itself,  in  the 
interactions  of  life  with  the  environment,  or  any  other 
of  the  means  postulated  by  the  biologist?  At  all 
events,  the  principle  has  not  yet  been  discovered,  and 
we  may  wait  for  its  discovery  with  some  patience. 
It  does  not  appear  that  for  a  rational  understanding 
of  the  progress  which  life  has  made  we  can  yet 
dispense  with  the  hypothesis  of  Energising  Reason 
that  foresees  the  end  and  goal,  know\s  what  it  would 
be  at,  and  takes  adequate  means  to  secure  its  end. 
Energising  Reason  is  also  one  of  the  causes  which  can 
be  seen  at  -work  in  the  universe  at  present,  and  we 
may  ask  our  scientific  friends  to  recognise  its  reality. 
It  is  one  of  the  causes  now  at  work  in  the  universe ; 
and  may  we  not  say  that  it  has  always  been  at  work, 
since  we  find  ourselves  in  a  rational  universe  ? 


V 


\  set 
,  1  of 


140      CIIIUSTIANITY  AND  EVOLUTION 

On  any  view,  however,  man  is  the  crown  and  goal 
of  the  organic  w^orld,  and  in  him  the  organic  world 
has  come  to  know  itself.  At  present  we  shall  not 
\  seek  to  look  at  the  question  of  his  descent,  or  rather 
„-  his  ascent,  from  the  organic  world  to  self-conscioiis- 
'  ness.  We  shall  look  at  him  first  in  his  relation  to 
and  his  contrast  with  the  world  beneath  him ;  for 
since  man  has  been  on  the  earth  he  has  been  dis- 
tinctively man.  "  When  we  study  this  fossil  man 
of  the  quaternary  period,  w^ho  must,  of  course,  have 
stood  comparatively  near  to  our  primitive  ancestors 
in  the  order  of  descent  or  ascent,  we  always  find 
a  Man,  just  such  as  men  are  now"  (Yirchow,  The 
Freedom  of  Science,  p.  60).  As  far  back  as  we  can 
trace  him  man  is  man,  and  wherever  we  find  him 
we  find  that  the  method  of  advance  by  mere  organic 
modification  has  been  distinctly  limited;  for  the 
organic  differences  between  varieties  of  the  human 
family  are  insignificant  in  comparison  with  the 
number  of  elements  in  which  they  are  one.  The 
differences  are  only  superficial  and  external,  and  a 
savage  may  in  the  course  of  a  single  lifetime  become 
a  civilised  man.  Physically,  therefore,  and  also  in 
many  other  respects,  man  is  one. 

Physically,  notwithstanding  the  great  general  like- 
ness between  man  and  the  higher  animals,  there 
Iis  a  distinct  difference;  for  man  has  the  power  of 
modifying  his  environment,  and  only  in  a  slight 
degree  does  he  need  to  modify  himself.  He  does  not 
need  to  develop  defensive  armour  against  the  attacks 
of  wild  beasts,  does  not  require  to  don  scales  against 
his  enemy  as  the  crocodile  does,  nor  grow  sharp  teeth 


SUPER-ORGANIC  EVOLUTION         141 

and  claws  as  the  tiger  does,  nor  to  mimic  offensive 
and  nauseous  qualities  as  the  butterflies  seem  to  do. 
He  does  not  need  to  be  so  strong,  or  so  swift,  or  so 
cunning  as  other  animals.  He  has  found  ways  less 
expensive  than  organic  modification,  and  he  has  acted 
on  them.  He  does  not  need  to  lengthen  or  to  strengthen 
his  arm  in  order  to  be  able  to  lift  heavy  weights ;  he 
has  in  effect  done  both  by  discovering  and  utilising 
the  lever.  His  eye  is  not  so  keen  as  the  eye  of  the 
eagle ;  but  with  an  eye  less  keen  he  can  see  farther, 
for  he  has  discovered  the  telescope.  His  eye  may  not 
be  so  fitted  for  microscopic  vision  as  that  of  a  fly ;  but 
he  can  see  things  so  small  as  to  be  invisible  to  the 
eye  of  any  other  creature.  He  cannot  spring  so  far 
as  a  tiger  can  ;  but  he  has  discovered  that  a  rifle  bullet 
is  swifter  than  a  tiger's  leap  and  stronger  than  a 
tiger's  muscles.  In  short,  he  has  ceased  to  modify  his 
physical  organism,  ha\ing  found  out  that  he  can 
succeed  as  well  by  modifying  tools  and  weapons  and 
making  them  serve  his  purpose. ' 

In  winter  many  animals  have  to  modify  themselves 
to  protect  themselves  from  cold.  They  put  on  a 
thicker  fleece  of  fur,  and  many  of  them  change  their 
colour.  Who  can  say  what  is  the  physiological  cost  of 
the  heavier  fur  ?  or  the  amount  of  energy  expended 
in  the  organic  change  ?  But  man  simply  puts  on  a 
thicker  overcoat,  which  he  can  easily  slip  off  when 
warmer  weather  comes — a  process  which  involves  no 
physiological  cost.  Not  many  animals  can  modify 
their  environment.  They  build  their  nests,  they  seek 
out  dens  and  caves  of  the  earth,  or  they  may  use 
other  means  of  a  simpler  sort  to  protect  themselves. 


142      CHRISTIANITY  AND   EVOLUTION 

But  man  has  learnt  to  build  houses,  to  warm  them 
with  fire,  to  supply  himself  with  light  when  the  sun 
goes  clown,  and  in  a  hundred  other  ways  to  make  a 
climate  at  his  pleasure.  He  can  cook  his  food,  and 
save  a  large  part  of  the  physiological  labour  of 
digestion.  He  can  also  provide  for  the  future — sow 
seed  in  the  spring,  gather  it  in  harvest,  and  store 
it  up  for  future  use.  In  this  he  has  no  doubt  been 
anticipated  by  the  ants,  but  almost  all  other  animals 
live  from  day  to  day. 

Not  only  has  he  ceased  to  modify  himself,  and 
modifies  his  environment  instead ;  he  has  pressed 
the  organic  modifications  of  other  animals  into  his 
service.  He  has  directed  the  modifications  of  certain 
grasses  until  he  has  produced  wheat.  He  has  taken 
animals  and  moulded  them  into  a  form  which  makes 
them  of  greater  use  to  him.  He  makes  use  of  the 
swiftness  of  the  horse,  and  of  the  qualities  of  other 
animals  which  he  has  tamed  and  made  submissive  to 
his  wishes.  He  has  chained  the  lightning,  he  has 
harnessed  steam  to  his  carriage,  and  there  is  hardly 
any  limit  to  the  use  he  has  made  and  is  still  making 
of  the  agents  and  powers  of  the  world, 

These  things  he  has  done  because  he  has  been  able 
to  rise  above  the  necessity  of  organic  modification 
Other  creatures  are  under  the  necessity  of  modifying 
themselves  to  meet  the  changing  conditions  of  life ; 
and  if  the  modification  succeeds,  they  transmit  it  to 
the  species.  The  whole  process  is  organic,  and  unless 
the  modification  becomes  so  organic  as  to  be  trans- 
mitted it  is  lost.  Memory  with  them  seems  also  to 
be  organic.     The  experience  of   the  individual  does 


SUPER-ORGANIC   EVOLUTION         143 

not  seem  to  count  for  much  ;  what  counts  is  that 
habit  that  has  got  itself  inwrought  into  their  nature 
and  has  become  instinctive.  While  there  are  still 
habit  and  instinct  in  man,  they  do  not  play  so  great  a 
part  as  in  the  lower  stages  of  life.  At  all  events,  the 
powers  which  animals  have  of  recording  their  ex- 
perience, profiting  by  it,  and  transmitting  it  are  very 
limited.  As  with  tools  and  weapons  and  houses  and 
garments,  so  also  with  the  power  of  recording  and 
transmitting  experience,  man  has  found  a  more  excel- 
lent and  a  more  economic  way.  He  does  not  inscribe 
his  experience  in  the  convolutions  of  the  brain ;  he 
writes  them  in  a  book,  and  books  are  less  expensive 
than  brains,  and  the  supply  of  book -material  is 
much  more  ample  and  more  easily  procurable  than 
brain-matter.  It  is  also  more  lasting;  for  brains 
vanish  with  the  individual,  and  books  last  for  all  time. 
Hereditary  transmission  is  precarious,  and  may  not, 
indeed  cannot,  hand  down  the  largest  and  greatest  of 
human  possessions.  The  greatest  and  most  valuable 
of  human  experiences  may  have  belonged  to  a  man 
who  had  no  offspring,  and  thus  would  inevitably  have 
been  lost  had  man  not  found  out  a  way  of  recording  it. 
Organic  memory  would  not  lead  to  much,  and  along 
with  other  organic  modifications  tends  to  decrease  in 
man.  But  this  new  way  of  recording  experience  has 
obvious  advantages.  Homer's  song  has  lasted  ;  but  it 
would  have  perished  had  organic  memory  been  the 
only  link  between  the  generations.  The  thoughts  of 
Plato  and  of  Aristotle,  the  song  of  Dante,  the  Prin- 
cijna  of  Newton  are  with  us  still,  because  man  has 
speech,  and  intelligence,  and  ways  of  recording   and 


144      CHRISTIANITY  AXD   EVOLUTION 

tiansmitting  that  experience,  apart  from  a  series  of 
organic  changes  in  the  individual  and  in  the  species. 
It  is  not  needful  to  write  more  at  length  on  this 
point ;  for  we  have  our  art,  our  science,  our  litera- 
ture, our  architecture,  our  philosophy,  our  poetry, 
our  theology,  each  one  of  which,  and  much  more  all 
of  them  together,  tell  us  and  prove  to  us  that  here 
in  man  there  is  a  new  kind  of  life — a  life  that  has 
not  changed  with  the  changing  environment,  but 
has  so  far  altered  the  environment  to  suit  its  own 
ends. 

We  have  simply  looked  at  man  as  a  being  who  has 
his  place  among  other  beings  on  this  earth.  We  have 
not  denied  his  similarity  to  other  animals.  ¥/e  have 
not  looked  for  structural,  or  physiological,  or  other 
differences  between  him  and  other  animated  beings. 
We  have  raised  no  question  as  to  his  origin,  or  his 
relation  to  the  world  of  life  which  preceded  him.  We 
have  simply  looked  at  him  and  at  them,  in  themselves, 
in  their  actions,  and  in  their  results;  and  we  have 
found  ourselves  burdened  with  a  load  of  distinctions 
and  differences,  and  we  ask  for  an  explanation  of 
them.  We  have  found  much  instruction  in  the  works 
of  Darwin  on  the  Descent  of  Man  and  on  the  Ex'pfes- 
sion  of  the  Emotions.  And  we  have  read  Dr.  Romanes, 
with  profit  as  he  toils  and  struggles  at  an  impossible! 
task,  namely,  to  trace  the  evolution  of  intelligence! 
through  animals  up  to  man  without  a  break.  Dr.' 
Tylor's  work  also  is  full  of  interest  as  he  strives  to 
trace  for  us  the  origin  and  growth  of  language,  and 
the  rise  and  progress  of  the  arts  of  life.  But  there 
is  a  marked  difference  between  this  kind  of  evolution 


SUPER-ORGANIC  EVOLUTION          145 

and  that  kind  with  which  we  are  famiUar  in  the 
organic  world.  Here  it  is  not  the  physical  organism 
that  is  evolved ;  it  is  something  else.  No  one  will 
say  that  there  is  a  growth  of  the  human  brain 
oi'  the  nervous  system  which  proceeds  j^ojH  ikissu 
with  the  evolution  of  tools,  of  languages,  of  civilisa- 
tioi^.  Yirchow's  statement  already  quoted  is  de-| 
structive  of  that  supposition.  If  in  all  physical 
characteristics  man  is  man  from  the  time  when  he 
first  appears  on  the  earth,  then  the  evohition  of  arts, 
science,  civilisation  has  not  been  accompanied  by 
corresponding  organic  changes.  It  would  be  well  to 
recognise  this,  and  for  mental  progress  to  devise  a 
formula  of  evolution  not  now  expressed  in  terms  of 
matter  and  motion,  but  in  terms  of  mind  and  reason. 
Not  that  w^e  can  dispense  with  mind  and  reason  in 
the  case  of  physical  and  organic  development,  for  in 
it  are  discovered  all  the  principles  of  a  rational  order  \ 
but  in  the  latter  kind  of  evolution  both  the  order  and 
the  method  of  it  and  the  thing  which  is  developed 
can  be  expressed  in  terms  of  mind  alone. 

The  essential  note  of  difference  appears  at  the  point  j 
where  a  being  appears  who  can  adapt  himself  to  the/ 
environment,  not  by  changing  himself,  but  by  chang- 
ing the  environment.  The  beginning  of  the  change 
may  be  very  small ;  but  the  main  point  to  observe  is 
that  a  change  has  been  begun.  The  lower  animals 
indeed  have  *'  rudiments  of  the  implement-using 
faculty.  Orangs  in  the  Durian  trees  furiously  pelt 
passers-by  with  the  thorny  fruit.  The  chimpanzee  'm. 
the  forests  is  said  to  crack  nuts  witli  a  stone."  And 
the  first  tools  which  man  uses  are  likely  those  which 

10 


146     CHRISTIANITY  AND  EVOLUTION 

are  ready-made  or  which  can  be  finished  for  use.     But 
no  animal,  as  far  as  we  know,   ever  gives  just  the 
finish,  slight  or  great,  which  the  tool  requires  to  fit  it 
for  use.     When  man  first  carried  a  pebble  about  with 
him  as  a  weapon  of  ofience,  when  he  used  a  sharp 
stone  to  cut  or  scrape  with,  or  shaped  the  branch  of 
a  tree  for  use  as  a  club,  he  made  a  new  departure. 
We  may,  if  we  like,  trace  the  growing  use  of  tools 
and  weapons,  as  Dr.  Tylor  does  in  his  Anthropology^ 
and  see  how  man  learned  to  use  better  and  better 
material   for   his   tools  and  weapons,  and  to   make 
better   and  better  implements.      We  may  trace  the 
improvements  in  the  hne  of  offence  and  defence,  until 
we  pass  from  the   stone   weapon   to    an  Armstrong 
gun;  or  we  may  trace  the  development  of  industrial 
implements  from  the  first  i-ude  implement  with  which 
man  scratched  the  earth,  until  we  come  to  the  steam 
plough    and    the    reaping    machine ;    or    trace    the 
evolution  of  dwellings  from  the  cave  and  the  shelter 
under  a  tree  to  the  homes  of  the  present  day,  with 
their  comfort,  refinement,  beauty ;  and  we  may  also 
trace  otlier  lines  of  development :  but  we  ought  always 
to  remember  that  this  is  a  peculiar  line  of  develop- 
ment.    It  is  the  first  step  that  counts,  and  the  first 
step  was  taken  with  the  first  tool  which  man  fashioned, 
with  the  first  garment  he  wore,  with  the  first  shelter 
he  made  for  himself.     For  the  lower  animals,  as  for 
man,  the  wealth  of  the  world  existed,  if  they  could 
use  it.     And  they  did  use  it  after  their  fashion ;  but 
they  had  to  use  their  environment  as  it  was,  and 
adapt  themselves  to  it.     Their  weapons  of  ofience  and 
defence  were  organic,  and  they  could  adapt  themselves 


SUPER-ORGANIC  EVOLUTION         147 

to  the  conditions  of  life  only  with  exceeding  slowness. 
This  holds  true  even  if  we  accept  all  that  is  told  us  of 
the  exceeding  cunning  of  animals,  and  of  the  manifold- 
ness  of  the  shifts  they  have  to  make  for  a  living. 
Accept  all  that  Mr.  Poulton  tells  us  about  the  colours 
of  animals,  and  his  explanation  of  mimicry  and  its 
advantages,  and  the  remark  yet  holds  good  that 
mimicry  has  succeeded  just  because  it  was  so  far 
organic.  The  mimickers  had  to  make  the  changes 
which  procured  them  an  advantage  by  some  modifica- 
tion of  shape,  of  colour,  or  of  attitude,  or  in  some  way 
they  were  physically  modified.  It  may  be  true  also 
that  the  change  was  slight  and  did  not  become 
structural ;  but  the  change  was  effected  by  a  modifica- 
tion of  its  own  substance,  and  not  by  the  use  of 
something  else. 

There  are  many  instances,  indeed,  which  look  like  an 
anticipation  of  the  unique  power  of  man  to  modify  his 
environment.  Mr.  Poulton  quotes  from  Mr.  Bateson 
as  follows :  "  The  crab  takes  a  piece  of  weed  in  his 
two  chelae,  and,  neither  scratching  nor  biting  it,  de- 
liberately tears  it  across,  as  a  man  tears  paper  with 
his  hands.  He  then  puts  one  end  of  it  into  his 
mouth,  and  after  chewing  it  up,  presumably  to  soften 
it,  takes  it  out  in  the  chelai  and  rubs  it  firmly  on  his 
head  or  legs  until  it  is  caught  by  the  pecuHar  curved 
hairs  which  cover  them.  If  the  piece  of  weed  is  not 
caught  by  the  hairs,  the  crab  puts  it  back  in  its 
mouth  and  chews  it  up  again.  The  whole  proceeding 
is  most  human  and  purposeful."  {Colour  of  Animals ^ 
pp.  78,  79.)  There  are  other  instances  also  of  what 
Mr.  Ai'thur  Thomson  calls  "  maskini?,"  in  which  use 


148     CHRISTIANITY  AXD   EVOLUTION 

is  made  of  external  things  for  purposes  of  concealment 
and  protection ;  and  there  may  be  other  instances  in 
which  animals  may,  without  organic  modification, 
succeed  in  concealing  and  protecting  themselves. 
However  these  may  be  explained,  it  is  broadly  true 
that  one  distinction  between  human  life  and  other 
life  is  this  power  of  which  we  have  spoken — the  power 
of  making  other  things  serve  the  purpose  of  life. 
And  this  power  has  grown  from  more  to  more,  until 
we  can  really  set  no  limit  to  the  process  of  change 
due  to  the  action  of  man.  There  may  come  a  time 
when  man  may  prepare  his  food  directly  from 
inorganic  elements,  and  may  dispense  with  the 
agency  of  plants  and  animals  needed  at  present,  in 
order  that  his  food  may  be  raised  to  the  chemical 
level  at  which  he  is  able  to  use  it.  Speaking  broadly, 
therefore,  the  power  of  modifying  his  environment, 
and  particularly  the  power  of  doing  it  progressively 
and  with  ever-increasing  success,  belongs  to  man  alone 
of  all  the  forms  of  life  on  the  earth. 

As  there  are  limits  set  to  the  power  of  organic 
modification,  so  also  are  there  limits  to  the  nature 
of  heredity  in  relation  to  man.  Of  the  accumulated 
intellectual,  emotional,  moral,  and  spiritual  treasures 
of  humanity,  not  much  is  due  to  the  cumulative  power 
of  hereditary  action.  Parents  do  not  transmit  to 
their  children  the  knowledge  which  they  have  them- 
selves obtained.  Children  have  by  slow  and  painful 
methods  to  learn  even  to  walk  and  to  run,  and  much 
more  have  they  to  learn  grammar,  arithmetic,  mathe- 
matics, the  arts  and  sciences,  ethics,  and  philosophy. 
Nor  can  it  be  said  that  even  special   aptitudes  are 


SUPER-ORGANIC  EVOLUTION         149 

transmitted ;  for  a  mathematician  may  have  sons  who 
are  far  from  being  mathematical.      It    would   seemi/ 
that,  in  the  advance  of  humanity,  education  counts ' 
for  more  than  heredity.     Besides. on   the  new   line  ; 
of   advance   which    man   has   discovered,    we   find  a 
new  distinction  between  man  and  the  lower  animals. 
Their   hereditary  transmissions  are  limited   to  what 
has  become  organic,  and  to  what  has  come  to  them 
by  the  particular  line  of  their  own  ancestry.     An  ape 
has  no  way  of  receiving   the  transmitted  organised 
experience   of   all   apes;    he  obtains   only  what   has 
been  handed  down   by  his  own  direct  predecessors. 
There    may  be   varieties   of   attainment   among  the 
family  of  apes.     One  may  be  wiser,  stronger,  more 
courageous  than  others ;  but,  supposing  that  these  can 
be  transmitted,  they  can  be  transmitted  only  to  his 
immediate  and  direct  progeny.     But  with  man,  and 
with  the  new  means  of  transmission  he  has  discovered, 
nothing  need  be  lost.     What  has  been  won  by  one 
man   may  become  the  inheritance  of   the  race;    for 
the  race  of  man  is  one  in  a  sense  which  can  belong  to 
no  other  species.     And  the  achievement  of  one  race 
may  become  the  common  property   of  all   the  races 
of  man.     Whatever  finer  feelings  or  deeper  cunning 
may  have  belonged^ to  j^n  exceptional  animal  perishes^ 
with  him  ;  but  the^services  rendered_to_  humanity  by  ^ 
"  the  dead'^but  sceptred  sovi^ans  who   still   rule   our    | 
spirits  from  their  urns "  are  recorded  and  are  living 
and  powerful  to-day.     Individual  men  differ  from  one 
another  in  many  respects,   but   all  humanity  is   in 
every  man.     Some  may  fall  below  the  average,  but 
others  rise  high  above  it,  and  may  reveal  to  us  how 


150     CHRISTIANITY  AND   EVOLUTION 

great  humanity  is.  The  great  men  of  humanity 
have  given  to  it  possessions  which  man  will  not 
wittingly  let  die.  They  have  lifted  us  up  to  the 
heights  of  knowledge,  of  feeling,  of  volition.  The 
truth  and  beauty  they  have  seen  they  have  also 
recorded,  and  succeeding  men  may  live  on  what  they 
have  handed  down. 

Organic  modification  seems  to  have  no  way  of 
preserving  these  exceptional  experiences,  and  there- 
fore the  lower  animals  must  be  still  subject  to  that 
complex  of  conditions  which  serves  to  produce  organic 
changes.  But  these  laws  of  variability,  natural  selec- 
tion, and  heredity  have,  in  man,  given  place  to  other 
and  higher  laws  of  development.  How  the  thought  of 
one  man  may  help  to  enable  other  men  to  be  adapted 
to  environment  let  the  history  of  civilisation  testify. 
One  man  thinks  the  steam  engine,  and  suddenly  the 
conditions  of  modern  life  are  changed  for  all  men. 
One  might  speak  here  of  the  poets  and  their  gift  of 
song  to  the  race,  of  the  painters  who  have  revealed 
to  their  fellow-men  the  Divine  quality  of  beauty  in 
the  world,  of  the  scientific  leaders  of  the  generations 
w^ho  have  wrested  from  nature  the  laws  of  her 
movements  both  in  the  heavens  above  and  in  the  earth 
beneath,  of  the  thinkers  of  philosophy  who  have 
aspired  to  think  in  human  thought  and  express  in 
human  language  the  thought  which  is  embodied  in 
the  universe  and  in  all  its  movements.  Take  the 
great  men  of  the  world,  who  have  been  the  mightiest 
benefactors  of  their  race,  and  we  may  say  of  them, 
and  then'  influence  that  their  exceptional  might  and! 
power  and  insight  would  have  perished  with  them-'' 


SUPER-ORGANIC  EVOLUTION        151 

selves  had  the  evolution  of  man  been  limited  to  the 
natural  selection,  heredity,  and  adaptation  which 
seem  to  rule  in  the  organic  world.  Happily,  however, 
in  the  evolution  of  mental  life  higher  laws  have  been 
found  and  wider  results  have  been  won  than  were 
possible  on  the  old  lines  of  development.  For  the 
exceptional  men  of  the  world  of  humanity  have 
served  the  race,  but  their  service  has  been  of  the 
spiritual  sort,  and  the  transmission  of  their  thought 
and  emotion  was  by  means  which  were  not  of  an 
organic  and  mechanical  kind.  Nor  can  it  be  said 
of  them  that  the  struggle  for  existence  had  much 
part  in  the  production  of  their  capacity,  or  in  the 
expression  of  their  thought.  'I  These  singers  sang 
because  they  could  not  do  otherwise.  These  men  of 
science  worked  and  toiled  because  they  were  urged  on 
by  some  mental_  desire  to  know  the  secret  of  the 
action  of  nature  in  the  particular  sphere  of  their 
observation,  and  so  of  the  others.  "'■  For  they  were 
urged  on  by  their  love  of  beauty,  their  passion 
for  truth,  theii'  desire  it  may  be  to  better  their 
fellow-men.  It  may  be  safely  said  that  not  one  or 
hardly  any  of  those  great  men  whose  thoughts  and 
works  have  helped  to  develop  the  higher  side  of  our 
nature,  the  intelligence,  the  social  and  moral  senti- 
ments, have  ever  been  pressed  on  to  this  kind  of  work 
by  the  struggle  for  existence.  They  spoke  and  toiled 
because  a  finer  necessity  was  laid  on  them.  Having 
seen  the  vision  they  must  speak  it ;  and  they  spoke, 
and  lifted  men  towards  the  heights  on  which  they 
dwelt.  They  revealed  to  others  the  depth  and  height 
and   possibility   of   human   nature,    and   encouraged 


152     CHRISTIANITY  AND  EVOLUTION 

ordinary  human  people  to  seek  the  heights  where  such 
visions  could  be  seen. 

It  is  evident,  therefore,  that  the  study  of  man 
must  be  directed  differently  and  must  recognise  larger 
princijDles  than  we  find  at  work  in  other  spheres  of 
knowledge.  We  do  not  at  present  raise  the  question 
of  the  origin  of  man,  or  ask  how  we  are  to  explain 
the  difference  between  him'  and  the  lower  creation. 
All  we  now"  do  is  to  insist  on  the  difference,  and  to 
have  some  idea  of  what  it  is.  The  difference  is  there, 
in  whatever  way  we  account  for  it.  We  may  trace 
the  supposed  path  of  progress  from  the  lower  organic 
world  to  man,  and  add  one  infinitesimal  difference 
to  another,  and  then  suppose  we  have  explained  the 
matter.  Suppose  we  have  traced  the  slow  steps  of 
development,  as  we  have  not,  yet  the  process  does  not_ 
explain  the  outcome  of  the  proci^.  What  has  to  be 
explained,  or  simply  accepted,  is  the  change  of  method 
when  we  pass  from  the  lower  world  to  man.  Physically 
the  change  is  seen  in  the  limitation  of  these  laws  of 
organic  life  by  laws  which  have  a  larger  meaning 
and  a  wider  sweep.  The  laws  of  life  seem  to  press 
the  laws  of  physics  and  chemistry  into  their  service, 
and  control  them  for  higher  issues ;  so  also  the  laws 
of  mental  life  seem  to  grasp  all  the  complexes  of 
laws  of  physics,  chemistry,  organic  life,  and  give 
them  a  new  transformation,  and  direct  them  to  ends 
unexi3ected  and  unfoireseen,  until  the  higher  form  of 
mental  life  appeared.  The  laws  of  the  lower  sphere 
are  not  abrogated,  and  do  not  cease  to  operate,  nor 
are  the  properties  and  qualities  of  the  lower  spheres 
changed ;  but  they  obtain  a  new  significance,  and  the 


SUPER-ORGANIC  EVOLUTION         153 

unity  of  the  universe  gets  a  wider  meaning,  when  all 
its  forces  are  seen  to  be  serviceable,  or  at  least  in  the 
service  of  the  mental  life,  which  can  see  them,  think 
them  anew,  understand  them,  and  transform  them 
with  a  more  glorious  significance.  Thus  we  do  not 
endeavour  to  explain  the  higher  by  the  lower,  or  the 
effect  by  the  cause.  On  the  contrary,  the  lower  can 
never  be  rightly  seen  until  it  is  set  in  the  light  of 
what  is  higher ;  and  the  cause  is  never  seen  in  its 
breadth,  and  length,  and  depth,  and  height  until  we 
see  what  it  can  do,  and  that  we  see  only  in  the 
effect. 


CHAPTER  IX 

EVOLUTION  AND  PSYCHOLOGY 

Human  and  animal  intelligence — Kational  Self -consciousness 
— Habit — Feelings,  Emotions,  Appetites  in  rational  beings 
and  irrational — Differences  in  Kind  and  in  Degree — 
Romanes  and  Spencer — Can  feelings  make  a  conscious- 
ness ? — The  Self -Genesis  of  self  according  to  Eomanes 
and  Spencer — Unity  of  human  nature — Eussel  Wallace's 
Deistic  view — Creation  is  continuous — Eesults. 

WHAT  we  have  seen  with  regard  to  the  action 
o£  man  in  modifying  his  environment  ajD- 
pears  even  more  plainl}'-  when  we  consider  his  mental 
life.  From  the  consideration  of  his  mental  life  we 
shall  gather  that  he  is  a  unique  being,  with  notes  and 
characteristics  which  are  only  foreshadowed  in  the 
lower  world  of  animals.  That  there  are  such  fore- 
shadowings  it  would  be  idle  to  deny.  There  are  in 
the  lower  creation  adaptations  which  seem  to  be  un- 
conscious, such  as  the  colours  of  animals,  and  many 
others  which  cannot  be  ascribed  to  the  purpose  and 
will  of  the  animals  concerned.  But  there  are  other 
actions  and  adaptations  of  which  the  only  explanation 
is  that  they  were  purposely  intended  by  the  animals 
who  did  them.  Whoever  reads  such  works  as  those 
of  Dr.  Komanes  on  Animal  Intelligence  will  at  once 
admit  that  the  question  is  beyond  dispute.  Animals 
are  intelligent;  but  their  intelligence  is  of  a  rudimen- 

15-i 


EVOLUTION  AND   PSYCHOLOGY      155 

tary  kind.  The  only  question  which  is  of  interest 
here  is,  Can  we  explain  human  intelligence  as  if  it 
were  the  same  in  kind  as  the  intelligence  we  see  in  the 
ant  and  the  elephant,  and  in  other  animals  ?  Can  we 
substitute  for  the  higher  nature  the  laws  and  processes 
of  the  narrower  non -human  world,  and  explain  the 
higher  by  the  lower  ?  We  may  say  that  the  higher  is 
evolved  from  the  lower.  Suppose  we  do.  It  is  just 
the  evolution  that  has  to  be  explained ;  for  when  we 
come  to  human  nature  we  come  to  a  nature  which  is 
consciously  i^ional.  And  when  conscious  reason  has 
appeared,  there  is  a  difference  between  the  attitudes 
and  relations  of  the  conscious  being  and  those 
which  seem  to  be  like  them  in  the  being  which 
is  not  rational.  While  the  stimulus  which  gives 
rise  to  sensation  and  the  sensation  itself  may  be  i 
alike  in  the  animal  and  the  man,  yet  the  reaction 
against  the  stimulus  is  very  different.  The  fact  that 
man  is  a  rational  and  self-conscious  being  makes 
every  feeling,  every  emotion,  every  volition  of  a 
different  order.  In  the  lower  organisms  the  reaction 
on  stimulus  is  simple  and  uniform,  and  the  appro- 
priate action  follows  almost  immediately.  As 
organisms  advance  in  complexity,  and  as  the  nervous 
system  becomes  more  elaborate,  the  reaction  gets  to 
be  more  slow  and  full  of  purpose,  until  we  come  to 
the  actions  of  the  ant,  or  of  the  other  more  intelli- 
gent animals ;  for  every  single  being  is  a  unity,  and 
capable  of  reaction  to  stimulus. 

When  we  come  to  speak  of  a  rational  self-conscious 
being,  the  reaction  partakes  of  the  whole  nature  of 
the    being ;    and   an   element    of    rationality   enters 


156     CHRISTIANITY  AND  EVOLUTION 

into  every  response  which  the  rational  being  makes 
to  its  environment.  The  stimuhis  is  referred  to  the 
self-conscious  being,  and  the  response  is  that  of 
the  self-conscious  being.  This  is  true  even  when 
the  response  has  become  automatic ;  for  automatic 
action  seems  for  man  to  be  a  secondary  product. 
Actions  learned  with  effort  by  continued  and  repeated 
and  conscious  action  of  attention  grow  easier  by 
repetition,  and  are  at  length  performed  without  any 
attention  at  all.  A  large  part  of  man's  habitual  action 
is  thus  handed  over,  as  it  were,  to  mechanism,  and 
stimulus  and  reaction  become  so  co-ordinated  that 
we  can  do  our  work  without  constant  superintend- 
ence. We  are  thus  set  free  for  further  attainment. 
Reason  and  attention  have  made  the  habit,  and  can 
now  proceed  to  something  else. 

It  would  take  too  much  space  to  lead  a  detailed/ 
proof  of  the  statement  that  the  feelings,  the  emotions, 
even  the  appetites  of  a  rational  being,  have  taken  into 
themselves  new  elements  which  differentiate  them  from 
the  experiences  of  the  animals  which  have  not  risen 
to  a  consciousness  of  self.  Take  the  appetites  them- 
selves, and  a  little  reflection  will  show  that  even  here 
a  new  element  has  entered  in.  Man  can  control  his 
appetites,  can  accustom  himself  to  new  kinds  of  food, 
can  make  an  element  of  reason  enter  into  the  prepara- 
tion of  his  food.  He  can  make  it,  or  at  least  can  so 
modify  it  as  to  make  it  serve  his  purpose  better. 
The  stimulus  of  hunger  and  of  thirst  physiologically 
considered  may  be  one  in  man,  and  in  an  animal  the 
response  to  it  is  diflTerent  by  all  the  breadth  which 
separates   the   rational    nature  from    that  which   is 


EVOLUTION  AND  PSYCHOLOGY      157 

not  rational.  And  if  appetite  becomes  a  new  thing 
with  rational  beings,  much  more  is  this  true  of  the 
emotions.  Take  the  table  prefixed  by  Dr.  Romanes 
to  his  works  on  Mental  Evolution  in  Animals  and 
Mental  Evolution  in  Man,  and  let  us  assume  that  these 
emotions  are  manifested  by  animals.  He  claims  that 
animals  can  manifest  surprise,  fear,  parental  affection, 
jealousy,  affection,  sympathy,  emulation,  grief,  revenge, 
shame,  and  remorse;  and  he  affirms  that  they  resemble, 
or  that  they  are  the  same  in  kind,  as  those  emotions 
which  are  called  by  the  same  name  in  man.  His 
proof  consists  in  an  interpretation  of  the  sign  of 
an  emotion  which  appears  when  the  animals  are  in 
the  state  which  seems  to  correspond  to  it.  Thus  he 
interprets  the  sign  of  anger  as  he  would  interpret  it 
in  man.  Well,  we  are  not  to  urge  the  difficulty  of 
interpreting  these  signs,  inasmuch  as  we  are  not  mere 
animals,  and  cannot  enter  into  the  consciousness  of 
animals.  Dr.  Romanes  knows  this  preliminary  difti- 
culty,  and  has  taken  care  to  keep  his  interpretation 
within  the  mark.  Let  us  suppose  that  the  signs  of 
fear,  surprise,  and  all  the  other  emotions  are  the 
same  in  animals  and  in  man,  and  also  that  the 
feelings  as  mere  feelings  are  identical;  yet  in  the  case, 
of  man  the  feelings  are  taken  up  into  the  web  of 
conscious  rational  experience,  and  are  shot  through! 
with  that  quality  that  reason  gives,  while  the  experi- 
ence of  the  other  remains  irrational.  Let  us  remember 
that  feelings  are  a  relation  between  the  stimuli  and 
the  being  which  has  the  feeling.  A  feeling  is  not 
something  in  itself,  unrelated,  unrecognised  ;  it  is  the 
response  of  the  living  being  to  the  stimulus.     And  the 


158     CHRISTIANITY  AND  EVOLUTION 

relation  between  different  feelings  is  just  the  relation 
which  each  has  to  the  subject  of  them. 

The  emotion  of  surprise,  to  take  the  one  lowest  on 
Dr.  Romanes'  list,  is  one  thing  with  the  lower  animals 
and  another  thing  wdth  man.  What  it  is  will  depend 
on  the  experience  and  wisdom  of  the  being  who 
experiences  it.  In  fact,  the  emotion  of  surprise 
differs  in  man  according  to  the  culture,  knowledge, 
and  experience  of  the  man.  We  are  not  surprised  at 
tiie  existence  of  railways,  telegraphs,  telephones  ;  our 
fathers  would  have  felt  the  utmost  surprise  if  they 
had  seen  them.  The  ancients  felt  no  surprise  at  the 
notion  of  a  hippocentaur ;  we  should  feel  the  utmost 
surprise  if  we  saw  one.  It  is  evident,  therefore,  that 
the  emotion  of .  surprise  has  with  man  now  a  deeper 
character,  a  more  rational  element  than  it  had  in  former 
ages.  Where  it  does  exist  it  has  a  wider  meaning, 
and  has  gathered  into  itself  the  wider  knowledge,  the 
deeper  experience  of  the  rational  man.  If  emotions 
in  the  human  family  can  thus  be  built  up  of  more 
complex  elements  as  the  ages  pass  on,  shall  we  not 
ialso  say  that  the  emotions  of  man  are  also  more 
complex  than  those  of  the  irrational  creatures  1  We 
cannot  isolate  the  emotions,  and  think  of  them  as  if 
they  took  place  in  a  vacuum.  The  simplest  feelings 
partake  of  the  complexity  of  the  whole  being. 

It  appears  to  me,  therefore,  that  much  of  the  writing 
of  Darwin  in  The  Descent  of  Ma7i  and  in  The  Ex- 
j^ression  of  the  Emotions  is  irrelevant  to  the  purpose  he 
has  in  hand.  He  first  would  have  to  show  that  the 
emotions  in  the  lower  animals  are  identical  with  those 
in  man.    He  has  assumed  without  inquii^ing  that,  when 


EVOLUTION  AND  PSYCHOLOGY      159 

he  has  got  the  same  muscular  contraction,  say,  of 
the  forehead  in  the  monkey  and  in  man,  he  has  also 
got  the  same  subjective  state.  But  this  is  incapable  of 
proof  ;  it  seems,  indeed,  to  be  capable  of  disproof.  The 
outward  signs  may  seem  to  be  identical,  but  the 
inward  feeling  may  be  as  wide  as  the  poles  asunder. 
That  which  is  what  it  is  in  relation  to  a  whole  is  to 
be  judged  in  relation  to  the  whole  of  which  it  is  a 
part.  And  an  emotion  is  to  be  judged  in  relation  to 
the  being  in  whose  experience  it  is  a  factor  ;  and  thus 
the  emotion  partakes  of  the  character  of  that  being, 
and  will  increase  in  complexity  in  proportion  as  the 
experience  consists  of  more  or  less  elements  in  relation 
to  the  whole.  Thus  the  emotion  of  a  being  who  has 
not  attained,  and  who  never  will  attain,  to  self-con- 
sciousness can  scarcely,  to  any  profit,  be  compared] 
with  the  emotions  of  a  being  who  is  potentially  at 
least  self-conscious  from  the  beginning. 

If  it  is  so  with  the  emotions,  a  fortiori  it  is  so  with 
the  cognitions  and  the  volitions  of  man.  Comparative  I 
psychology  can  make  little  progress  for  this  very 
reason,  because  the  being  who  makes  the  comparison 
is  rational,  and  is  apt  to  read  his  own  rationality  into 
what  he  observes.  It  appears  to  us  that  Dr.  Rop^anes 
has  not  been  able  to  avoid  this  cause  of  uncertainty. 
In  his  able  and  interesting  books  already  mentioned 
he  has  done  more  than  any  other  man  in  the 
attempt  to  prove  that  the  intelhgence  of  animals  is 
the  same  in  kind  as  the  intelligence  in  man,  thou^h^he 
admits  a  difference  in  deg^ree.  It  is  not  easy  to  make 
out  what  Dr.  Komanes  means  by  a  difference  in  kind, 
or  rather  it  is  difficult  to  say  whether  Dr.  Komanes 


160     CHRISTIAXITY  AND   EVOLUTION 

would  admit  that  any  difierence  is  a  difference  in  kind. 
We  have  the  following  note  from  him  :  "  It  is  perhaps 
desirable  to  explain  from  the  first  that  by  the  words 
'  difference  of  kind,'  as  used  in  the  above  paragraph 
and  elsewhere  throughout  this  treatise,  I  mean  differ- 
ence of  origin.  This  is  the  only  real  distinction  that 
can  be  drawn  between  the  terms  '  difference  of  kind ' 
and  '  difference  of  degree,'  and  I  should  have  scarcely 
have  deemed  it  worth  while  to  give  the  definition,  had 
it  not  been  for  the  confused  manner  in  which  the 
terms  are  used  by  some  writers — e.g.,  Professor  Sayce, 
who  says,  while  speaking  of  languages  from  a  common 
source, '  differences  of  degree  become  in  time  differences 
of  kind.'  "     {Mental  Evolution  in  Man,  p.  3  note.) 

Can  there  be  on  Dr.  Romanes'  terms  a  difference  of 
kind  1  On  his  own  view,  the  view  of  evolution,  any 
distinction  between  species  and  species  can  never  be  a 
distinction  of  kind,  for  it  can  never  be  a  "  difference 
of  origin."  All  the  forms  of  animals  have  been  modi- 
fied to  their  present  shape  by  slow  changes — that  is, 
according  to  the  teaching  of  Dr.  Romanes.  They 
have  one  origin.  Are  we  to  say,  then,  that  there 
is  no  difference  of  kind  between  the  vertebrate  and 
the  invertebrate,  between  a  salmon  and  an  elephant, 
between  an  ape  and  a  man  1  Are  we  to  set  down  the 
difference  between  species  and  species  as  a  difference 
in  degree  1  If  not,  then  Professor  Sayce  is  right  in 
saying  that  a  difference  in  degree  may  become  a  difier- 
ence in  kind.  It  is  also  difficult  to  understand  what 
Dr.  Romanes  means  by  a  diffei-ence  of  origin.  We 
thought  that  evolution  had  given  up  the  search  after 
origins,  and  had  discovered  that  it  must  begin  with 


EVOLUTIOJSr  AND  PSYCHOLOGY      161 

something.  According  to  the  theory  of  Mr.  Spencer, 
we  begin  with  an  Unknowable  Power,  and  the  first 
form  of  its  manifestation  lay  in  the  primitive  nebu- 
losity. If  we  take  the  more  modest  form  of  the 
Darwinian  hypothesis,  we  still  begin  with  life,  and  all 
life  has  only  one  origin  according  to  him.  If  with 
Haeckel  we  seek  to  unite  the  living  with  the  non- 
living and  to  bridge  the  chasm  between  the  two,  we 
still  begin  somewhere,  and  according  to  the  theory 
of  evolution  there  is  one  origin  for  everything. 

It  is  also  the  view  of  theology.  Theologians  also 
have  only  one,  know  of  only  one  origin  for  the  universe, 
and  for  all  that  is  in  it.  They  say  in  the  beginning 
God  created  the  heavens  and  the  earth.  They  believe, 
in  the  words  of  a  book  which  they  revere  and  honour 
and  seek  to  obey,  that  "  by  the  word  of  the  Lord  were 
the  heavens  made,  and  all  the  host  of  them  by  the 
breath  of  His  mouth."  They  do  not  distinguish  between 
man  and  the  lower  animals  by  a  difFerence  of  origin ; 
for  all  derived  existence  must,  they  believe,  trace  its 
origin  to  God.  If  the  Scripture  says,  "  God  created 
man  in  His  own  image,  in  the  image  of  God  created  He 
him ;  male  and  female  created  He  them  " ;  if  it  says, 
furthermore,  "  The  Lord  God  formed  man  of  the  dust 
of  the  ground,  and  breathed  into  his  nostrils  the 
breath  of  life;  and  man  became  a  living  soul,"  it 
also  says,  ''  Thou  sendest  forth  Thy  Spirit,  they  are 
created,  and  Thou  renewest  the  face  of  the  ground." 
Thus,  as  far  as  the  question  of  origin  is  concerned, 
there  is  for  the  theologian  no  question  of  difference 
of  kind,  all  things  owe  their  origin  to  the  creative 
power  of  God,  and  all  things  are  sustained  by  Him. 

11 


/ 


r 


{ 


162     CHRISTIANITY  AND    EVOLUTION 

Nor  for  the  evolutionist  can  there  be,  on  Dr.  Eomanes' 
teaching,   any  difference  of  kind;    for  all  things  are 
from  the  primal  source  of  being  whatever  that  may 
be,  and  all  things  are  what  they  are  by  the  same  kind 
of  process.     If  difference  of  kind  means  difference  of 
I  origin,  then  there  can  be  no  difference  of  kind ;  and 
f  we  must  get  for  ourselves  some  new  kind  of  classifica- 
tion just  to  satisfy  the  caprice  of  Dr.  Romanes. 

What  may  amount  to  a  difference  in  kind  falls 
therefore  to  be  determined  by  a  consideration,  not  of 
the  origin  and  history  of  a  being,  but  by  a  considera- 
tion of  its  present  nature,  character,  and  action.  If__ 
\ve~can  say  that  there  is  a  specific  difference  between 
one  class  of  animals  and  another,  weTiave  in  other 
words  established'aTdifference  of  kind.  Biologists  do 
not,  as  far  as  I  can  gather,  refuse  to  recognise  a 
difference  of  kind  between  one  species  and  another  ; 
they  do  not  deny  a  difference  of  species  ;  the  main  ques- 
tion for  them  has  been.  How  came  there  to  be  a  species  1 
The  problem  of  organic  evolution  is,  given  life,  to  show 
how  it  has  come  to  be  sorted  into  different  kinds.  Will 
Dr.  Romanes  help  us  to  language  which  will  enable  us 
to  distinguish  between  one  species  and  another  ?  We 
shall  not  quarrel  with  him  about  phrases.  If  he 
will  give  us  a  word  which  will  express  the  difference 
between  species  and  species,  we  shall  take  it ;  but  till 
then  we  shall  say  with  Professor  Sayce  and  most  other 
people  that  a  difference  in  degree  may  become  so 
great  as  ultimately  to  amount  to  a  difference  in  kind. 
It  is  somewhat  perilous  to  disagree  with  Dr.  Romanes, 
for  every  now  and  then  we  come  across  phrases  like 
the  folio-wing  :  "  This  is  admitted  l)y  all  my  opponents  | 


EVOLUTION  AND  PSYCHOLOGY      163 

who  understand  the  psychology  of  the  subject."     Of 
course  the  assumption  is,  that  if  we  do  not  admit  his 
view  we  are  of    those  who  do   not  understand  the 
psychology   of   the  subject.       Recognising   the  peril, 
we  still  venture  to  doubt  and  to  demur  to  many  of 
his  psychological  assumptions.     We   admit  that  Dr. 
Romanes  is  in  the  succession  of  English  psychologists. 
He  follows  in  the  wake  of   Locke,  Priestley,  Hume, 
the    Mills,   Bain,  and  he  seems  to  think   that  it  is 
the  only  possible  psychology.    Mr.  Herbert  Spencer  is 
also  in  the  same  succession  with  a  difference  peculiar 
to  himself.     It  is  a  psychology  which  builds  largely 
on  physiology,  which  explores  the  nervous  system  for 
physical  concomitants  of  psychological  events,  which 
is  great  in  the  cross-examination  of  babies,  and  of  late 
years  has  dealt  largely  with  the  possible  experiences 
of  the  primitive  man.     It  is   great   in    the    natural 
history  of  man,  especially  in  the  growing  period  of 
babyhood,  youth,  and  early  manhood.  Lit  is  always 
of  opinion  that  a  process  of  becoming  explains  the 
result,  ^j  Many  other  wonderful  things  might  be  said 
of  it.     Alliance  with  evolution  has  not  improved  it, 
but  the  alliance  has  enabled  it  to  do  more  wonderful 
things  than   ever.     It  has   enabled   Mr.   Spencer  to 
suppose    that   he   can    manufacture   intuitions,    and 
produce  necessary  principles  as  they  are  needed,  and 
to   explain   how  what  is  a  priori  to  the  individual 
may  be  a  2'>osteriori  to  the  race.      As  if  repetition, 
custom,  habit  could  ever  generate  a  belief  in  principles 
that   are  universal  and  necessary  !     Prolong  human 
experience  or  life-experience  as  much  as  you  please, 
it   is  still  a  particular  experience  of   the  particular, 


164     CIIIUSTIANITY  AND   EYOLUTIOX 

and  it  can  never  enable  us  to  affirm  a  proposition  as 
universal  and  necessary. 

But  perhaps  the  greatest  feat  ever  performed  in 
psychology  is  performed  by  Mr.  Spencer  when  he 
affirms  :  "  Not  only  do^  feelings  constitute  the  inferior 
tracts  of  consciousness,  but  feelings  are  in  all  cases 
the  materials  out  of  which,  in  the  superior  tracts 
of  consciousness,  intellect  is  evolved  by  structural 
combination"  {Faijchology,  vol.  i.,  p.  192).  That 
is  something  worth  knowing !  ,  Consciousness,  Mr. 
,  I  Spencer  repeatedly  says,  is_built;_  up  of  individual 
S     ^sensations    and    emotions.')     The    simplest    element 

\k.\  -W'.'^    of   consciousness   is   compared    to    a_  nervous   shock. 

'  s  '^•'^  i!''  Given  a  nervous  shock,  or  repeated  nervous  shocks, 
and  by  combining  and  recombining  these  in  endless 
ways  consciousness  is  built  up;  for  Mr.  Spencer 
sensation  and  feeling  are  equivalent  expressions.  I 
But,  may  we  ask,  what  is  it  that  is  aware  of  the 
nervous  shock  %  Make  feeling  as  simple  as  we  may, 
before  it  becomes  feeling,  or  when  it  becomes  feel- 
ing there  is  a  something  which  is  aware  of  it. 
The  lowest  organism  is  one ;  it  has  a  unitary  centre 
somewhere,  which  reacts  against  the  stimulus  and 
the  sensation.  But  Mr.  Spencer  deals  with  feelings 
as  if  they  existed  apart  from  a  creature  whose  feelings 
they  are.  By  a  process  of  combining  and  recombining 
them  he  endeavours  to  build  up  a  consciousness ;  but 
the  consciousness  is  the  condition  of  their  existence. 
/  Feeling  presupposes  consciousness,  and  yet  it  is 
'I  assumed  that  feeling  makes  consciousness. 

Mr.  Spencer  speaks  constantly  of  "  relations  between 
feelings,"  and  he  has  not  explained  how  this  is  possible. 


EVOLUTION  AND    PSYCHOLOGY      165 

Feeling  is  itself  a  relation  between  the  object  and 
the  subject,  and  relations  between  feelings  are  just 
relations  between  the  several  objects  and  the  one 
subject.  With  this  understanding  of  the  meaning 
of  the  relations  between  feelings,  we  can  follow  Mr. 
Spencer's  exposition  of  the  subject  with  interest  and 
instruction.  He  has  cast  much  light  on  the  process 
of  the  coalescence  of  feelings  into  larger  wholes ;  but 
he  has  not  approached  the  goal  he  professedly  has  in 
view — that  of  enabling  us  to  understand  how  conscious- 
ness is  built  up  :  "  Clusters  of  clusters  of  feelings  held 
together  by  relations  of  an  extremely  involved  kind." 
Yes  ;  but  the  bond  which  holds  them  together  is  that 
they  are  referred  to  the  conscious  subject  which  holds 
them  together  injtlie  unity  of  one  self -consciousness. 

But  the  one  thing  which  English  psychologists 
have  ever  sought  to  avoid  is  just  this  unity  of  self- 
consciousness^  We  get  from  them  quite  a  number 
of  useful  observations.  We  get  endless  disquisitions 
on  mind  and  body,  on  the  nervous  system  and  its 
psychological  accompaniments,  on  the  laws  of  associa- 
tion, on  mental  faculties,  on  the  emotions  and  the 
will,  and  on  a  thousand  other  topics ;  but  they  have 
so  dealt  with  all  of  them  as  to  make  us  forget  that  the', 
feelings,  emotions,  volitions,  associations  jbelong  to  all 
self,  are  those  of  a  self-conscious  rational  being.  The  ^ 
self  is  lost  amid  tlie  feelings,'  cb"ghrtions,  "and  volitions  ; 
and  psychology  proceeds  as  if  these  feelings,  cognitions, 
and  volitions  were  separate  and  independent  realities. 
One  might  suppose  that  Professor  Green,  in  his  drastic 
and  dramatic  Introduction  to  Hume,  had  made  an  end 
of  that  kind  of  thing.     But  no  :  English  ps^xhology 


166     CURLyriANITY  AND  EVOLUTION 

seems,  like  the  BourLons,  to  have  learnt  nothing  and 
to  have  forgotten  nothing.  It  is  still  alive,  and  has 
been  recently  reinforced  from  abroad,  both  from 
Erance  and  from  Germany;  and  those  who  have 
recently  dealt  with  the  matter,  Ribot  and  Miinsterberg, 
have  reduced  consciousness  to  a  mere  accompaniment 
of  physiological  changes. 

Notwithstanehng  this  persistent  view  of  psychology, 
and  the  reinforcement  brought  to  it  from  beyond  the 
sea,  there  is  this  to  be  said,  that  the  presupposition 
of  all  possible  psychology  is  the  possibility  of  self -con- 
sciousness, to  which  all  feelings,  cognitions,  volitions 
are  to  be  referred.  You  may  make  of  it  what  you 
please,  but  this  much  will  remain,  that  it  is  the 
central  unity  to  which  all  possible  experience  is  to  be 
referred.  The  self-conscious  being  stands  over  against 
all  possible  objects  of  experience,  and  refuses  to  be 
included  among  them.  It  is  the  self  to  which  they 
are  related,  and  in  w^iich  the  experience  finds  its  unity. 

It  was  necessary  to  say  so  much,  in  view  of  the 
attempt  which  is  made  to  construct  a  natural  history 
of  the  self.  We  have  to  admit  that  Dr.  Romanes 
is  aware  of  the  problem,  and  that  he  says  that  in 
the  work  before  us  it  is  not  the  problem  he  has  in 
hand.  His  is  a  problem  of  psychogenesis,  and  his 
aim  is  to  prove  that  the  intelligence  of  the  man  is  not 
different  in  kind  from  that  of  the  brute.  We  think 
he  has  failed;  but  his  has-been  the  most  serious 
attempt  that  has  been  made,  and  the  most  valuable 
even  to  those  who  disagree  with  him.  He  has  not 
made  the  attempt  of  building  up  mind  from  feelings 
as  if  they  were  independent  realities.     He  knows  that 


EVOLUTION  AND  PSYCHOLOGY      167 

the  organism  is  one  connected  whole,  and  that  all 
the  parts  of  an  organism  are  mutually  related  in  the 
unity  of  individual  sensibility.  "  Every  stimulus 
supplied  from  without,  every  movement  originating 
from  within,  carries  with  it  the  character  of  belong- 
ing to  that  which  feels  or  moves"  (p.  197).  Thus 
feelings  are  referred  to  their  unifying  centre ;  and 
he  maintains  also  that  thus  the  foundations  of  self- 
consciousness  are  largely  laid  in  the  fact  that  an 
organism  is  one  connected  whole.  I  do  not  myself 
see  how  this  is  consistent  with  the  psychological  pre- 
suppositions he  derives  from  Locke.  Dr.  Romanes 
seems  to  assume  that  the  only  possible  psychology  is 
that  of  the  empirical  school.  He  is  no  doubt  aware 
that  the  method  and  the  conclusions  of  the  empirical 
school  are  keenly  contested.  We  now  point  only  to 
Green's  Introduction  to  Hume  in  witness  of  the  fact. 
Dr.  Romanes — for  we  must  be  brief — defines  "  idea  " 
as  follows  :  "  The  word  '  idea '  I  will  use  in  the  sense 
defined  in  my  previous  work — namely,  as  a  generic 
term  to  signify  indifferently  any  product  of  imagina- 
tion, from  the  mere  memory  of  a  sensuous  impression 
up  to  the  result  of  the  most  abstruse  generalisation." 
Then  he  describes  what  he  means  by  "  simple  idea," 
"  complex  idea,"  and  "  general  idea."  Then  the  differ- 
ent stages  of  ideation,  are  given.  Simple  ideas  he 
calls  perc_epts,  general  ideas  are  coiicepts,  and  for  the 
class  which  is  between  percepts  and  concepts  he  uses 
the  word  *'recepts  ";  and  he  thinks  that  every  one  is 
likely  to  accept  his  classification.  He  thinks  that  in 
'•  perception  "  and  in  "  reception  "  the  mind  is  passive, 
while  in  "  conceptual  "  thought  it  is  active.     V/e  are 


168     CHRISTIANITY  AND  EVOLUTION 

not  quite  sure  what  to  say  about  "recepts."  They 
must  either  be  particular,  or  they  must  be  general.  If 
they  are  more  than  particular,  they  must  be  repre- 
sentative j  and  if  they  are  representative  they  are 
useless,  and  simply  serve  to  perplex.  But  the  question 
of  the  passivity  of  the  mind  until  it  reaches  to  general 
ideas  is  the  most  perplexing.  It  is  this  v^hich  we 
cannot  reconcile  with  the  statement  of  Dr.  Romanes  : 
'"  Every  stimulus  supplied  from  without,  every  move- 
ment originating  from  within,  carries  with  it  the 
character  of  belonging  to  that  which  feels  and 
moves."  If  this  be  true,  as  we  believe  it  is,  then  even 
in  the  lowest  organism  there  is  activity  in  i-esponse 
to  stimulus.  Much  more  is  it  true  when  a  higher 
organism  responds  to  stimulus.  The  activity  may 
manifest  itself  even  in  feeling,  and  perception  is 
activity.  But  this  is  not  the  only  inconsistency  into 
which  Dr.  Romanes  has  fallen.  "I  take  it,  then,  as 
established  that  true  or  conceptual  self-consciousness 
consists  in  paying  the  same  kind  of  attention  to 
inward  psychical  consciousness  as  is  habitually  paid 
to  outward  psychical  processes  ;  that  in  the  mind  of 
animals  and  infants  there  is  a  world  of  images  stand- 
ing as  signs  of  outward  objects,  although  we  may 
concede  that  for  the  most  part  they  only  admit  of 
being  revived  by  sensuous  association ;  that  at  this 
stage  of  mental  evolution  the  logic  of  recepts  com- 
prises an  ejective  as  well  as  an  objective  world ;  and 
that  here  we  also  have  the  recognition  of  individuality, 
so  far  as  this  is  dependent  on  what  has  been  termed 
an  outward  self-consciousness,  or  the  consciousness 
of  self  as  a  feeling  and  an  active  agent,  without  the 


EVOLUTION  AND  PSYCHOLOGY      169 

cousciousness  of   self   as  an  object  of   thought,  and 
therefore  a  subject  "  (p.  200). 

This  is  really  a  wonderful  passage.  We  have  read 
it  again  and  again,  and  have  read  the  passages  which 
lead  up  to  it,  and  those  which  immediately  follow  it, 
and  with  a  wonder  which  grew  and  grew.  What  is 
the  meaning  of  it  ?  I  take  note  of  the  passage  : 
"  Receptual  or  outward  self- consciousness  is  the  prac- 
tical recognition  of  self  as  an  active  and  a  feeling  agent; 
while  conceptual  or  inward  self -consciousness  is  the 
introspective  recognition  of  self  as  an  object  of  know- 
ledge, and  therefore  as  a  subject.  Hence  the  one  form 
of  self-consciousness  differs  from  the  other  in  that  it  is 
only  objective  and  never  subjective."  But  that  state- 
ment does  not  make  the  matter  easier  to  understand. 
Does  the  higher  self -consciousness  never  exist  until 
it  attains  to  the  "  recognition  of  itself  as  an  object  of 
knowledge "  ?  But  the  recognition  of  it  does  not 
make  it.  It  is  already  there  and  active.  Besides, 
Dr.  Romanes  would  need  to  explain  how  the  subject 
can  become  an  object,  how  that  for  which  all  objects 
are,  and  to  which  all  objects  are  presented,  can  be  an 
object.  That  certain  states  of  the  subject  can  be  an 
object  can  be  readily  understood,  but  not  that  the 
subject  can  be  an  object  to  itself.  If  the  subject  can 
be  an  object,  how  does  it  differ  from  other  objects  ? 
and  what  becomes  of  the  distinction  between  the 
different  forms  of  self -consciousness  when  the  subject 
becomes  an  object  ? 

Then,  again,  what  has  the  power  or  stage  of  con- 
ceptualism  to  do  with  the  inward  self-consciousness  ? 
Have  we  no  power  to  recognise  ourselves  as  thinking. 


170     CHRISTIANITY  AND  EVOLUTION 

active,  feeling  beings  until  we  have  attained  the  stage 
of  making  concepts  ?  or  how  do  concepts  help  us  to 
recognise  ourselves  ?  Is  it  that  we  must  obtain  the 
power  of  making  and  using  general  conceptions  before 
we  can  recognise  our  own  power  of  thinking  ?  Is  it 
that  we  can  recognise  the  self  as  an  object  of  know- 
ledge only  when  w^e  look  at  it  under  a  general  notion 
or  idea  ?  We  submit  in  this  case  that  the  object  of 
knowledge  is  not  the  self,  but  the  general  notion. 
This  may  perhaps  be  the  meaning  of  Dr.  Romanes,  as 
it  falls  in  with  his  psychological  position  generally. 
If  it  is,  then  psychology  has  again  to  pass  through 
the  period  and  the  stages  of  controversy  which  have 
already  been  passed  from  Locke  and  Berkeley  to 
Hume  and  his  successors;  and  we  shall  have  to 
discuss  the  question  as  to  whether  ideas  are  the  only 
objects  of  knowledge.  But  that  is  a  task  which  we 
may  w^ell  decline. 

At  all  events,  Dr.  Romanes  has  not  made  clear 
what  he  means  by  conceptual  self -consciousness.  Nor 
has  he  made  good  the  distinction  between  outward 
and  inner  self -consciousness;  for  after  one  attains 
to  conceptual  self-consciousness,  he  may  live  all  his 
life  and  do  all  his  work  without  ever  turning  his  mind 
inward  to  contemplate  itself.  Dr.  Romanes  has  him- 
self the  highest  self-consciousness  when  he  is  occupied 
so  completely  with  the  study  of  external  objects  as  to 
forget  the  inner  self-consciousness  altogether.  Shall 
we  say  that  Newton  and  Darwin  and  other  great 
men,  who  hardly  ever  looked  inward,  but  always 
outward,  have  not  attained  to  the  higher  self-con- 
sciousness?    That  might  be  a  plausible  way  of  ex- 


EVOLUTION  AND   PSYCHOLOGY      171 

plaining  some  of  the  remarks  of  Darwin,  and  might 
help  to  explain  why  he  thought  of  himself  mainly  as 
an  object  among  other  objects.  But  even  that  ad- 
vantage will  not  tempt  us  to  admit  the  precarious 
distinction  which  Dr.  Romanes  has  drawn  between 
outer  and  inner  self-consciousness.  The  emergence 
of  self-consciousness  does  not  coincide  with  the  emer- 
gence of  the  power  of  forming  general  concepts.  Nor 
can  we  separate  action  and  feeling  from  conception  in 
that  sharp  and  abrupt  way.  Activity  and  feeling 
are  not  separated  from  intelligence,  and  even  the 
feeling  of  a  self-conscious  being  is  touched  with 
rationality. 

Now  the  interest  of  Dr.  Romanes  in  this  distinction 
arose  from  the  fact  that  here  for  him  is  the  dividing 
line  between  brutes  and  men.  Following  Locke,  he 
makes  the  power  of  forming  abstract  ideas  to  belong 
only  to  man.  ''Therefore  I  think,"  says  Locke, 
"  beasts  compare  not  their  ideas  further  than  some 
sensible  circumstances  annexed  to  the  objects  them- 
selves. The  other  power  of  comparing,  which  may  be 
observed  in  man,  belonging  to  general  ideas,  and 
useful  only  in  abstract  reasonings,  we  may  probably 
conjecture  brutes  have  not."  This  is  certainly  a 
marked  distinction  between  man  and  brutes,  and 
Dr.  Romanes  has  set  it  forth  with  admirable  clear- 
ness. But  is  it  psychologically  the  only  distinction  ? 
Does  not  the  distinction  between  conscious  and  self- 
consciousness  begin  at  an  earlier  stage?  Is  it  not 
manifested  whenever  the  self  is  recognised  as  a  feeling, 
acting,  thinking  agent  1  Is  not  the  self  consciously 
there,  even  before  the  stage  of  introspection  begins  1 


172     CHRISTIANITY  AND   EVOLUTION 

To  deny  this  is  to  deny  self-consciousness  to  all  who 
are  not  in  the  way  of  practising  introspection,  and 
this  would  involve  the  grotesque  supposition  that  all 
our  scientific  men — our  physicists,  chemists,  biologists, 
whose  main  work  is  to  study  facts  and  laws  in  their 
objective  order,  without  reference  to  themselves  as  sub- 
jects— are  destitute  of  the  higher  self -consciousness. 
Apart,  however,  from  any  controversy  about  the 
•'^  stage  when  self-consciousness  begins  to  manifest  itself, 
let  us  accept  Dr.  Eomanes'  view  that  there  is  such  a 
thing  as  self-consciousness.  However  we  may  under- 
stand the  word,  yet  the  fact  that  self-consciousness 
makes  a  distinction  between  man  and  brute  is  im- 
portant. It  serves  to  mark  the  position  of  man  as 
unique.  The  recognition  of  self  as  an  active,  feeling, 
or,  as  Dr.  Romanes  says,  as  a  thinking  agent  separates 
man  from  the  whole  lower  world.  Can  we  call  this  a 
distinction  in  kind  ?  or  is  it  only  in  degree  1  We  shall 
not  quarrel  about  the  phrase,  if  we  get  the  thing.  We 
say  it  is  a  great  distinction,  call  it  as  we  please.  It 
does  not  seem  possible  to  explain  it  by  anything  but 
itself.  We  may  say  that  "  the  foundations  are  laid  in 
the  fact  that  the  organism  is  one  connected  whole  "  ; 
but  so  we  might  say  that  the  foundations  of  water 
are  laid  in  oxygen  and  hydrogen,  and  the  foundations 
of  life  are  laid  in  the  chemical  properties  of  matter, 
but  water  and  life  have  properties  which  cannot  be 
explained  by  the  characteristics  of  the  foundations. 
So  it  appears  to  be  with  self-consciousness.  It  is 
unique ;  there  is  nothing  like  it  in  the  world  beneath  ; 
and  as  far  as  evolution  is  concerned,  it  is  just  bound 
to  accept  it,  and  to  accept  it  without  explanation. 


EVOLUTION  AND   PSYCHOLOGY      173 

Whatever  the  explanation  may  be,  it  must  fulfil 
certain  conditions.  It  must  be  such  as  will  not  break 
up  the  unity  of  human  nature,  and  assign  the  origin 
of  his  body  to  one  set  of  causes  and  his  mind  to 
another  ;  and  it  must  not  bring  in  a  cause  here  which  ■ 
operates  only  at  this  point  or  at  a  few  other  points 
in  the  whole  history  of  the  earth.  This  is,  however, 
what  Mr.  Russel  Wallace  has  done,  and  the  result  is 
that  he  has  advocated  a  certain  kind  of  deism,  as, 
in  fact,  Mr.  Darwin  has  also.  But  deism  is  a  super- 
annuated form  of  thought  which  cannot  be  resuscitated 
at  the  present  hour.  (Mr.  Wallace  tells  us  that  "  there 
are  at  least_three  stages  in  the  development  of  the 
organic  world  when  some  new  cause  or  power  must 
necessarily  come  into  action.  The  _first,  stage  is  the 
change  from^organic  to  inorganic,  when  the  first 
vegetable  cell,  or  the  living  protoplasm  out  of  which 
it  arose,  first  appeared.  .  .  .  The  next  stage  is  still 
more  marvellous,  still  more  completely  beyond  all 
possibility  of  explanation  by  matter,  its  laws,  and 
forces.  It  is  the  introduction^  sensation  or  conscious- 
ness, constituting  the  fundamental  distinction  between 
the  animal  and  vegetable  kingdoms.  .  .  .  The  third 
stage  is,  as  we  have  seen,  the  existence  in  man  ; 
of  a  number  of  his  most  characteristic  and  noblest  ' 
faculties,  those  which  raise  him  furthest  above  the 
brutes,  and  open  up  possibilities  of  almost  indefinite 
advancement.  These  faculties  could  not  possibly 
have  been  developed  by  means  of  the  same  laws  which  1 
have  determined  the  progressive  development  of  the  / 
organic  world  in  general,  and  also  of  man's  physical 
organism.     These  three   distinct   stages   of   progress 


174     OHRISTIAXITY  AND   EVOLVTION 

/  from  the  inorganic  world  of  niatter  np  to  man  point 
I  clearly  to  an  unseen  universe,  to  a  world  of  spii'it,  to 
.-  which  the  world  of  matter  is  altogether  subordinate." 
\^    (Darwinism,  pp.  274-6.) 

These  are  the  positions,  this  is  the  attitude  of 
mind  which  we  call  deistic,  and  which,  on  gi-ounds  of 
science,  philosophy,  and  theology,  we  cannot  accept. 
Are  we  to  hold  that  only  at  these  three  stages  can  we 
find  anything  that  points  to  a  world  of  spirit  ?  Are 
we  to  bring  in  the  world  of  spirit  only  where  our 
favourite  theory  fails  ?  If  there  are  breaks  like  these 
in  the  theory  of  evolution,  is  it  not  time  to  revise  our 
theory  1  For  if  it  cannot  explain  these  points  of  new 
departure,  it  cannot  really  explain  anything  ?  It  Ls 
curious  to  notice  how  the  deistic  view  has  got  itself 
wrought  into  the  very  structure  of  Mr.  Wallace's 
mind.  "  The  theory  of  '  continual  interference '  is  a 
limitation  of  the  Creator's  power.  It  assumes  that  he 
could  not  work  by  pure  law  in  the  organic  as  he  has 
done  in  the  inorganic  world ;  it  assumes  that  he  could 
not  foresee  the  consequences  of  the  laws  of  matter  and 
mind  combined — that  results  would  continually  arise 
which  are  contrary  to  what  is  best,  and  that  he  has 
to  change  what  would  otherwise  be  the  order  of 
nature,  in  order  to  produce  that  beauty  and  variety 
and  harmony  which  even  we,  with  our  limited  intel- 
lects, can  conceive  to  be  the  result  of  self -adjustment 
in  a  universe  governed  by  unvarying  law."  (Natural 
Selection,  p.  240.)  Ls  there  no  way  of  conceiving  the 
action  of  the  Divine  presence  and  power  in  the  world 
save  that  of  continual  interference  ?  Why  should  we 
with  Mr.  Wallace  postulate  the  absence  of  God  from 


EVOLUTION  AND    PSYCHOLOGY      175 

the  world  save  only  at  these  critical  points  where  the 
self-adjusting  forces  had  failed  and  were  unequal  to 
the  new  departure  ?  Having  made  the  new  departure 
Mr.  Wallace  thinks  that,  having  got  such  a  start,  the 
world  could  again  be  left  to  self-adjusting,  self-acting 
laws.  Might  it  not  help  Mr.  Wallace  if  he  were  to 
read  Butler,  and  learn  from  him  that  the  laws  of 
nature  are  just  the  uniform  action  of  God  ?  It  is  not 
possible  to  think  that  God  is  ever  absent  from  His 
creation,  or  we  must  think  that  He  is  always  absent. 
Theology  cannot  accept  a  mere  deus  ex  machina. 

Nor  can  we  accept  that  view  of  Mr.  Wallace  which 
asserts  one  origin  for  man's  physical  organism  and 
another  for  his  spiritual  nature.     Such  a  view  destroys 
the  unity  of  man,  and  simply  makes  him  a  highly 
organised   animal    to    which    somehow    a    spiritual 
nature  has  been  superadded.     It  is  surrounded  with 
difficulties.     Man  proceeds  by  ordinary  generation ; 
how  has  this  superadded  spiritual  nature  been  trans- 
mitted?     Man  has  a   true  body  and   a   reasonable 
soul ;  is  each  reasonable  soul  superadded  to  each  in- 
dividual as  he  comes  into  existence  ?     Is  it  not  more 
reasonable,  as  it  is  certainly  more  Scriptural,  to  trace 
the  origin  of  man,  body,  soul,  spirit,  as  a  unity,  to 
the  creative  power  of  God  ?     Certainly  the  Scripture 
teaches  that  in  the  future,  in  another  life,  man  in 
his  complete  state  will  be  an  organic  man,  with  a 
spiritual    body    adequate    to    express    his    spiritual 
nature.     Are  we,  then,  to  deny  even  in  the  case  of 
man  "  special  creation  "  ?     Yes  and  no,  as  we  under- 
stand the  meaning  of  the  term.     To_me  creation  is 
continuous.     To  me  everything  is  as  it  is  through  the 


176    ':efistiaxitt  AXJj  etolutiox 

iContiiiuoTis  power  of  God:  every  law.  every  being,  every 
I  relation  of  being  are  determined  by  Him.  and^  He  is 
I  the  Power  bv  wluch  all  things  e^ist.  I  beUeve  in 
the  L':.ii::_r:i:r  of  God  in  the  world,  and  I  do  not 
belie  r  :L  :  lie  comes  forth  merely  at  a  crisi?,  as 
Mr.  Wallace  supposes.  Apart  from  the  Divine  action 
man  woidd  not  have  been,  or  have  an  existence  ;  but 
apart  from  the  Divine  action  nothing  else  would  have 
an  existence. 

We  have  seen,  with  the  help  of  Dr.  Eomanes.  that 
the  seK-cotiseioiis  man  is  a  unique  being  in  the  world, 
that  there  is  none  Uke  him.  Are  we  to  think  also  that 
this  is  a  lonely  kind  of  existence  in  this  universe  or 
above  this  universe  %  He  is  a  being  who  can  look  be- 
fore and  after,  who  can  thintr-  and  conceive  the  order 
and  method  and  evolution  of  the  tmiverse ;  and  he 
can  gather  np  the  wealth  of  his  experience  into  the 
unity  of  his  self -consciousness.  Is  there  any  other 
being  like  him,  a  Being  in  whose  image  he  is,  who 
can  speak  to  bim^  and  to  whom  he  can  speak  ?  Man 
has  been  able  to  look  back  on  a  world  which  was  once 
without  life.  But  even  in  that  world  he  was  able  to 
recognise  power,  r^nlated  power,  which  proceeded 
rationally  in  a  manner  which  c-an  be  understcKvl  by 
man :  power  in  the  systems  of  the  stars,  flower  in 
the  solar  system,  power  in  the  early  history  of  the 
lifele^  earth :  not  a  random  power,  but  a  power  that 
work^ Jbv  law,  byjnethod,  and  in  order.  He  saw 
that  the  power  he  recognised  proceeded  stage  by  stage 
until  a  world  was  made  with  conditions  fit  for  hfe. 
Is  he  wrong  if  he  thinks  that  the  power  manifested 
in  the  living  world  was  a  power  to  which  life  was 


EVOLCTIOX  AXL  P.<YCH0LOGT       177 

no  stranger  ?  that  the  power  was  a  living  power  ?  Is 
he  wrong  in  thinking  that  the  power  he  knows  in 
the  Kving  world  as  living,  now  that  self-consckrasness 
has  appeared,  is  not  lacking  in  this  respect  ?  Is  he 
not  right  in  thinking  that  this  power  has  in  itcelf 
all  the  endowments  which  have  been  manifested  one 
after  another  in  the  world  of  life,  intelligence,  self- 
consciousness  ?  And  it  has  these  eternally.  We 
know  that  power,  life,  conscionsness,  self-conadonsness 
arose  one  after  another,  and  we  may  be  greatly  exer- 
cised about  the  method  and  manner  of  their  appear- 
ance. But  wiU  not  the  perp«lexity  be  greatly  lessened 
if  we  have  reason  to  believe  in  a  Power,  living,  intelli- 
gent, self-conscious,  to  whose  creative  energy  and 
eternal  wisdom  all  things  owe  their  being  and  their 
character  ?  But  this  is  to  postulate  an  efcemal  .Splf- 
consciousness.  Yes ;  and  why  not  ?  It  is  a  more 
reasonable  assumption  than  the  asumption  of  an 
eternal  upfipnscionsness.  out  of  which,  in  the  process 
of  the  ages,  a  self-consciousness  should  ari^. 


12 


CHAPTER    X 

EVOLUTION  AND   ETHICS 

Ethics  of  evolution — Professor  Huxley's  ethical  ideal^ 
Whence  derived  1 — Not  from  cosmic  process,  not  from 
Greek  or  Koman  ethics,  nor  from  ordinary  human  ethics 
— Ethical  life  :  what  it  is — Struggle  for  existence  partial 
in  cosmos  ;  at  its  fiercest  in  human  life — Spheres  of 
human  conduct  non-moralised — Moral  ideals — Moral 
obligation — The  Christian  ethical  ideal — Its  acknow- 
ledged supremacy — Its  character— Eecognition  of  it— 
Not  derived  from  evolution — Christian  ethics  both  Test 
and  Goal  of  ethical  evolution. 

WITH  the  advent  of  a  self-conscious  being  into 
the  world,  the  world  has  talien  on  a  new 
meaning.  Here  is  a  being  who  can  stand  over 
against  the  world,  oppose  himself  to  it,  who  can  say 
' '  I,"  and  distinguish  himself  from  everything  else. 
The  change  thus  made  in  the  universe  is  of  unspeak- 
able importance;  for  here  is  a  being  who  can,  in 
course  of  time,  become  the  greatest  factor  in  the 
cosmos,  can  read  the  process  of  its  becoming,  and 
forecast  in  a  measure  its  final  outcome.  He  is  part 
of  the  process;  but  in  so  far  as  he  can  oppose  himself 
to  it  he  is  greater  than  it,  and  can  in  a  measure 
control  it.  So  far  as  we  can  limit  our  view  of  man 
to  the  intellectual  side,  and  regard  him  mainly  as  a 
rational,  self-conscious  being,  we  are  able  to  say  that 

178 


EVOLUTION  AND   ETHICS  179 

he  is  an  immeasurable  advance  on  all  that  has  gone 
before.  All  the  intelligence  formally  manifested  in 
the  cosmos,  so  far  as  consciousness  has  gone,  is  only 
rudimentary.  It  is  when  we  come  to  look  at  the 
moral  and  social  life  of  man  that  the  strangest 
phenomena  appear.  It  is  not  our  purpose  here  to 
trace  the  history  of  the  phenomena  of  ethics,  or  to 
criticise  the  attempts  that  have  been  made  to  bring 
them  into  line  with  the  theory  of  evolution.  We 
have  many  such  attempts.  Mr.  Spencer,  Mr.  Leslie 
Stephen,  Mr.  Darwin,  and  others  have  sought  to 
trace  the  evolution  of  ethics.  We  have  also  many 
contributions  from  the  students  of  anthropology.  A 
full  and  critical  account  may  be  found  in  the  work 
of  Mr.  C.  M.  WiUiams,  A  Review  of  the  Systems  of 
Ethics  founded  on  the  Theory  of  Evolution,  who,  after 
giving  us  a  valuable  account  of  the  systems  of  ethics 
founded  on  evolution,  himself  adds  one  to  the  number. 
Of  all  of  them  it  may  be  said  generally  that  the 
explanation  they  give  of  the  phenomena  of  the  moral  - 
life  is  inadequate,  and  these  phenomena  are  for  the 
most  part  explained  away. 

That  evolution  is  not  inconsistent  with  the  recog-  ' 
nition  of  moral  ideals  we  may  see  by  a  reference  to 
the  system  of  Mr.  Spencer.  We  may  see  this  also 
by  a  reference  to  the  latest  and  the  most  remarkable 
of  the  writings  of  Professor  Huxley.  A  great  part 
of  the  Romanes  lecture  {Evolution  and  Ethics)  is  of 
such  a  kind  as  to  make  us  inclined  to  forget  many 
of  the  fierce  and  bitter  things  which  the  Professor 
has  Aviitten  in  the  course  of  his  most  controversial 
life.       "As   I   have    ah-eady   said,    the    practice    of 


180     CHRISTIANITY  AKD  EVOLUTION- 

that  which  is  ethically  best — what  we  call  goodness 
or  virtue — involves  a  course  of  conduct  which,  in 
all  respects,  is  opposed  to  that  which  leads  to  success 
in  the  cosmic  struggle  for  existence.  In  place  of 
ruthless  self-assertion,  it  demands  self-restraint ;  in 
A  place  of  thrusting  aside  or  treading  down  all  com- 
petitors, it  requires  that  the  individual  shall  not 
merely  respect,  but  shall  help  his  fellows  ;  its  influence 
is  directed,  not  so  much  to  the  survival  of  the  fittest, 
as  to  the  fitting  of  as  many  as  possible  to  survive.^ 
It  repudiates  the  gladiatorial  theory  of  existence.  It 
demands  that  each  man  who  enters  into  the  enjoy- 
ments of  a  polity  shall  be  mindful  of  his  debt  to 
those  who  have  laboriously  constructed  it,  and  shall 
take  heed  that  no  act  of  his  weakens  the  fabric  in 
which  he  has  been  permitted  to  live.  Laws  and 
moral  precepts  are  directed  to  the  end  of  curbing 
the  cosmic  process,  and  reminding  the  individual  of 
his  duty  to  the  community,  to  the  protection  and 
influence  of  which  he  owes,  if  not  existence  itself,  at 
least  the  life  of  something  better  than  a  brutal  savage." 
{Ethics  and  Evolution,  pp.  33,  34.)  "  Let  us  under- 
stand, once  for  all,  that  the  ethical  progress  of  society 
depends,  not  in  imitating  the  cosmic  process,  still  less 
in  running  away  from  it,  but  in  combating  it."  Here 
Professor  Huxley  sets  forth  an  ethical  ideal  of  a  noble 
order.     From  what  source  has  he  derived  it  ? 

It  is  not  from  the  cosmic  process.  Nor  has  he 
found  it  in  the  ethical  systems  he  has  passed  in  review 
in  the  previous  part  of  his  lecture.  It  coincides  in  a 
large  degree  with  the  ethics  of  the  Sermon  on  the 
Mount ;  and  we  may  be  glad  that  Professor  Huxley 


EVOLUTION  AND  ETHICS  181 

agrees  with  it ;  not  so  much  for  the  sake  of  the 
Sermon  on  the  Mount  as  for  his  own  sake.  We  are 
not  sure,  however,  as  to  whether  on  his  own  principles 
Professor  Huxley  has  a  right  to  separate  the  ethical 
from  the  cosmic  process.  On  what  ground  does  he 
justify  his  moral  ideal  ?  We  hardly  know.  We  are 
too  glad,  however,  to  have  these  noble  words  of  his 
with  respect  to  the  moral  ideal  to  inquire  too  curiously 
into  its  sources  and  its  sanction. 

At  the  same  time,  we  feel  bound  to  ask  whether 
the  cosmic  process  is  wdiat  Professor  Huxley  has 
described  it  to  be,  or  whether  it  is  not  a  kind  of 
anthropomorphism,  whether  it  is  not  a  reading  of 
man's  practices  into  the  cosmos.  The  struggle  for 
existence  has  been  made  to  play  a  great  part  in  the 
theory  of  evolution.  Is  it  not  exaggerated  %  In  fact, 
the  typical  form  of  the  struggle  for  existence  is  not 
cosmic,  but  human,  and  has  its  most  perfect  expression 
in  the  science  of  political  economy  as  that  science 
has  been  formerly  expounded.  In  it  self-interest  is 
regarded  as  the  ruling  motive,  and  from  it  as  a 
motive,  with  the  fact  of  private  property  and  freedom 
of  competition,  the  laws  of  the  science  are  formulated. 
Unlimited  freedom  of  competition,  baker  against 
baker,  draper  against  draper,  company  against  corn- 
pan}^,  shipowner  against  shipowner,  and  one  class 
against  another, — thus  w^e  have  the  struggle  for  exist- 
ence in  its  highest  form. 

As  we  go  back  in  history  w^e  find  that  the  struggle 
for  existence  which  we  see  to-day  pressed  most  keenly 
in  the  industrial  form  has  had  other  ways  of  mani- 
festing itself  in  the  world  of  man.     There  is  war,  and 


182      CHRISTIANITY  AND  EVOLUTION 

the  development  of  the  warhke  spirit.  There  is  the 
hostihty  between  tribe  and  tribe,  between  city  and 
city,  between  kingdom  and  kingdom.  From  the 
beginning  of  recorded  history  until  now  what  Pro- 
fessor Huxley  has  called  the  cosmic  process  has  been 
more  fully  realised  in  the  world  of  man  than  in  the 
lower  world.  From  one  point  of  view  it  looks  as  if 
the  gift  of  self-conscious  life,  the  power  of  reflection 
and  of  conscious  adaptation  of  means  to  ends,  were 
not  a  boon;  for  on  the  stage  of  history  the  self- 
conscious  being  has  largely  shown  himself  to  be  a 
being  of  the  most  selfish  sort.  "  Man  the  animal," 
says  Professor  Huxley,  "  in  fact,  has  worked  his  way 
to  the  headship  of  the  sentient  world,  and  has  become 
the  superb  animal  he  is,  in  virtue  of  his  success  in 
the  struggle  for  existence.  The  conditions  having 
been  of  a  certain  order,  man's  organisation  has 
adjusted  itself  to  them  better  than  that  of  his  com- 
petitors in  the  cosmic  strife.  In  the  case  of  mankind, 
the  self-assertion,  the  unscrupulous  seizing  upon  all 
that  can  be  grasped,  the  tenacious  holding  of  all 
that  can  be  kept,  which  constitute  the  essence  of 
the  struggle  for  existence,  have  answered.  For  his 
successful  progress  as  far  as  the  savage  state  man 
has  been  largely  indebted  to  those  qualities  which  he 
shares  with  the  ape  and  the  tiger:  his  exceptional 
physical  organisation  ;  his  cunning,  his  sociability,  his 
curiosity,  and  his  imitativeness ;  his  ruthless  and 
ferocious  destructiveness  when  his  anger  is  roused  by 
opposition."     (Pp.  5,  G.) 

Thus  the  appearance  of    a  self-conscious,  rational 
being  on  the  stage  of  life  served  only  to  accentuate 


EVOLUTION  AND  ETHICS  183 

and  to  intensify  the  struggle  for  existence.  It  is  a 
striking  and  an  appalling  fact,  which  would  seem  to 
require  a  more  radical  examination  and  a  deeper 
explanation  than  that  given  to  it  by  Professor  Huxley ; 
for  from  this  point  of  view  man  is  something  worse 
than  the  lower  world.  He  has  fallen  from  the  level  ■ 
of  the  higher  animals,  and  reason  in  him  has  been 
pressed  into  the  service  of  selfishness,  ruthlessness, 
and  ferocity;  and  the  nature  which  is  higher  from'"', 
an  intellectual  point  of  view  has,  ethically  regarded, 
become  lower.  This  fact  would  need  to  be  explained,  yj 
and  theology  has  an  explanation,  on  which  I  do  not 
insist  at  present.  The  matter  now  in  hand  is  to 
press  home  the  fact  that  the  Darwinian  notion  of  the 
struggle  for  existence  has  been  derived^  not  from  the 
cosmos,  but  from  the  more  virulent  form  of  human 
competition ;  and  if  our  thinking  is  to  correspond  to 
fact,  we  must  make  allowance  for  the  exaggeration  ; 
for  the  presence  of  reason,  uncontrolled  by  conscience 
and  unguided  by  moral  considerations,  serves  only  to 
make  the  possessor  of  it  more  selfish,  and  more  power- 
ful in  his  self-assertion.  He  has  got  into  possession 
of  the  most  powerful  of  all  instruments,  and  he  uses 
it  without  remorse  for  selfish  ends.  If  a  rational 
being  allows  himself  to  be  selfish,  then  he  becomes 
more  intensely  selfish  than  any  other  being  of  a 
lower  order.  The  desires  of  an  ape  and  a  tiger  are 
limited :  if  they  can  get  sufficient  food  for  the  day 
they  are  content  for  the  day,  and  the  struggle  is  only 
for  the  day.  The  desires  of  a  rational  being  are 
practically  unlimited^  and  every  object  may  become 
an   object  of  desire.     The  competition  between  him 


184      CHRISTIANITY  AND  EVOLUTION 

and   his   fellows   is   practically   unlimited,    and    the 
struggle  for  existence  has  no  ending. 

The  cosmic  struggle  for  existence  is  therefore  partial 
and  limited.  It  is  neither  so  fierce  nor  so  persistent 
as  is  represented.  It  is  modified  also  by  co-operation, 
and  by  many  instances  of  mutual  help  and  benefit. 
There  is  the  adumbration  of  self-sacrifice  in  the 
lower  world,  though  there  it  is  in  the  region  of  instinct, 
and  not  in  that  of  conscious  reflection  and  purpose. 
The  individual  sacrifices  itself  for  the  species ;  and  as 
the  species  ascend  in  rank,  the  sacrifice  becomes 
greater  and  greater,  until  among  them  there  is  some- 
thing like  the  appearance  of  family  life.  Then  we 
find  such  cases  as  are  manifested  in  a  law  of  mutual 
helpfulness  impressed  on  ^'ery  different  kinds  for 
the  advantage  of  each.  Instances  might  readily  be 
enumerated,  and  more  and  more  of  these  beneficial 
inter-relations  are  being  discovered  every  day. 

We  are  therefore  driven  to  the  conclusion  that  the 
process  against  which  ethics  has  to  strive  is  not  so 
much  a  cosmic  as  it  is  a  human  process.  For  we  do 
find  in  the  cosmic  process  the  outlines  and  the  rudi- 
ments of  that  ethical  doctrine  set  forth  so  eloquently 
by  Professor  Huxley.  We  find  the  law  of  self-sacrifice 
at  w^ork  in  the  grain^and  in  the  flower.  We  find  the 
law  of  social  unity  adumbrated  in  the  vine  and  its 
branches.  We  find  the  outline  of  a  settled  social  state 
in  the  community  of  the  ant  and  the  bee,  where  each 
individual  works  not  for  its  own  benefit,  but  for  the 
benefit  of  the  community.  And  in  many  other 
instances  also  we  have  involuntary  foreshadowings 
of  the  ethical  ideal. 


EVOLUTION  AND   ETHICS  185 

Ethically  the  problem  to  be  solved  is,  How  is  it  that 
in  man  we  have  the  curious  result  of  both  the  fiercest 
insistence  on  the  unethical  cosmic  process  and  the 
most  strenuous  insistence  on  the  necessity  of  combat- 
ing it  ?  It  affords  no  solution  of  the  problem  to  say 
that  man  the  animal  has  worked  his  way  up  in  virtue 
of  his  success  in  the  struggle  for  existence;  for  we\ 
have  no  evidence  that  man  jjie  mere  animal  ever  ' 
existed.  And  if  he  ever  were  only  an  animal,  he 
would  not  have  persisted  or  survived  in  the  struggle 
for  existence.  A  rational,  self-conscious  being  ought, 
as  such,  to  have  a  moral  consciousness  and  a  rational 
order  in  his  moral  life.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  we  see 
that  there  have  been  rational  beings  who  really  seem 
to  fight  not  against  what  Professor  Huxley  calls  the 
cosmic  process,  but  against  the  moi-al  order.  They 
have  exao^orerated  all  the  selfish  elements  of  the  cosmic 
process,  and  have  become  superbly  selfish. 

Nor  can  we  solve  the  problem  by  saying  that  this 
phase  of  development  belongs  to  the  time  before  men 
passed  from  anarchy  to  ci\41isation.  As  a  matter  of 
fact,  the  gladiatorial  theory  of  existence  was  never 
more  in  vogue  than  it  is  in  the  present  hour.  We  see 
it  in  the  field  of  international  relations,  nations  armed 
to  the  throat,  and  each  nation  addmg  to  its  army 
because  its  neighbour  has  made  some  movement  of 
the  same  kind.  There  are  about  twenty  millions  of 
men  in  arms  in  Europe  at  the  present  hour ;  ships  are 
built ;  and  the  talk  everywhere  is  not  of  duty,  not  of 
principle,  but  of  self-interest.  Nor  does  a  different 
state  of  things  meet  our  view  in  the  industrial  world. 
In  truth,  over  a  wide  field  of  human  activity  we  find 


I 


186      CHRISTIANITY  AND   EVOLUTION 

that  men  are  not  combating  the  cosmic  process,  but 
are  imitating  it,  and  are  improving  on  the  pattern, 
and  the  cosmic  process  by  becoming  rational  has 
become  ethically  worse.  Nor  is  this  the  worst ;  for 
the  problem  ls  not  merely  that  of  the  difference 
between  men  and  men :  it  is  the  difference  within 
the  same  man.  All  the  week  through  men  live 
according  to  the  cosmic  process,  and  on  Sunday  they 
profess  to  believe  a  religion,  one  main  feature  of  which 
is  set  forth  in  the  Sermon  on  the  Mount.  On  Monday 
they  buy  in  the  cheapest  and  sell  in  the  dearest 
market,  and  feel  that  their  conduct  is  sanctioned  l^y 
the  purest  laws  of  political  economy,  and  all  the  while 
they  profess  to  believe  that  he  who  saves  his  life  shall 
lose  it,  and  he  that  loses  his  life  shall  save  it. 
^  From  the  point  of  view  of  evolution  as  manifested 
in  the  cosmic  process,  we  have  no  criterion  of  right  or 
wrong,  nor  of  good  and  evil ;  for  it  is  the  fittest  that 
survive,  and  the  survival  proves  the  fitness.  We  are 
not  helped  by  the  criterion  of  Mr.  Spencer  that  right 
conduct  is  the  conduct  that  is  most  evolved.  The 
immoral  sentiments  are  as  evolved  as  the  moral.  There 
is  a  great  deal  of  definite,  coherent  heterogeneity  in 
the  burglar  and  the  thief.  And  the  conduct  of  the 
first  Napoleon  exhibits  a  great  example  of  evolved 
conduct ;  but  his  ethical  character  does  not  rise  to  the 
standard  set  by  Professor  Huxley.  In  fact,  as  the 
conditions  of  society  get  more  and  more  complex,  and 
the  struggle  for  existence  becomes  more  and  more  keen, 
conduct,  whether  it  is  good  or  bad,  necessarily  becomes 
more  evolved.  Selfishness  must  become  more  cunning, 
and  must  adapt  itself  to  tlie  conditions  of  existence. 


EVOLUTION  AND   ETHICS  187 

It  seems  necessary  to  lay  stress  on  this  sad  fact  of 
our  common  humanity,  as  it  is  an  aspect  of  human  life 
too  much  neglected  in  systematic  ethical  treatises,  j 
Why  has  man  been,  why  is  man  so  unethical  ?  It  is  ) 
a  pleasant  exercise  for  ethical  writers  to  trace  the 
origin  and  progress  of  the  ethical  emotions,  to  show  us  / 
the  first  faint  traces  of  sympathy,  self-sacrifice,  and  j 
love  in  the  lower  creation,  to  point  us  to  the  evolu- 
tion of  motherhood  and  the  grow^th  of  family  life,  to 
show  us  the  first  growth  of  moral  maxims,  and  their 
increase  in  complexity  and  simplicity,  until  we  get  to 
the  moral  code  of  to-day.  But  it  might  be  well  if 
they  traced  also  the  history  of  the  dark  shadow  that 
has  hung  over  human  life  from  the  beginning,  and 
try  to  understand  and  explain  it ;  for  side  by  side 
with  the  evolution  of  good  conduct  there  has  gone  the 
evolution  of  evil  conduct ;  and  we  cannot  account  for 
this  on  the  ground  of  any  mere  evolutionary  process. 
Even  if  we  could  trace  the  progress  of  evolved  morality, 
that  will  hardly  give  us  a  criterion  of  good  conduct ; 
and  we  must  obtain  an  explanation  from  some  other 
source. 

It  seems  a  difficult  task  to  account  for  the  existence  ;  , 
of  a  moral  ideal  on  the  part  of  man  when  we  look  at '  / 
him  as  a  product  of  the  cosmic  process.  It  seems 
difficult,  when  we  look  at  the  current  maxims  of  con- 
duct, to  understand  how  or  where  Professor  Huxley 
has  got  his  ethical  ideal ;  for  the  maxims  of  common 
conduct,  such  as  business  is  business,  England  must 
pursue  her  career  and  look  after  her  interests,  and 
other  maxims  which  in  business  life  and  national  life 
make  self-interest  jthe  ruling  motive,  are  quite  opposed 


vo- 


% 


(hr^ 


188      CHPdSTIANITY  AND  EVOLUTION' 

to  his  high  icleah  The  two  ideals  are  really  incon- 
sistent ;  and  it  seems  scarcely  possible  to  account 
for  the  existence  of  moral  ideals,  of  the  kind  set 
forth  by  Professor  Huxley,  as  an  unaided  achieve- 
ment of  the  human  mind,  or  as  the  outcome  of  an 
evolutionary  process.  For  men  are  worse  than  theyl 
ought  to  be,  considered  as  products  of  evolution,  and' 
men  are  also  better ;  and  both  in  their  badness  and 
in  their  goodness  the}^  seem  to  transcend  the  cosmic 
order. 

In  this  connection  it  might  be  well  to  consider  the 
character  of  moral  ideals,  of  moral  institutions,  and 
of   the    moral  sphere ;    for  as   a    matter   of    history 
moral   ideals   have    changed   from    age   to   age,   and 
moral  institutions  and   moral  enactments  have  also 
varied,  while  the  strange  thing  with  regard  to  morals 
is  the  vast  extent  of  human  activity  which  seems  to 
lie  outside  of  man's  moral  regard.    Stress  has  been  laid 
by  writers  on  the  fact  of  obligation,  and  the  moral 
feeling  implied  in  the  words  "  ought  "  and  "  duty." 
All  are  agreed  that  these  are  words  which  represent 
ethical  facts  of  the  highest  importance.      Various  ex- 
planations are  given  both  of  the  origin  of  them,  their 
character,  and  their  sanctions  ;    but  whatever  these 
»        \  J  may  be,  there  is  agreement  as  to  the  fact  that  man 
4r     I    I  somehow  feels  himself  bound  to  aim  at  a  moral  life. 
/    '  We  accept  the  fact,  then,  of  moral  coerciveness  ;  but 
the  fact  does  not  explain  the  differences  in  the  moral 
ideal  which  have  appeared   in  the  course  of  history 
between  man  and  man,  between  one  generation  and 
another,  and  between  nation  and  nation.     Have  we 
not  one  ideal  in  India,  another  in  Persia,  another  in 


rf 


EVOLUTION  AND  ETHICS  189 

Greece,  another  in  Eome  ?  and  to-clay  have  we  not 
different  ideals  in  modern  Hfe,  and  in  modern  nations  ? 
The  obHgation  to  do  right,  the  feeling  of  "  ought " 
may  be  universal  in  man,  as  we  do  not  doubt  it  is  ;      ,  ^ 
but  how  is  a  man  to  know  what  the  moral  ideal  is,      /  j 
and  how  is  it  to  be  embodied  in  his  own  life  and  in 
social  life  1     One  thing  is  sure,  that  when  we  look  at       I 
the  contemporary  life  of  to-day  we  find  lai-ge  tracts 
of    it   which    seem   to   lie    outside   of   ethical   action 
properly   regarded.      How   small    is    the   sphere    in 
which  duty  appears  to  rule  !     While  the  feeling  of  [f 
obligation  is  existent  in  every  man,  yet  how  narrow]] 
is  its  scope  !      It  does  not  seem  to  reach  beyond  a ' 
few  conventional  moralities.     Hardly  any  one  makes 
the  whole  of  his  life  an  expression  of  goodwill  and 
right  reason.     Indifterence  to  one's  own  health,  in-  / 
temperance  in  food  and  drink,  abiding  in  ignorance  I  ^ 
when  knowledge  can  be  attained, — these  are  as  com-  \   \ 
mon  as  possible,  and  are  scarcely  ever  visited  with  \  ' 
the  disapproval  which  they  merit.     Neglect  of  means 
which  are  needed  to  save  life,  whether  these  be  the 
observance  of  sanitary  laws,  or  the  proper  precautions 
in  order  that  work  may  be  carried  on  in  safety,  and  a 
hundred  other  neglects  of  the  same  order,  which  issue 
in  the  ill  health  and  death  of  many,   are  scarcely 
looked  at  as  wrong  at  all.     Then  there  is  scarcely 
any  recognition   of   public   duty,  and    often    a  man  / 
who  is  sensitively  conscientious  in  the  discharge  of 
personal  duty  feels  no  responsibility   and    takes  no 
action  in  public  matters ;    or  if   he  takes  action  he 
simply  votes  with  his  party.     It  is  evident,  therefore, 
that  there  is  a   large  sphere  of  human  action  into 


190      CHRISTIANITY  AND  EVOLUTION 

which  the  thought  of  duty  and  responsibility  has  not 
yet  penetrated,  nor  will  it  penetrate  until  we  learn 
that  the  social  order  is  the  only  thing  which  makes 
individual  growth  in  a  moral  life  possible,  and  if 
there  is  a  low  tone  of  public  morality  a  high-toned 
and  moral  life  is  scarcely  possible. 

Then,  again,  we  have  a  formal  claim  set  up,  that 
various  human  activities  should  proceed  on  their  ow^n 
lines  unhampered  and  unhindered  by  ethical  considera- 
tions. It  is  scarcely  possible  to  enumerate  these,  so 
many  have  they  been.  (lArt  has  claimed  that  it  has 
a  right  to  neglect  morality,  and  to  cultivate  the 
beautiful  for  its  own  sake.  ,,  Literature  also  has  had 
its  fleshly  school  and  its  reahsms,  which  have  not 
lacked  defenders  at  the  present  hour.  Trade  and 
commerce  make  their  claim  that  they  have  a  right 
to  pursue  their  own  end  in  their  own  way.  Politics 
also  has  become,  or  perhaps  has  always  been,  on  a 
non-moral  basis,  and  party-spirit  is  sometimes  so  keen 
that  the  facts  can  scarcely  be  seen  in  the  mists  of 
controversy.  A  wide  survey  of  the  life  of  to-day  leads 
to  the  conclusion  that  the  field  of  ethical  action  is 
circumscribed  to  a  strange  degree.  But  it  is  evident 
that  if  ethics  is  the  art  of  true  living— of  ideal 
'living,  shall  we  say? — then  the  ethical  rules  must  be 
universal,  and  no  human  activity  can  be  left  outside 
its  scope. 

The  shifting  moral  ideals  of  the  past,  and  the  utter 
imperfection  of  moral  institutions,  as  also  the  slight 
extent  to  which  human  life  has  been  moralised,  all 
tend  to  show  us  that  the  ethical  ideal  set  forth  by 
Professor  Huxley  must  have  some  other  source  than 


EVOLUTION  AND   ETHICS  191 

that  of  mere  human  evolution.  The  ethical  ideal 
ah-eady  quoted  by  him  is,  in  some  respects,  identical 
with  that  of  the  Sermon  on  the  Mount  and  of 
the  New  Testament  generally.  How  different  this 
ethics  was  from  contemporary  ethics  any  one  knows 
who  has  given  any  attention  to  the  subject.  How 
different  was  the  view  of  the  sacredness  of  human 
life  in  Christian  and  in  non-Christian  ethics  !  Plato 
allowed  infanticide  as  fitting  in  certain  circumstances, 
and  Aiistotle  viewed  slavery  as  founded  in  the 
very  nature  of  things ;  but  the  New  Testament 
taught  that  God  had  made  of  one  blood  all  the 
nations  of  the  earth,  and  looked  on  all  men  as  alike 
partakers  of  one  human  nature,  and  therefore  all 
alike  entitled  to  equal  justice.  From  the  unity  of 
human  nature,  from  the  greatness  of  human  destiny 
and  from  a  universal  Divine  redemption,  conclusions 
were  drawn  which  contained  in  them  implicitly  the 
I'eversal  of  many  ethical  judgments,  and  set  forth  an 
ideal  utterly  subversive  of  a  large  amount  of  current 
practice.  There  is  no  ethical  ideal  like  the  ideal  of 
Jesus  of  Nazareth,  realised  in  His  own  life  and  set 
forth  in  His  teaching. 

It  seems  a  hard  thing  to  say  that  this  moral  ideal 
has  never  been  sufficiently  understood,  or  really  and 
seriously  taken.  Dr.  Hatch  says  :  "  The  ethics  of  the 
vSermon  on  the  Mount,  which  the  earliest  Christian 
communities  endeavoured  to  carry  into  practice,  have 
been  transmuted  by  the  slow  alchemy  of  history  into 
the  ethics  of  Eoman  law.  The  basis  of  Christian 
{society  is  not  Christian,  but  Eoman  and  Stoical.  A 
portion  of  the  Roman  conception  of  rights  with  the 


192      CHRISTIANITY  AND  EVOLUTION 

Stoical  conception  of  relations  involving  reciprocal 
actions  is  in  possession  of  practically  the  whole  field 
of  civilised  society.  The  transmutation  is  so  complete 
that  the  modern  question  is  not  so  much  whether  the 
ethics  of  the  Sermon  on  the  Mount  are  practicable, 
as  whether,  if  practicable,  they  would  be  desirable." 
{Ilibbert  Lectures,  pp.  169,  170.)  It  would  be  well, 
then,  to  go  back  to  the  Sermon  on  the  Mount,  to  the 
life  and  conduct  and  teaching  of  Jesus  of  Nazareth, 
and  to  try  in  the  first  place  to  understand  these.  To 
know  plainly  what  these  mean,  apart  from  all  questions 
as  to  whether  these  precepts  of  His  are  practicable  and 
desirable,  apart  also  from  all  questions  as  to  their 
origin  and  tendency,  would  seem  to  be  one  of  the  first 
duties  of  this  generation.  For  the  study  of  them  has 
been  hindered  in  many  ways — hindered  by  prejudice 
and  preconceptions,  by  our  bringing  with  us  to  the 
study  of  them  conceptions  derived  from  Roman  and 
Stoic  sources,  and  by  current  ethical  conceptions  of  a 
kind  similar  to  the  prevailing  ideas  of  Greek  ethics. 
As  to  the  interpretation  of  Christ's  moral  precepts, 
there  have  been  discussions  as  to  whether  they  really 
mean  what  they  seem  to  mean,  and  for  the  most 
part  they  are  interpreted  to  mean  something  else.  It 
seems  to  be  held  that  His  words  have  something  rash 
about  them,  that  they  are  stated  too  absolutely,  that 
they  need  to  be  toned  down,  guarded,  attenuated  in 
some  way,  until  they  are  brought  more  in  accordance 
with  man's  usual  judgments.  Even  Christian  commen- 
tators seem  somehow  to  lose  courage  in  the  presence 
of  these  broad,  strong,  ethical  judgments  of  Jesus 
Christ ;  as  a  consequence,  the  breadth  and  universality 


-1/ 


EVOLUTION  AND   ETHICS  193 

and  unconditional  character  of  His  teaching  have  been 
obscured,  and  even  the  people  who  profess  to  follow 
Him  hardly  ever  get  face  to  face  with  the  moral 
ideal  of  Jesus  Christ  without  a  veil  between. 

If  this  be  largely  so  with  regard  to  the  understand- 
ing of  His  teaching,  much  more  is  it  so  with  regard  to 
the  practice  of  it.  No  one,  or  but  very  few  have  had 
the  courage  even  to  try  to  obey  the  commands  of 
Christ.  Certainly  no  nation  has  tried  to  do  so.  In 
fact,  some  Christian  teachers  have  distinctly  said  that  Q 
it  is  not  the  duty  of  nations  to  obey  the  precepts  of  the 
Sermon  on  the  Mount.  It  may  be  acknowledged  that 
we  are  far  from  the  time  when  men  or  nations  are 
likely  seriously  to  try  this  way  of  life.  Certainly  men 
will  never  seriously  try  it  as  long  as  the  present  attitude 
of  mind  towards  that  teaching  is  maintained.  As  long 
as  that  teaching  is  not  taken  seriously,  as  long  as  its 
commands  are  looked  at  as  mere  counsels  of  perfection, 
so  long  will  the  present  lack  of  effort  continue.  Were, 
however,  the  teaching  of  Christ  and  His  example  taken 
as  true,  and  binding,  and  authoritative,  and  were  the 
kind  of  moral  life  inculcated  by  Him  taken  as  the 
only  kind  of  life  fit  for  men  to  live,  what  a  different 
kind  of  world  this  world  would  become  !  If  self- 
assertion  were  to  pass  out  of  existence,  and  poverty  of 
spirit  take  its  place  ;  if  the  hunger  and  thirst  after 
righteousness  were  to  become  as  insistent,  pei'emptory, 
and  imperative  as  the  hunger  and  thirst  after  food 
and  drink  for  the  body,  and  as  imperiously  demanded 
satisfaction ;  if  the  purity  of  heart  that  can  see 
God  were  to  become  common,  and  the  peacemakers 
become  as  universal  as  man,  is  there  any  one  who  can 

13 


194      CHRISTIANITY   AND   EVOLUTIOX 

doubt  that  the  things  which  now  mar  our  peace  and 
trouble  the  prospects  of  humanity  would  speedily  pass 
away  ?  No  one  can  doubt  that,  if  the  ethical  ideal  of 
Jesus  Chi-ist  were  to  be  universally  realised,  we  should 
have  a  world  wherein  righteousness  would  reign  ;  and 
this  can  be  said  of  no  other  ethical  ideal. 

It  is  a  commonplace  to  say  that  lie  is  the  only 
moral  Teacher  who  ever  realised  His  own  ideal.  What 
He  taught  He  lived,  and  what  He  commanded  others 
to  do  He  first  realised  in  His  own  conduct.  In/ 
this  there  is  a  great  contrast :  for  whatever  a  man's/ 
moral  ideal  is,  it  may  be  safely  said  that  his  practicef 
comes  short  of  it.  Take  a  man  wherever  you  may 
find  him,  in  ancient  Greece,  Eome,  Persia,  Egypt, 
and  you  find  in  him  a  difference  between  the  ideal  life 
and  the  real,  the  life  he  feels  he  ought  to  live  and  the 
life  he  actually  does  live.  It  is  in  this  connection 
that  the  fact  of  moral  obligation  has  its  unique  place. 
Universally  man's  conception  of  duty  is  higher  than 
he. can  realise.  The  "  ought"  is  always  greater  than 
the  reality.  Video  prohoque  meliora  deteriora  sequor 
is  an  old  saying  universally  recognised  as  true.  It  is 
so  when  the  ideal  of  moral  life  has  not  been  wide, 
or  deep,  or  high  ;  much  more  so,  as  the  moral  ideal 
becomes  higher,  and  as  wider  experience  reveals  the 
infinite  character  of  duty.  The  discrepancy  between 
the  ideal  and  the  real,  between  what  ought  to  be  and 
what  is,  is  largely  present  to  the  mind  of  every  one. 
The  man  of  greatest  attainments  feels  it  most  keenly, 
and  his  sorrow  at  the  fact  is  sometimes  too  deep  for 
expression.  ^ 

That  the  ethical  ideal  of  human  life  set  forth  in  the 


EVOLUTION  AND   ETHICS  195 

New  Testament  is  the  highest,  purest,  best,  is  a 
proposition  which  is  almost  iiniversally  recognised  as 
true.  It  has  become  the  standard  by  which  all  other 
ethical  standards  are  measured  and  judged.  It  has 
found  its  way  in  whole  or  in  part  into  almost  every 
system  of  ethics,  and  the  greatest  task  which  ethical 
students  have  is  to  find  a  way  by  which  the  ethical 
ideal  of  Christianity  can  be  brought  into  their  systems 
and  harmonised  with  their  leading  principles.  The 
religion  of  humanity  has  given  the  new  ethical 
principle  the  name  of  Altruism  ;  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer 
recognises  it,  and  is  disposed  to  complain  that  his 
scientific  basis  for  morals  has  been  anticipated  by  the 
ethical  principles  of  Christianity ;  for  the  Hegelians 
the  principle  of  self-sacrifice  has  become  the  central 
principle  of  their  philosophy  and  religion ;  and 
Kant's  leading  rules  of  ethics  are  but  the  abstract 
form  of  what  was  concretely  set  forth  in  the  New 
Testament.  It  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  the  life 
and  teaching  of  Jesus  Christ  have  penetrated  to  the 
very  centre  of  our  modern  theory  in  ethics,  that  they 
have  moulded  the  thoughts  and  influenced  the  judg- 
ment of  the  greatest  writers  on  ethics,  and  have 
given  endless  trouble  to  them ;  for  they  must  make 
the  ethical  conception  of  Christianity  square  in  some 
measure  at  least  with  their  fundamental  ideas. 

BUchner  tells  us  that  "  our  present  state  of  culture 
has  already  long  since  left  behind  it  all,  and  even 
the  highest,  intellectual  ideals  elaborated  by  former 
religions.  The  only  correct,  tenable  moral  principle 
depends  on  the  relation  of  reciprocity.  There  is 
therefore  no  better  guide  to  moral  conduct  than  the 


196      CIirJSTIAXITY  A.YJ)   EVOLUTION' 

old  and  well-known  proverb,  '  What  ye  would  not 
have  done  to  you  that  to  others  never  do,'  If  we  com- 
plete the  proverb  with  the  addition,  '  Do  to  others  as 
ye  would  that  they  should  do  to  you,'  we  have  the 
entire  code  of  virtue  and  morals,  and  indeed  in  a 
better  and  simpler  form  than  could  be  furnished  by 
the  thickest  manuals  of  ethics,  or  the  quintessence  of 
all  the  religious  systems  of  the  world."  When  Qpinte 
sought  to  condense  his  ethical  system  into  a  sentence 
he  wrote,  "  It  is  more  blessed  to  give  than  to  receive  "  ; 
but  this  last  sentence,  which  contains  the  essence  of 
positivist  ethics,  is  already  familiar  to  readers  of  the 
New  Testament :  "Ye  ought  to  help  the  weak,  and 
to  remember  the  words  of  the  Lord  Jesus,  how  He 
Himself  said,  It  is  more  blessed  to  give  than  to 
receive "  (Acts  xx.  35).  The  entire  code  of  ethics 
according  to  Biichner  is  already  found  in  the  Sermon 
on  the  Mount :  "All  things  therefore  whatsoever  ye 
would  that  men  should  do  unto  you,  even  so  do  ye 
also  unto  them  :  for  this  is  the  law  and  the  prophets  " 
(Matt.  vii.  12). 

Nor  do  we  find  any  advance  on  the  ideal  of  Christian 
ethics  in  those  maxims  formulated  by  Kant,  of  which 
it  has  been  said  that  they  occupy  a  place  in  ethics 
corresponding  to  the  place  which  the  three  laws  of 
motion  have  in  the  physical  sciences:  "(1)  Act  so 
that  the  maxim  of  thy  will  may  be  capable  of  being 
a  universal  law;  (2)  act  so  that  thou  mayest  use  the 
luimanity  in  thy  own  person,  as  well  as  in  the  person 
of  every  other,  always  as  an  end,  and  never  as  a 
means ;  (3)  act  according  to  maxims  which  at  the 
same  time   may  be  objectified  as  natural  laws  in  a 


EVOLUTION  AND  ETHICS  197 

system  of  universal  legislation."     These  are  but  the 
abstract  expression  of  the  commonplaces  of  Christian 
ethics.      The  first   maxim   asks   us  to  look  at  each 
individual  act  in  the  light  of  a  universal  law.     What 
would  be  the  result  if  every  one  acted  so  ?    We  may  say 
of  the  second  that  it  could  scarcely  have  been  formu- 
lated had  Dot  Christianity  paved  the  way,  and  if  the 
Christian  view  of  human  life  had  not  obtained  recogni- 
tion.    It  simply  says  that  a  man  must  remain  a  man, 
must  not  allow  himself  to  become  a  mere  tradesman, 
engineer,  politician,  orator,  or  man  of  science.     He 
must  be   a  man  with  all  humanity  in  himself,  and 
must  not  make  of  himself  or  of  others  a  means  to  an 
end.     How  readily  we  may  use  ourselves  as  means  to 
an  end  need  hardly  be  said.     No  better  illustration 
of  this  can  be  given  than    Darwin  himself.      How 
readily  also  we  use  other  people  merely  as   means  ! 
How  easily  we  make  a  man  an  abstraction,  look  at 
him  only  in  one  aspect,  and  that  the  aspect  of  him 
which  we  can  most  easily  use  !    Soldiers  for  a  general 
are  not  men,  but  only  so  much  fighting  power,  which 
has  to  be  kept  in  good  order,  and  fit  to  be  in  a  certain 
place  at  a  certain  time  to  do  certain  work ;  for  the 
capitalist  men  are  so  much  labour  ;  for  the  merchant 
men  are  so  many  customers;  and  generally  we  are  all 
looked  on  by  ourselves  and  others  as  means  to  an  end. 
In  the  third  Kant  asks.  Would  our  maxims,  if  acted 
on,  maintain   the   moral  order  of  the  universe?  or 
would  they  throw  the  moral  universe  into  confusion, 
and  let  us  judge  accordingly? 

But  the  maxims  of  Kant  are  really  different  formsl 
of  the  teacliing  of  Christ,  and  apart  from  the  ethical  I 


198      CHRISTIANITY  AND  EVOLUTION 

spirit  of  Christ  would  remain  barren  abstractions. 
Christ  embodied  these  maxims  in  a  concrete  life ;  of 
Him  alone  could  it  be  said  that  lie  always  acted  so,  as 
described  in  Kant's  maxims.  The  basis  of  His  actions 
might  at  any  moment  be  made  universal,  and  at  any 
moment  might  adequately  be  made  natui-al  laws  in  a 
system  of  universal  legislation.  He  was  the  first,  as 
He  is  indeed  the  only  one  who  taught  the  infinite 
worth  of  man.  Institutions  were  made  for  man, 
not  man  for  institutions.  He  alone  saw  the  height 
and  depth  and  possibilities  of  humanity,  and  He  alone 
was  able  to  penetrate  beyond  the  differences  between 
races,  nations,  tribes,  individuals,  classes,  and  discern 
the  common  human  nature.  He  saw  men  in  the 
light  of  eternity,  and  thus  He  taught  that  all  things 
are  for  men,  and  man  for  God. 

The  ethical  ideal  set  up  by  Christ,  though  im- 
perfectly understood  and  only  partially  realised  in 
His  followers,  has  obtained  the  victory.  To  be  like 
Christ,  to  live  as  He  lived,  to  resolve  that  not  pleasure 
but  service  shall  be  the  guide  of  life,  that  not  self- 
indulgence,  but  self-denial,  self-sacrifice  for  great  and 
worthy  ends  shall  be  our  motive,  this  is  the  ideal  of 
life  which  has  won  the  approval  of  the  best  and 
noblest  of  men.  "  We  needs  must  love  the  highest 
when  we  know  it."  And  that  Christ's  ethical  ideal 
is  the  highest  is  almost  universally  recognised. 

(What  is  the  bearing  of  these  things  on  the  ethics  of 
evolution,  or  on  the  evolution  of  ethics  ?     Well,  this 
much  at  least  is  implied :  that  at  a  certain  period  in 
the  world's  history  a  certain  ethical  ideal  arose,  was 
■  embodied  in  the  life  and  conduct  of  its  Founder,  and 


EVOLUTION  AND   ETHICS  199 

.set  forth  in  His  teaching  ;  an  ethical  ideal  which  was 
to  win  slowly,  and  in  the  face  of  stern  o^Dposition,  such 
approval  for  itself,  that  by  the  more  advanced  people 
it  shall  be  recognised  as  the  best  and  highest  for  man. 
It  looks  as  if  it  had  not  been  evolved  hy  man,  but 
evolved /or  man  ;  an  ideal  of  true  living  which  he  did 
noFforni  Tof^Hmiself,  but  which  he  could  recognise  as 
right  and  true  and  good  when  it  was  set  before  him. 
It  could  scarcely  have  been  formed  by  man,  since  it 
reversed  his  usual  ethical  judgments,  disapproved  what 
he  had  approved,  and  approved  what  he  disapproved. 
What  is  evolved  must  always  bear  some  relation  to 
the  process  of  evolution  and  to  the  lines  on  which 
evolution  proceeded. 

This  conclusion  becomes  even  more  stringent  when 
we  consider  not  only  the  ethical  ideals  before  Christ, 
but  the  ethical  ideals  since  His  ideal  has  been  before 
men.  His  ethical  ideal  cannot  be  placed  in  the  line 
of  evolution.  It  stands  out  from  all  others,  distinct 
in  character  and  aim,  in  promise  and  in  fulfilment. 
It,  unlike  all  other  ethical  speculations,  has  not  taken 
its  place  as  a  mere  factor  in  ethical  theoiy  which 
subsequent  speculation  has  absorbed  and  transcended. 
We  can  write  a  history  of  the  evolution  of  etliics,  and 
can  show  something  like  relation  between  one  stage 
and  another  in  every  case  except  that  of  Christ. 
Some  relation  and  preparation  there  are  between 
before  and  after,  save  only  here.  But  in  this  case  a 
moral  ideal  appears,  which  does  not  merely  become  a 
platform  for  further  devolopment,  which  is  not  appro- 
priated and  transcended,  which  is  largely  misunder- 
stood, and  not  acted  on,  which  even  to  the  present 


200     CHRISTIANITY  AXD   EVOLUTION 

I  hour  remains  an  unapproachable  standard  of  ideal 
moral  life,  something  which  tests  all  other  moral  ideals, 
and  is  itself  beyond  all  tests.  Evolution  can  deal 
with  such  a  problem  in  only  two  ways  :  it  must  either 
show  that  the  moral  ideal  of  Christianity  is  just 
what  we  ought  to  expect  in  the  time  and  place  and 
circumstances  of  its  origin,  and  that  its  origin  and 
character  are  not  exceptional ;  or  it  must  show  that 
it  is  not  of  a  kind  fitted  to  be  the  highest  ideal  of 
humanity  in  every  age  and  time.  Either  task  seems 
impossible.  For  Jesus  Christ  as  a  moral  Person,  as  a 
moral  Influence,  and  as  a  moral  Teacher  infinitely 
transcends,  not  only  the  men  of  His  own  time,  but 
the  men  of  every  time  ;  and  the  testimony  of  our  best 
/  ethical  writers  bears  witness  to  the  worth  and  value 
/  of  the  Christian  ideal  of  life. 

In  the  Christian  view  of  God  and  of  His  relation  to 
the  world  such  an  event  as  depicted  is  not  unintelli- 
gible. It  means  that  the  processes,  laws,  and  opera- 
tions of  the  world  have  not  proceeded  apart  from 
God.  It  means  that  God  was  making  the  world  for  a 
purpose,  and  that  He  guided  and  ruled  it  by  laws 
appropriate  to  the  nature  of  the  things  He  has  made ; 
that  each  higher  grade  of  being  manifests  more 
clearly  and  fully  the  nature  of  "the  infinite  and 
eternal  Energy  from  which  all  things  proceed."  It 
means  also  that  the  infinite  and  eternal  Energy  not 
nly  manifests  Himself  in  the  world,  but  manifests 
Himself  to  the  world  as  soon  as  there  is  a  world 
capable  of  apprehending  the  manifestation.  Thus, 
when  by  the  slow  processes  of  His  creative  power  and 
wisdom  He   had  made  a  creature  rational  and  self- 


EVOLUTION  AND   ETHICS  201 

conscious,  He  began  to  manifest  Himself  to  him  in 
ways  he  could  apprehend.  There  is  here  also  a 
process  of  slow  growth  and  evolution.  "  That  is  not 
first  which  is  spiritual,  but  that  which  is  natural,  then 
that  which  is  spiritual."  It  may  take  a  long  time 
and  much  toil  to  make  that  which  is  spiritual ;  but 
God  is  never  absent  from  His  creation,  and  never 
ceases  to  be  in  living  contact  with  it.  We  proceed  on 
the  assumption  that  God  is  something  for  Himself. 

Let  us  say,  with  Mr.  Spencer,  "that  the  power 
manifested  throughout  the  universe  distinguished  as 
material  is  the  same  power  which  in  ourselves  wells 
up  under  the  form  of  consciousness*."  Have  we  any 
other  affirmation  to  make  of  that  power  ?  Mr.  Spencer 
himself  distinguished  between  the  power  and  its  mani- 
festations, though  his  distinction  is  that  the  power  is 
unknowable,  while  the  manifestation  may  be  known 
It  might  be  more  logical  to  say  that  the  power  is 
known  by  its  manifestations.  May  we  not,  however, 
logically  say  that  the  power  manifested  within 
consciousness  and  throughout  the  universe  is  not 
exhausted  by  these  manifestations — that  the  power  is 
something  for  itself,  and  if  so  may  .be  manifested  in 
some  other  ways  ?  Why  may  not  that  power  manifest 
itself  to  man  in  some  way  which  could  not  be  accom- 
plished either  by  welling  up  in  consciousness  or  by 
action  in  the  material  universe?  Mr.  Spencer  dis- 
misses as  incredible  the  thought  that  "  the  cause  to 
which  we  can  pub  no  limit  in  space  or  time,  and 
of  which  our  entire  solar  system  is  a  relatively  in- 
finitesimal product,  took  the  disguise  of  a  man  for 
the  purpose  of  covenanting  with  a  shepherd  chief  in 


202      CHRISTIANITY  AND   EVOLUTION 

Syria  "  [Principles  of  Socioloyy,  "  Ecclesiastical  Insti- 
tutions," p.  704).  Exception  might  be  taken  to  the 
terms  of  the  statement,  but,  waiving  that,  we  look  to 
the  merely  j]^uajijai;ative_^erms  of  the  comparison. 
What  if  Abraham  were  of  more  value  than  the  whole 
material  of  the  solar  system  ?  What  if  the  self-con- 
scious, ethical,  spiritual  life  of  man  were  the  end  for 
which  the  solar  system  is  ?  What  if  the  proposition 
which  Mr.  Spencer  dismisses  as  incredible  were  to 
be  justified  by  his  own  example  1  He  has  devoted  a 
lifetime  to  the  production  of  the  Synthetic  Philosophy. 
From  the  outset  he  has  had  in  view  the  purpose  of 
providing  a  scientific  basis  for  ethics  and  a  scientific 
guide  to  conduct.  He  is  fond  of  speaking  of  the 
naturally  revealed  end  to  which  evolution  tends.  We 
cannot  supjjose  that  the  Power  which  works  through 
evolution  is  indifferent  to  the  end  in  view.  Why 
should  not  the  Power,  "of  which  the  entire  solar 
system  is  a  relatively  infinitesimal  product,"  reveal 
Himself  to  Abraham,  if  by  that  revelation  He  could 
bring  about  that  ethical  life  which  is  the  goal  of 
evolution,  as  that  goal  is  shadowed  forth  in  Mr. 
Spencer's  works?  Did  Mr.  Spencer  hope  to  influence 
moral  conduct  by  his  laborious  life  and  by  the  results 
of  his  thought  and  toil  1  Is  he  to  deny  to  the  Power 
of  which  he  is  himself  a  product  the  capacity  of  doing 
what  he  has  himself  done  ?  Then  theie  is  something 
in  Mr.  Spencer  unaccounted  for  by  the  Power  of  which 
he  is  a  product?  If  Mr.  Spencer  can  speak  to  his 
fellow-men,  and  seek  to  influence  them  to  the  pursuit 
of  high  and  noble  ends,  why  should  not  the  Power 
which  wells  up  in  his  consciousness    have  the  same 


EVOLUTION  AND   ETHICS  203 

})rivilege  ?  If  the  end  to  which  evohition  tends  is 
worthy,  then  the  Power  which  manifests  itself  in  evo- 
kition  may  take  direct  means  to  eftect  that  end.  It 
is  but  a  manifestation  of  that  Power  in  a  form  suited 
to  the  end  in  view,  and  to  the  nature  of  the  being  to 
whom  it  is  manifested.  We  submit  that  what  is 
possible  to  Mr.  Spencer  is  possible  to  God ;  and  if  the 
production  of  moral  life  is  a  worthy  outcome  of  the 
toil  manifested  in  evolution,  then  the  production  of 
that  kind  of  life  will  also  give  a  sufficient  ground  for 
Revelation. 


v/ 


CHAPTER   XI 

EVOLUTION  AND  RELIGION 

The  Christian  religion — The  Christian  goal  of  life — Fellow- 
ship with  God — Christian  religious  ideal  realised  in  Jesus 
Christ — Immanence  of  God — Christ  not  evolved^E volu- 
tion holds  for  all  others — The  ghost  theorj^  of  religion — 
Spencer's  reconciliation  of  science  and  religion — Criticism 
— Worship  for  ancestors  distinguished  from  worship  of 
ancestors — Evolved  conduct  and  evolved  belief — Univer- 
slblity  of  religion — Manifestations  of  religion — Correspond- 
ence with  realit}- — Eternal  element  in  religious  emotion 
— Christianity  and  evolution — Analogy  between  evolution 
in  all  spheres  and  the  evolution  of  Christian  life. 

IN  the  life  and  teaching  of  Jesus  Christ  the  ethical 
ideal  is  subservient  to  a  further  end.  With  Him 
the  first  and  also  the  last  is  CTod.  For  Him  God 
is  in  the  world,  and  everything  le veals  God.  '*  Behold 
tlie  birds  of  the  air,  that  they  sow  not,  nor  reap,  nor 
gather  into  barns ;  and  your  heavenly  Father  f  eedeth 
them.  .  .  .  Consider  the  lilies  of  the  field,  how  tliey 
grow ;  they  toil  not,  neither  do  they  spin :  yet  I  say 
unto  you,  that  even  Solomon  in  all  his  glory  was  not 
arrayed  like  one  of  these."  It  is  God  who  clothes  the 
grass  of  the  field  with  its  incomparable  beauty.  A 
Divine  power  so  extensive  that  nothing  can  exist 
apart  from  it,  a  Divine  care  so  minute  that  not  even 
a   sparrow   can   fall   to    the  ground  without   "your 

204 


EYOLVTIOX  AND   nEUQION  205 

Father,"  a  Divine  power  from  which  all  other  power 
is  derived,  and  without  the  exertion  of  which  no  ^ 
power  could  exist, — such  is  the  vision  which  Jesus 
saw  ;  and  which  of  us  shall  say  that  His  vision  was 
either  wrong  or  inadequate  ?  For  Jesus,  neither  the 
fowds  of  the  heaven,  nor  the  lilies  of  the  field,  nor  the 
grass  which  grows  on  the  mountains,  have  any  being, 
fitness,  or  beauty  apart  from  God.  They,  after  their 
kind,  and  in  their  measure,  are  for  God,  live  and  move 
and  have  their  being  in  God. 

As  for  man,  well  men  are  also  for  God,  and  they  I 
cannot  rest  until  they  find  their  rest  in  Him.  The' 
questions  which  men  ask,  the  aims  and  desires  which 
burden  them  with  anxiety,  are  of  comparative  un- 
importance when  looked  at  in  this  light.  "  Be  not 
therefore  anxious,  saying,  What  shall  we  eat  ?  or.  What 
shall  we  drink?  or,  Wherewithal  shall  we  be  clothed? 
For  after  all  these  things  do  the  Gentiles  seek ;  for 
your  heavenly  Father  knoweth  that  ye  have  need  of 
these  things."  Man  ought  to  have  one  aim,  to  be 
filled  with  one  desire,  to  bend  all  energies  to  the 
attainment  of  one  end.  "  Seek  ye  first  His  kingdom, 
and  His  lighteousness  ;  and  all  these  things  shall  be 
added  unto  you." 

Thus  ethical  duties  and  the  ethical  ideal  of  character 
were  insisted  on  by  Him  for  this  further  end,  that 
without  them  men  were  not  fit  for  the  kingdom  of 
God.  In  truth,  this  is  the  burden  of  the  Bible  from 
first  to  last.  From  the  point  of  view  of  revelation 
the  most  awful  state  a  man  can  be  in  is  to  be  separate 
from  God;  and  the  greatest  terror  of  the  future  is 
to  be  in  separation  from  God  for  ever.     The  greatest 


206      CHRISTIANITY  AND  EVOLUTION 

blessedness  a  man  can  have  is  to  be  in  fellowship 
with  God ;  and  the  teaching  of  Christ  Jesus  in 
this  respect  is  simply  the  culmination  of  all  the 
teaching  of  Scripture.  When  we  regard  His  dealing 
with  ethical  defects,  we  find  they  are  looked  at 
by  Him  and  are  condemned  by  Him,  not  so  much 
because  they  are  ruinous  to  man  and  marked  in 
their  progress  by  desolation  to  society,  as  because 
they  unfitted  men  for  the  kingdom  of  God,  and 
made  fellowship  with  God  impossible.  "  Blessed  are 
the  pure  in  heart,  for  they  shall  see  God."  And 
the  impure  in  heart  are  unblessed  mainly  in  that 
they  shall  not  see  God.  Christ  Jesus  does  not  set 
forth  moral  ideals  or  enforce  moral  precepts,  as 
ethical  writers  do,  by  a  reference  to  a  mere  categorical 
imperative,  or  to  the  consequences  of  immoral  action, 
or  to  the  deteriorating  effect  of  immoral  action  on 
character.  These  are  disastrous;  but  He  enforces 
them  mainly  because,  apart  from  ethical  purity  and 
attainment,  man  can  never  see  God  and  never  have 
fellowship  with  Him.  If  a  man  cannot  attain  to 
fellowship  with  God,  he  is  lost,  he  has  missed  the  aim 
of  this  being,  he  is  miserable. 

In  Christ's  teaching,  therefore,  we  have  not  a  God 
who  is  absent  from  His  creation,  or  who  interferes 
now  and  then  with  its  working,  bjit^  a  present  living 
God,  to  whom  all  things  owe  their  becoming  and 
their  being,  who  hath  appointed  for  them  the  mode 
and  measure  of  their  working,  in  whom  they  are; 
and  who  is  always  striving  to  communicate  Himself 
to  them  as  they  are  able  to  receive  Him.  To  the 
world  without  life   He  gives  Himself  as  power  and 


EYOLUTION  AND    nELlGIOK  207 

wisdom  ;  to  the  living  world  as  life,  impulse,  guidance  ; 
to  the  intelligent  world  as  conscious  reason  and  intel- 
ligent self-reference ;  to  the  moral  world  as  the  source 
of  moral  purity  ;  and  to  the  spiritual  world  as  spiritual 
life.  Many  hindrances  there  are  on  Christ's  view  to 
the  communication  of  God  to  His  creation ;  but  the 
main  hindrance  is  that  men  are  not  pure  in  heart. 
In  order  to  make  men  pure  in  heart,  and  to  make 
them  fit  for  the  communication  of  God,  there  have 
been  Divine  toil.  Divine  labour  through  the  ages; 
there  have  been  the  revelation  of  God,  the  mission 
of  the  Christ,  and  all  the  other  Divine  workings  set 
forth  in  revelation,  on  which  I  cannot  now  dwell. 
Thus,  if  w^e  accept  evolution  as  a  method  of  the 
Divine  working,  a  working  by  wise  and  adequate 
methods  for  a  foreseen  end,  revelation  itself  will  be 
seen  to  be  of  a  piece  with  that  process  of  evolution 
which  has  for  end  and  purpose  the  establishment  of 
the  kingdom  of  God.  Scripture  also  is  an  evolution, 
growing  from  small  beginnings  to  greater  and  greater 
fulness  and  clearness  until  the  end.  It  is  impossible, 
indeed,  to  place  Christ  in  the  midst  of  a  process  of 
evolution;  for  He  claims  to  be  the  First  and  the 
Last  and  the  Living  One ;  and  His  exceptional  claim 
will  be  vindicated  by  all  Christians,  and  must  in 
a  measure  be  conceded  by  all  men. 

But  evolution  will  hold  for  all  others.  Even  if  we 
grant  that  the  New  Testament,  the  type  of  life 
and  the  form  of  teaching  in  it,  is  the  norm  for  all 
succeeding  ages,  it  may  yet  be  affirmed  that  there 
is  still  an  evolution  for  all  other  men.  It  is  now  an 
approach  to  a  standard  of  life  and  thought  set  up 


208      CIIPJSTIANITY  AND   EVOLUTIOX 

/  once,  and  once  for  all,  a  revealed  ideal  which  forms 
the  real  standard  of  attainment  at  which  all  men 
onght  to  aim.  In  Christ  we  may  see  what  humanity 
ought  to  be,  and  what  it  may  become  ;  and  through 
Christ  we  may  attain  the  standard  and  the  fulness 
of  the  stature  of  perfect  men  in  Him. 

The  Christian  view  of  the  world  assumes  that  God 
is,  and  that  God  may  be  known.     It  is  assumed  that 
there  is  a  kingdom  of  God,  for  which  all  men  ought 
to  be,  and  for  the  full   realisation  of  which  God  is 
ever  working.     It  sets  forth  the  character   of   that 
kingdom,  and  the  means  by  w^hich   men  are  being 
made  fit  for  that  end.     But  here  we  are  met  with 
the  objection  that  God  cannot  be  known,  and  that 
we  are  unable  to  say  whether  the  ultimate  Reality  is 
personal  or  impersonal,  moral  or  non-moral,  spiritual 
or   unspiritual,  conscious  or   unconscious;    in    short, 
that  we  can  say  nothing  further  about  it  than  this, 
/  it  simply  is.     Yet  while  Mr.  Spencer  denies  all  right 
[ij  to  others  to  say  anything  about  the  ultimate  Reality, 
'  he  allows  himself  to  call  it  "  an  infinite  and  eternal 
I    Energy  from  which  all  things  proceed."     He  speaks 
\  of  the  Unknowable  and  its  manifestations,  and  does 
not  see  that  if  the  Unknowable  is  manifested,  so  far 
as  it  is  manifested  it  can  be  known.     It  is  quite  true 
that  all  our  knowledge  is  related  to  our  faculties ; 
true,  also,   that  being  without  attributes  or  powers 
pf  any  kind  is  unknowable  :  but  this  does  not  inter- 
fere with  the  fact  that  what  knowledge  our  faculties 
do  give  us  is  objectively  real. 

It  is  true,  also,  that  in  our  process  of  explanationi 
we   must    ultimately   be   brought    down    to   the   in- 


EVOLUTION  AXD   RELIGION  209 

explicable.  That  there  is  an  ultimate  principle  which 
we  cannot  refer  to  anything  more  ultimate,  we  cannot 
doubt ;  but  that  does  not  hinder  us  from  knowing 
the  ultimate  principle.  For  example,  in  physics  we 
cannot  get  beyond  gravitation,  and  we  know  nothing 
of  its  essential  nature ;  but  we  know  it  as  a  fact,  and 
we  know  that  it  varies  inversely  as  the  square  of  the 
distance,  and  that  it  is  constant.  We  may  know  the 
incomprehensible  as  a  fact,  and  its  laws  and  relations 
may  be  a  part  of  the  knowledge. 

We  are  not  to  touch  the  argumentation  of  Hamil- 
ton and  Mansel  and  Spencer  about  the  absolute,  the 
infinite,  the  unconditioned.  We  have  no  interest  in 
an  absolute  out  of  all  relation,  in  an  infinite  which 
is  the  negation  of  the  finite,  or  in  an  unconditioned 
which  has  no  reference  to  conditions.  We  leave  them 
all  to  Mr.  Spencer  to  make  of  them  what  he  pleases. 
For  the  God  we  seek  to  know  is  the  God  who  has 
revealed  and  still  reveals  Himself  in  the  universe,  the 
Author  of  its  being  and  its  glory,  the  Pi-eserver  of 
its  eternal  order.  The  God  of  infinite  purity  and 
holiness  we  may  know,  and  with  this  we  are  content. 
The  living  God  we  may  know,  and  we  do  not  care  to 
think  of  Him  as  being  out  of  all  relations,  or  apart 
from  all  conditions.  But  we  may  think  of  Him  as 
the  Maker  of  heaven  and  of  earth,  and  as  the  source 
and  goal  of  all  creation. 

Mr.  Spencer  and  those  who  follow  him,  because  of  i 
these  metaphysical  puzzles,  have  denied  to  religion  all 
objective  validity.     True  he  gives  us  a  reconciliation  | 
between   religion    and    science.     He    hands   over    to 
science  all  that  is  known,  and  to  religion  all   that 

U 


210      CHRLrriANITY  AND  EVOLUTION 

is  unknown.  Religion  can  begin  only  where  .science 
ends,  and  must  be  content  with  such  worship  of  the 
Unknowable  as  is  possible  in  the  circumstancLS.  But 
this  would  be  the  death  of  rehgion,  which  cannot  live 
on  nescience,  nor  can  it  reverence  a  blank.  We  see 
through  a  glass  dlirklyZ^et  wej^ee.  The  vision  may 
be  dim  and  the  knowledge  imperfect,  yet  vision 
and  knowledge  must  be,  or  rehgion  will  perish.  In 
His  presence  we  must  feel  awe  and  mystery,  and 
we  may  be  possessed  with  a  sense  of  what  we  do  not 
and  cannot  know.  We  may  find  that  silence  best 
expresses  our  adoration,  yet  there  must  be  a  voice 
which  we  can  trust,  or  religion,  with  its  emotion, 
aspiration,  hope,  will  die.  In  the  God  we  worship 
and  adore  there  must  bL^  mystery  and  much  that 
we  are  unable  to  comprehend,  but  there  must  also  be 
manifestation  and  revelation.  God  can  reach  us,  and 
we  can  find  God. 

The  full  significance  of  the  reconciliation  proposed 
by  Mr.  Spencer  was  not  realised  until  he  pubHshed 
The  Frinci'ples  of  Sociology.  In  Part  I.,  "The 
Data  of  Sociology,"  and  in  Part  VI.,  "  Ecclesiastical 
Institutions,"  he  has  let  us  see  what  lot  and  in- 
heritance he  will  allow  to  religion.  He  was  bound 
by  the  very  terms  of  his  reconciliation  to  refuse  to 
religion  any  share  in  knowledge  ;  and  he  was  also 
bound  to  regard  any  attempt  of  religion  to  say  what 
the  object  of  its  adoration  really  was  as  illegitimate. 
He  knew  that  religion  had  beliefs,  laid  claim  to 
knowledge;  and  he  elaborates  a  theory  of  rehgion 
and  its  development  which  makes  it  an  illusion  from 
first  to  last.      Theologians  rejected   his  "  reconciha- 


EVOLUTION  AND   RELIGION          211 

tioii "    before    tliey    knew    its    practical    illustration. 
They  will  reject  it  all  the  more  now. 

From  his  point  of  view  he  must,  he  is  bound  to 
give  to  religion  an  artificial  character  and  an  illusive 
oiigin.  He  allows  one  germ  of  truth  in  religion,  and 
only  one, — "the  truth,  namely,  that  the  power  which 
manifests  itself  in  consciousness  is  but  a  differently 
conditioned  form  of  the  power  which  manifests  itself 
beyond  consciousness  "  (''  Ecclesiastical  Institutions," 
p.  838) ;  or,  as  he  again  expresses  it,  "  the  ultimate 
form  of  the  religious  consciousness  is  the  final 
development  of  a  consciousness  wliich  at  the  outset 
contained  a  grain  of  truth  obscured  by  multitudinous 
errors  "  (p.  839).  As  we  toiled  through  the  pages  of 
his  Sociology,  we  had  not  found  anything  to  lead  us 
to  suppose  that  religion  had  any  beneficial  purpose 
whatsoever,  or  any  germ  of  truth  whatsoever;  and 
the  sentences  quoted  above  had  in  them  something 
of  a  surprise  to  us.  But  we  saw  that  on  his  system 
it  was  impossible  to  assign  any  function  to  religion 
save  a  recognition  of  the  mystery  of  things  and  a 
vague  awe  of  the  Unknowable. 

There  was  the  fact,  however,  that  men  had  been  f 
religious  always,  that  they  had  a  belief  in  unseen 
powers,  or  a  power  on  which  they  felt  they  de- 
pended, and  that  this  belief  had  prompted  them 
to  acts  of  propitiation  and  worship.  How  is  this**\ /^  c, 
universal  belief  to  be  explained  ?  Mr.  Spencer  does 
explain  it  in  his  own  way.  His  explanation  is  that 
''  ancesloi-\N'orship  is  the  root  of  every  religion."  He 
will  not  allow  that  nature-worship  is  primitive. 
Idol-worship,   fetich -worbhip,    animal- worship,    plant- 


212      ClIUI^TIAmTY  AND  EVOLUTION 

worship,  nature-worship,  and  the  worship  of  deities 
of  all  kinds  are  all  modifications  of  ancestor- worship. 
The  explanations  he  gives  of  the  process  of  develop- 
ment are  curious,  but  have  not  convinced  any 
impartial  student.  We  do  not  propose  to  criticise 
them  here.  We  may  observe,  however,  that  if  there 
is  such  a  thing  as  nature -worship  his  theory  falls 
to  the  ground.  There  is  a  striking  difference  between 
his  treatment  of  nature  in  relation  to  science  and 
in  relation  to  religion.  "Absolute  uniformities  in 
things  have  pi-oduced  absolute  uniformities  in 
thoughts  "  \  and  if  he  allowed  nature  to  have  any 
relation  to  religion,  he  might  have  to  admit  that 
i-eligion  does  corresj^ond  with  reality.  Hence  the 
zeal  with  which  he  denies  any  direct  influence  of 
nature  on  religion. 

The  one  thing  to  be  explained  is,  Whence  is  the 
impulse,  the  universal  tendency  of  man  to  worship  ? 
There  is  no  tribe  without  a  leligion  of  some  sort. 
Mr.  Spencer  gives  no  explanation  of  this  impulse,  no 
account  of  this  tendency.  Animals  have  it  not ;  man 
universally  has.  It  does  not  help  us  much  to  give 
I  us  a  hypothetic  account  of  the  primitive  man,  phy- 
\  sical,  emotional,  intellectual,  and  to  trace  a  supposed 
genesis  of  belief  in  ghosts  through  sleep  and  dreams, 
swoon,  apoplexy,  catalepsy,  ecstasy,  and  so  on;  for 
the  thing  left  unexplained  is,  How  did  man  come  to 
have  an  idea  of  a  ghost  at  all  ?  And  the  explana- 
tion may  be  found  in  the  pages  of  Mr.  Spencer, 
though  he  never  uses  it.  "Every  voluntary  act 
yields  to  the  primitive  man  a  proof  of  a  source  of 
enei'gy  withhi  him"  ("  Eccl.  Inst.,"  p.  838).     From 


EVOLUTION  AND   PiELIGIOX  213 

himself  he  derives  his  idea  of  energy,  of  spiritual 
life,  of  continued  existence  after  death.  He  must 
have  found  in  himself  the  sources  of  the  idea  of  the 
spiritual,  or  he  would  have  never  thought  of  it  in 
things  outside. 

Mr.  Spencer's  method  of  dealing  with  the  primitive 
man  is  peculiar.  "  Of  the  ideas  current  among  men 
now  forming  the  rudest  societies  there  are  most  likely 
some  which  have  descended  by  tradition  from  higher 
states.  These  have  to  be  discriminated  from  truly 
primitive  ideas,  so  that  simple  induction  does  not 
suffice.  To  the  deductive  method  there  are  ob.stacles 
of  another  kind  equally  great.  Comprehension  of  the 
thoughts  generated  in  the  primitive  man  by  converse 
with  the  surrounding  world  can  be  had  only  by  look- 
ing at  the  surrounding  world  from  his  standpoint." 
But  as  this  is  declared  by  Mr.  Spencer  to  be  impos- 
sible— "  Though  we  are  incapable  of  reaching  the 
conception  by  a  direct  process,  we  may  approach  to  it 
by  an  indirect  process.  The  doctrine  of  evolution  will 
help  us  to  delineate  primitive  ideas  in  some  of  their 
leading  traits.  Having  inferred,  a  pi^iori,  the  char- 
acters of  those  ideas,  we  shall  be,  as  far  as  possible, 
prepared  to  realise  them  in  imagination,  and  to  discern 
them  as  actually  existing"  (Principles  of  Sociology, 
vol.  i.,  pp.  96-8) — it  is  scarcely  necessary  to  make 
any  remark  on  the  logical  character  of  this  procedure. 
The  primitive  man  will,  of  course,  turn  out  to  be  the 
kind  of  creature  required  by  IMr.  Spencer's  theory  of 
evolution,  and  must  be  also  of  the  kind  which  will  fit 
in  with  Mr.  Spencer's  view  of  psychology.  There 
are,    however,    evolutionists    and    evolutionists,    and 


214      CIIRISTIAXITY  AND   EVOLUTION- 

psychologists    and   psychologists,  and    Mr.    Spencer's 
view  of  both  is  peculiar. 

We  turn  to  the  ghost  theory  of  religion.  We  have 
read  the  extracts  in  Mr.  Spencer's  Sociology  descriptive 
of  the  beliefs  of  savage  tribes,  and  similar  extracts  in 
other  books  of  the  same  sort,  and  we  are  astonished 
to  find  how  many  of  them  are  not  consistent  with  the 
conclusion  which  is  drawn.  Mr.  Spencer  says  :  "  The 
primitive  belief  implies  that  the  deceased  will  need 
not  only  his  weapons  and  implements,  his  clothing, 
ornaments,  and  other  movables,  together  with  his 
domestic  animals ;  but  also  that  he  will  want  human 
companionship  and  services.  The  attendance  he  had 
before  death  must  be  renewed  after  death  "  (p.  18G). 
Mr.  Spencer  refers  even  to  the  Eoman  Catholic  prac- 
tice of  masses  for  the  dead  as  a  proof  of  the  ghost 
theory.  Many  writers  on  anthropology  constantly 
refer  to  the  things  buried  with  the  dead,  will  refer 
even  to  the  ceremonies  of  military  funerals  as  sur- 
vivals of  ancestor- worship.  Is  it  not  obvious,  however, 
that  the  evidence  points  in  a  diftei-ent  direction  ?  The 
relation  is  not  one  between  the  ghost  and  the  person 
who  performs  the  funeral  rites ;  but  the  relation  is 
between  the  ghost  and  the  powers  which  rule  in  the 
unseen  world  of  the  dead.  The  weapons,  implements, 
etc.,  are  gis^en  in  order  to  fit  the  deceased  to  deal 
suitably  with  the  unseen  powers.  They  are  for  the 
use  of  the  ghost,  and  are  not  oflferings  to  propitiate 
the  ghost.  A  large  part  of  the  evidence  points  to 
this  conclusion. 

It  is  not  denied  that  there  is  propitiation  of  dead 
ancestors,  but  it  seems  to  be  secondary,  not  primary. 


EVOLUTION  AND   BELTGION         215 

The  return  of  the  ghost  was  to  be  feared  if  it  was  '^ 
insufficiently  equipped  for  the  new  existence  in  the 
under- world.  If  it  were  imagined  that  he  had  re- 
turned, any  further  offerings  might  have  the  double 
aspect  of  propitiation  of  himself — an  apology  for  former 
neglect  and  a  further  and  fitting  equipment  for  the 
other  life.  It  is  surprising  that  this  distinction  has 
not  occurred  to  Mr.  Spencer,  for  he  had  both  in 
existence  at  the  present  hour,  in  masses  for  the  dead 
and  in  the  worship  of  saints  practised  in  the  Roman 
Catholic  Church.  We  submit  that  the  larger  part  of 
his  treatise  is  vitiated  by  not  having  regard  to  the 
above  distinction.  If  the  view  be  true  that  funeral 
offerings  are  for  the  use  of  the  dead,  then  it  follows 
that^  ghosts  are  not  thought  of^as.thp  lords  of  the 
unseen  world,  and  Mr.  Spencer's  theory  vanishes. 

It  is  curious,  also,  how  differently  evolution  acts, 
say,   with   regard    to  ethics  and  to   religion.     With 
Mr.  Spencer  evolved  conduct  is  good  conduct,  and  the      / 
more  evolved  it  is  the  better  it  is,  until,  when  conduct 
becomes  completely  evolved,  it  will   be  peifect.     lie 
is  careful   to  show  that  the  development  of  religion 
proceeds  with  due  regard  and  in  strict  subordination 
to  the  process  and  nature  of   evolution.     But  here  . 
evolution    does    not    sanction    the    result.       Evolved  I 
religious  belief  is  no  more  true,  nay,  it  may  be  more  ] 
iiiitrrii;  tilan  belief  which  is  not  evolved.    Why  should 
evolution  work  out  such  contrary  results  ?   to  produce 
something   wholly  good  in  the  one  case  and  almost 
wholly  bad   in   the   other   case?     It    all    arose,  Mr. 
Spincer   testifies,    from   the   fact   that    religion    has 
not  been  content  with  a  mere  negation,  and  has  not 


216      CimiSTIANITY  AND   EVOLUTION' 

rested  in  the  Unknowable.  As  religion  has  never 
been  able  to  do  so  in  the  past,  it  is  not  likely  that 
it  will  cease  from  striving  in  the  future,  to  know 
the  Power  which  it  worships,  on  which  it  depends,  and 
for  which  it  longs.  We  are  struck  with  the  fact  that, 
as  far  as  actual  experience,  observation,  and  know- 
ledge go,  religion  is  universal ;  the  lower  tribes  have 
it  as  well  as  the  higher. 

Religion  existed  before  science,  before  philosophy, 
before  theology.  Even  before  definite  thought  was 
possible  to  man  he  was  religious,  and  bowrd  liimself 
in  aw^e  before  the  unseen  and  the  eternal.  And  in 
religion  there  is  always  the  element  of  eternity.  j\Ian 
could  not  l^elieve  that  death  was  the  end  of  all  ; 
he  believed  that  the  dead  had  some  relation  to  the 
liviug,  and  that  both  were  in  some  relation  to  the 
Power  on  which  both  alike  depended.  The  belief  in 
continued  existence  after  death  and  the  belief  in  the 
continued  relation  to  the  unseen  powers  are  there, 
however  we  may  interpret  them.  There  is  also  the 
unique  character  of  the  religious  emotions  to  be 
considered.  There  is  something  common  to  them 
nil,  and  the  services  they  prompt  have  also  common 
elements.  When  a  man  bows  himself  down  before 
what  to  him  is  Divine,  when  he  feels  the  power  of 
religious  emotion,  he  is  then  most  distinctl}^  human. 
But  everywhere  this  religious  emotion  is  the  witness 
of  his  consciousness  that  he  is  related  to  superhuman 
and  supernatural  beings. 

How  are  we  to  interpret  this  consciousness? — as 
superstition  ?  as  illusion  ?  as  sometliing  which  from 
first  to  last  has  no  root  in  reality  and  no  reference 


KV  GLUT  ION  AND   RELIGION  217 

to  objective  truth  ?  That  interpretation  means  that 
what  is  deepest  in  man,  that  which  is  earliest  and 
latest,  that  w^iich  is  most  distinctively  human,  is  also 
that  which  has  least  truth  in  it.  It  would  mean 
that  all  the  great  emotions  that  have  their  root  in 
religion  have  no  adequate  cause,  that  all  the  great 
thoughts  that  have  clustered  around  the  names  of 
God  and  immortality  are  simply  thoughts  in  the  air, 
that  the  share  which  religion  has  confessedly  had  in 
raising  man  to  a  higher  character  and  to  a  noble  view 
of  life  has  been  due  to  a  misplaced  trust  in  man's 
ability  to  know  the  Power  on  which  he  depends,  and 
the  God  he  seeks  to  worship  and  to  serve.  If, 
however,  this  is  so,  what  dependence  is  to  be  placed 
on  any  human  faculty?  On  Mr.  Spencer's  terms 
religion  may  have  to  disappear ;  but  when  it  dis- 
appears nothing  will  remain. 

It  is  true,  indeed,  that  in  the  history  of  religions 
men  have  seemed  to  exhaust  all  possibilities  in  their 
search  after  something  which  might  adequately  repre- 
sent to  them  the  Divine  unseen  powers.  It  is  true 
that  there  is  hardly  anything  which  has  not  been  taken 
for  Divine,  and  pressed  into  the  service  of  religion. 
It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  say  anything  here  of  the 
evolution  of  religion  or  to  trace  its  history.  It  is  a 
large  and  interesting  subject,  to  which  much  thought 
is  given  at  present.  To  the  modern  spirit  nothing 
that  men  have  ever  believed  is  indifferent.  We 
have  much  inquiry  into  the  manifestation  of  man's 
beliefs,  and  of  man's  ways  of  manifesting  his  conscious- 
ness of  relationship  to  the  \niseen  powers.  Nothing 
is  more  wonderful  than  the  elaborate  and  developed 


218      CHRISTIANITY  AND  EVOLUTION 

systems  of  religion  which  existed  among  primitive 
men.  There  are  explanations  of  these  elaborate 
systems,  qnite  as  elaborate  as  they,  to  be  had  in 
abundance  at  the  present  time.  But  the  perplexity 
is,  that  almost  all  of  these  explanations  proceed  on  the 
principle  that  the  higher  is  to  be  explained  by  the 
flower.  It  is  the  assumption  that  meets  us  all  through. 
To  explain  life  by  physics  and  chemistry,  to  explain 
consciousness  by  accumulation  of  the  unconscious,  to 
explain  reason  by  instinct,  and  the  higher  mental  life 
'of  man  by  the  lower  life  of  the  brutes,  and  finally  to 
explain  the  higher  religion  by  the  lower,  has  been  the 
consistent  aim  and  avowed  object  of  the  evolutionist 
of  the  type  of  Mr.  Spencer.  This  much  may  be 
conceded  to  them,  that  the  higher  is  after  the  lower  in 
point  of  time.  There  was  a  time  in  the  natural  history 
of  the  planet  when  the  higher  was  not.  But  what  is 
last  in  time  may  have  been  first  in  order  of  causation  ; 
for  if  the  higher  has  somehow  come  into  being,  it 
must  have  been  involved  in  being  from  the  beginning. 
Take  the  idea  of  religion,  then,  as  manifested  in 
man,  and  we  find  it  universally  thus,  a  consciousness 
of  relation  to  an  unseen  power,  and  this  consciousness 
lias  embodied  itself  in  customs,  rites,  institutions. 
We  may  trace  the  development  of  religion  along  both 
lines.  We  may  trace  it  in  the  deepening  conscious- 
ness of  the  man,  until  religion  gathers  to  itself  the 
whole  inner  life,  emotion,  cognition,  will,  and  until 
the  man  becomes  through  and  through  religious ;  or 
we  may  trace  the  evolution  of  religions  objectively 
in  the  institutions  in  which  subjective  religion  has 
obtained  objective  expression.     These  two  factors  are 


F.  VOLUTION  AND   RELIGION  219 

always  in  inter-relation  with  one  another ;  each 
reacts  on  the  otlier,  and  a  development  of  the  re- 
ligious consciousness  means  also  a  development  of 
relio^ious  institutions.  Thus  the  more  advanced  the 
man's  consciousness  of  religion  became,  the  more 
dissatisfied  would  he  become  with  those  customs 
which  at  one  time  gave  them  adequate  expression. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  objective  factor  in  rehgion 
would  have  its  influence  on  the  development  of  the 
reliarious  consciousness.  He  must  affirm  that  the 
religious  consciousness  is  in  touch  with  Eeality  ;  and 
the  Reality  here  includes  the  action  of  the  unseen 
power  or  object  of  worship.  Religion  assumes  the  I 
activity  of  God.  Take  that  conviction  from  it,  and  / 
it  vanishes.  (j^Take  from  religion  the  persuasion  that 
there  is  an  ear  open  to  its  prayers,  and  it  will  cease 
to  speak. )]  Bat  man  speaks  to  the  unseen  Power,  and 
he  believes  that  he  is  heard.  The  religious  nature  is 
recognised  as  a  universal  fact,  and  as  one  which 
cannot  be  ignored.  The  natural  assumption  in  such  y 
a  case  is  that  the  objective  reference  of  this  fact 
would  be  recogiiist'd  as  real  at  least  until  it  is 
disproved.  FaiHng  to  do  this,  we  have  an  instinct 
witliout  an  object,  an  organ  without  a  function,  a 
demand  without  a  supply ;  and  this  is  the  position  we 
are  landed  in  by  Mr.  Spencer's  view. 

In  all  "religions,  then,  there  is  expressed  the  idea 
of  the  relation  of  man  to  God  and  of  God  to  man^ 
and  the  relation  is  real.  It  may  be  very  imperfectly, 
or  even  be  very  erroneously  expressed.  Man's  con- 
ception of  God  may  be  very  rudimentary,  very 
inadequate,    very   erroneous ;    he   may  think  of  tlie 


220      CIIEISTIANITY  AND   EVOLUTION' 

Divine  Being  as  dwelling  in  an  anointed  stone,  in  a 
lifeless  bit  of  wood,  in  a  plant  or  in  an  animal,  in 
sun,  or  moon,  or  stars ;  but  as  soon  as  he  conceives  the 
Divine  Being  to  dwell  in  a  thing,  that  thing  becomes 
unique,  takes  on  a  new  character,  becomes  for  him 
Divine.  He  may  seek  to  express  his  adoration  in 
strange,  impure,  unholy  ways ;  but  he  dors  express  it, 
and  not  without  result.  Shall  we  say  that  there  is 
nothing  real,  nothing  helpful  in  this  worship  '?  that 
there  is  no  trace  of  the  Divine  in  this  rude,  ill- 
informed,  non-moral  mode  of  worship  ?  Does  not 
Paul  say,  "  Whom  therefore  ye  ignorantly  worship, 
Him  declare  I  unto  you  "  ?  It  was  worship,  though 
inadequate,  ignorant,  wrong.  The  thing  to  be  in- 
sisted on  is  the  capacity  for,  the  need  and  the 
practice  of,  worship.  Given  these,  and  there  is  always 
the  hope  that  man  will  learn  as  he  is  taught  to 
worship  rightly,  and   adequately. 

At  the  same  time  it  must  be  acknowledged  that 
there  is  no  subject  so  intricate,  so  baffling  to  our  I 
powers  of  explanation  as  that  of  religion.  We| 
may  trace  a  line  of  growth  and  advance  in  the 
evolution  of  life,  in  the  evolution  of  the  arts  and 
sciences,  in  the  evolution  of  morals,  though  there  is 
much  here  that  is  perplexing,  and  there  is  something 
like  an  advance  in  civilisation  generally.  But^  in 
relijjon  the  endeavour  to  trace  anything  like  progress 
is  scarcely  possible.  We  have  no  objection  to  evolu- 
tion ;  indeed,  would  prefer  to  use  it  as  a  method  if 
we  could.  How  can  we  apply  it  when  we  fhid  in  all 
historical  religions  an  ideal  of  purity  and  sublimity  at 
the  outset  and  a  degraded  woi'ship  at  the  close  ?     We 


EVOLUTION   AND  RELIGION          221 

have  from  the  anthropologists  a  scheme  of  evolution 
something  like  this — from  animism,  to  fetichism,  to 
anthropomorphism,  polytheism,  theism  ;  yet  we  have 
many  historical  religions  in  which  the  process  seems 
to  have  been  reversed,  and  there  is  an  evolution  the 
contrary   way.       Religion    is   the    oldest    and    most 
characteristic  of  the  qualities  of  humanity,  and  yet 
in  religion  it  is  that  we  find  man  at  his  lowest    as 
well  as  at  his  highest.     Is  there  something  here  which 
has  prevented'  progress,  which  has  made  it  possible  to 
lose  what  progress  has  been  made,  and  which   has 
made  the  phenomena  of  degradation  in  religion  which 
are  so  apparent  to  every  student  of  religion  ?     Is  there 
an  element  here  which  baffles  calculation,  and  makes 
speculation  impossible  ?      Is    it   possible   that,    along 
with   an  irrepressible  desire  to  worship,   there  goes 
also  a    something   which   drives  a  man    away  from 
worship?     Is   there   aversion   to  God   as    well    as  a 
hungering  desire  after  Him?     Is  there  a  conscious- 
ness of  two  tendencies  in  human  life,  one  of  which 
lu'ges  man  to  God,   and  another  away  fi-om    Ilim  ? 
Is  there  a  competition  of  two  j^i'inciples  in  his  moi-al 
and  in  his  religious  life  ?     It  would  seem  so. 

On  the  one  hand  a  longing  to  be  united  with  God, 
and  on  the  other  hand  a  feeling  of  estrangement  and 
a  desire  to  avoid  any  approach  to  Him.  What  is 
the  explanation  of  these  opposite  tendencies  ?  Hei-e 
a  feeling  of  persistence,  a  consciousness  of  the  con- 
tinuance of  the  self,  and  there  a  yearning  after  non- 
existence :  how  are  we  to  explain  these  phenomena  ? 
A  being  in  time,  who  is  conscious  of  transcending 
time ;  a  being  wlio  needs  eternity  to  realise  his  own 


222      CHRISTIANITY  AND   EVOLUTION 

worth,  and  who  is  conscious  of  u  moral  tUfect,  a 
religious  estrangement  from  the  source  of  all  good- 
ness, which  ever  baffles  his  aims  at  goodness  :  how 
are  we  to  explain  these  things  ?  For  these  questions 
are  present  to  man  wherever  we  find  him,  and  they 
press  with  the  greatest  force  on  those  who  have  made 
the  greatest  progress  in  religious  life. 

"  Gone  for  ever  !     Ever  ?     No  ;  for  since  our  dying-  race  began 
Ever,  ever,  and  for  ever  was  the  leading  light  of  man. 
Those  that  in  barbarian  burials  killed  the  slave  and  slew  the 

wife 
Felt  within  themselves  the  sacred  passion  of  the  f-econd  life  ; 

Truth  for  truth  and  good  for  good,  the  Good,  the  True,  the 

Pure,  the  Just 
Take  the  charm  '  for  ever '  from  them,  and  they  crumble 

into  dust. 

Evolution  ever  climbing  after  some  ideal  good, 

And  Reversion  ever  dragging  Evolution  in  the  mud."       I 

So  Tennyson  sung,  as  he  sought  to  express  the 
changing  moods  of  man  and  the  burden  of  the 
mystery  of  human  life.  On  all  hands  it  will  be 
acknowledged  that  in  ethics  and  in_religion  there  is  I 
a  departure  from  the  ideal  order  of  things.  Man  has' 
not  been  able  to  realise  his  own  ideal,  either  in  nature 
or  in  religion.  In  the  loAvest  man  or  tribe,  as  in  the 
highest,  there  is  a  wide  breach  between  what  man 
knows  he  ought  to  be  and  what  he  is.  How  is  the 
chasm  to  be  bridged?  We  shall  get  no  help  here 
fi-om  merely  natui-al  processes  or  merely  natural 
results,  for  in  both  we  have  transcended  nature.  We 
are  now  in  a  kingdom  of  freedom,  in  which  persons, 


to' 


EVOLUTION  AXD   RELIOION  2! 

\\\\Xi  a  power  of  making  themselves  to  be  sometliin 
have  to  realise  a  character ;  a  kingdom  not  formed  by 
pressure  from  behind,  but  beckoned  on  by  a  purpose 
yet  to  be  attained ;  '  a  kingdom  in  which  man  is  to 
use  all  things  in  order  to  realise  himself,  and  to 
realise  himself  that  he  may  attain  to  companionship 
with  God. 

Man  is  in  a  world  of  things  which  ministers  to  and 
serves  a  world  of  persons;  and  the  world  of  things 
has  made  room  for  him.  It  takes  up  new  elements  at 
his  bidding,  makes  new  departures  at  his  suggestion. 
Man,  however,  finds  insuperable  dilticulties  in  the  way 
of  realising  himself.  It  is  not  easy  to  make  a  world 
of  ethical  spirits,  or  to  realise  a  kingdom  of  persons 
ethically  and  religiously  perfect.  On  the  supposition 
that  such  a  kingdom  is  a  worthy  end,  that  it  is  worth 
all  the  toil  of  the  universe,  what  might  w^e  expect  ? 
May  we  not  expect  that  the  Power  who  has  made  all 
will  stiive  to  remedy  the  departure  from  the  ideal 
order  of  things,  and  work  such  changes  as  are  needed, 
anel  as  are  not  contained  in  the  antecedent  states  of 
the  system?  The  system  is  being  modified  by  human 
action  :  may  it  not  also  be  modified  by  Divine  action  % 
Eftects  may  be  thus  produced  which  the  system  in 
its  accustomed  movement  could  not  have  brought  out. 
Huch  effects  involve  no  suspension  of  natural  laws, 
not  even  a  breach  of  continuity. 

Granting  to  the  ultimate  Eeality  such  a  power  as 
man  wields,  a  power  of  modifying  the  world  to  suit 
his  purpose ;  grant  to  God  the  wish  to  help  and  guide 
man,  such  a  desire  as  we  see  in  men  to  help  their 
fellows,  and  revelation  becomes  possible  and  piobable. 


r   To 

tlie  u 


224       CHRISTIANITY  AND   EVOLUTION 

Katioiial  beings  have  aiDpeared  on  the  earth,  beings 
with  ideals,  with  motives,  with  aspirations ;  who  have 
to  reaHse  themselves ;  and  they  have  missed  their  way, 
have  made  mistakes  about  themselves,  about  nature, 
about  God.  They  have  transgressed  in  all  manners 
of  ways.  Why  should  not  God  be  free  to  help  them  ? 
why  should  He  not  speak  to  them  ?  and  seeing  they 
had  formed  wrong  thoughts  of  Him,  why  should  He 
not  set  them  right  ? 

deny  the  possibility  of  this  is  simply  to  deny  to  \ 
ultimate  Reality  a  power  which  is  in  daily  exer-  i 
cise  in  the  world  of  men.  If  we  grant  the  possibility 
of  such  a  revelation,  the  question  then  becomes  one  of 
evidence  as  to  whether  there  has  been  such  a  revelation. 
Those  who  believe  in  revelation  think  they  can 
give  good  reasons  for  thinking  so.  They  point  to  the 
character  of  the  revelation.  They  are  able  to  point 
to  one  people,  who,  not  by  speculation,  not  by  science, 
not  by  being  accustomed  to  a  world-wide  government, 
but  by  some  other  way,  liad  come  to  believe  in  the  unity 
of  man,  in  the  unity  of  the  world,  and  in  the  unity  of 
God.  They  believed  that  in  the  beginning  God  made 
the  heavens  and  the  earth ;  and  they  believed  that 
man  is  one.  Then,  too,  they  had  been  able  to  form 
a  high  ideal  of  man's  ethical  character  and  of  man's 
religious  destiny.  Above  all,  they  had  thought  of 
God  in  a  way  distinct  and  peculiar— not  only  in  those 
characteristics  of  Him  which  may  be  called  meta- 
physical, but  they  thought  of  Him  as  ethical;  a 
God  whom  the  heaven  of  heavens  could  not  contain, 
but  who  could  dwell  with  him  who  was  of  a  humble 
and  contrite  spirit. 


EVOLUTION  AND   RELIGION  225 

They  thouglit  of  the  supreme  Creator  of  the  uni- 
verse, not  as  One  who  dwelt  far  off  from  the  world, 
who  had  no  interest  in  the  world,  no  care  for  man ; 
but  as  One  who  cared  for  His  creatures,  toiled  for 
them,  loved  them,  who  strove  to  communicate  Himself 
to  them,  and  to  make  them  ever  more  fit  for  the 
reception  of  Himself.  They  thought  of  themselves 
as  sinful,  weak,  ungrateful,  and  of  God  as  caring  for 
them  and  loving  them  notwithstanding.  For  them 
revelation  came  to  mean  redemption,  and  on  that 
view  the  course  of  their  history  is  construed  by  them. 
The  new  departures  in  revelation  are  conditioned 
by  the  desire  of  God  to  help  man  to  rectify  those 
departures  from  the  ideal  order  of  things,  which  man 
by  his  mistakes  had  instituted. 

Not  suddenly,  nor  violently  was  the  revelation  \ 
given,  or  the  redemption  made.  Slowly  and  per-  ^ 
sistently  it  seems  to  have  grown  from  more  to  more, 
and  in  accordance  with  the  usual  method  of  Divine 
working.  "  By  divers  portions  and  in  divers  man- 
ners "  God  spoke/  and  in  slow  progression  the  process 
of  revelation  went  on.  As  the  people  were  able  to 
receive,  so  He  gave  here  a  little  and  there  a  little, 
but  in  such  a  way  that  every  part  bore  the  Divine 
stamp  upon  it,  until  at  length  appeared  the  full, 
ethical,  spiritual  revelation  of  God  manifested  in 
Christ  Jesus  and  by  Him.  The  character  of  God 
manifested  in  Scripture  is  distinctly  a  revelation; 
that  is  to  say,  God  manifested  Himself  in  another 
and  more  personal  way,  as  He  could  not  manifest 
Himself  in  nature  or  in  history.  At  all  events,  man 
has  not  elsewhere  reached  it.    He  has  always  reached 

15 


226     CHRISTIANITY  AND  EVOLUTION 

something  else.  Our  increasing  knowledge  of  the 
history  of  religion  has  made  this  clear,  that  ethical 
monotheism  belongs  only  to  three  religions,  and  all 
of  these  are  directly  and  historically  connected  with 
each  other. 
/  It  is  o;ie  thing  to  discover  a  truth,  and  another 
(j  thing  to  recognise  a  truth  when  it  is  made  known. 
And  though  man  could  not  have,  by  himself,  at- 
tained to  a  knowledge  of  the  true  God,  he  is  able 
to  recognise  it  as  the  highest  and  the  best  now  that 
God  has  manifested  Himself  to  man  ;  just  as  man  did 
not  form  for  himself  the  true  ethical  ideal  embodied 
for  him  in  the  life  of  Christ,  but  was  able  to  recognise 
it  as  the  highest  and  the  best  when  once  that  ideal 
was  made  real  and  manifested  to  man. 

"  And  so  the  Word  had  breath,  and  wrought 
With  human  hands  the  creed  of  creeds 
In  loveliness  of  perfect  deeds 
More  strong  than  all  poetic  thought, " 

The  process  of  revelation  was  slow,  evolutionary, 

progressive.      Eevelation  was  always  related  to  the 

I   natural,  proceeded  on  it,  assumed,  rectified   it,  and 

transformed  it  to  a  higher  character  and  use.     Even 

when,   as   Christians   believe,    revelation    had    been 

complete  and  redemption  had  been  in  essence  realised 

/  in  the  work  of  Christ,  then  began  again  a  slow  course 

I  of  evolution,  proceeding  with  many  a  backward  curve, 

\   with    many    a    sad    reversion,    yet    on    the    whole 

tupjvvards.  This  new  evolution  was  with  a  view  to 
realise,  in  man  and  by  man,  a  standard,  actually, 
historically,  and  concretely  given  in  Jesus  Christ,  in 
His  character,  in   His  relation  to  God,  and  in  His 


EVOLUTION  AND  RELIGION  227 

relation  to  man.  It  makes  no  difierence  to  the 
character  of  the  process  of  evolution,  looked  at  as 
a  process  "  ever  climbing  after  some  ideal  end," 
whether  we  consider  the  end  as  one  already  given 
and  known,  or  as  one  not  yet  realised,  and  so  far 
unknown.  The  process  of  evolution  of  Christian  life 
is  a  process  towards  Christ.  He  is  the  aim,  the  goal, 
the  end  towards  which  Christian  life  in  the  individual 
and  in  society  ever  tends,  and  He  is  also  the  means 
without  which  the  end  can  never  be  reached. 

There  is  thus  a  striking  analogy  betw^een  Christian 
experience  and  all  other  experience.     Christian    ex- 
perience begins,  and  it  goes  on  from  less  to  more. 
It  is  comparatively  simple  at  the  outset ;  it  proceeds 
through  struggle;  it  is  hindered  by  opposition  from 
vvdthin  and    from  without ;    it  wrestles,    fights,    and 
conquers.     Its  ideal  rises  from  day  to  day,  just  as 
its    practice    becomes     more     consistent    and    more 
uniform.     At  first  it  aims  at  a  near  ideal — there  is 
some  one  thing  to  do,  some  one  Ijent  to  subdue  ;  but 
soon  it  finds  that  to  do  one  thing  means  to  do  many 
things,    to   subdue    one   tendency    means   to   control 
many  tendencies.     The  new   aim  of  life  must  tend 
in  all  directions,  and  it  is  found  that  every  thought, 
every  imagination,  every  feeling,  every  desire,  all  our 
knowledge,  all   our   emotion,   all  our   activity  must 
be  controlled,  directed,  and  guided  by  the  new^  aim 
implanted  in  us  by  Jesus  Christ.     To  work  out  this 
new  evolution  of  character,   and  so  to  work  it  out 
that  all  opposing  forces  shall  either  be  absorbed  or 
cast   out,    is   a   task   of   enormous    difliculty ;    for  a 
Christian  soon  learns  that  the  new  life  is  inconsistent 


228     CHRISTIANITY  AND   EVOLUTION 

with  all  forms  of  selfishness,  of  evil,  and  of  sin.  This 
is  the  peculiarity  of  the  Christian  ideal  of  life.  Other 
ideals  are  consistent  with  some  form  of  defect,  of 
self-indulgence,  of  sin.  All  love  purifies  within  its 
range,  and  casts  out  what  is  opposed  to  it.  Patriotism 
will  cast  out  all  that  is  unpatriotic,  and  love  of  family- 
will  not  permit  a  man  to  do  anything  which  he  knows 
to  be  opposed  to  love  of  purity ;  but  these  have  no 
relation  to  that  which  does  not  interfere  with  the 
sphere  of  their  operation.  But  the  Christian  ideal 
will  tolerate  no  selfishness,  no  cruelty,  no  impurity, 
no  defect  whatsoever.  It  is  opposed  to  all  forms 
of  moral  defect,  to  all  forms  of  intellectual  prejudice 
and  obscurity,  to  all  forms  of  spiritual  perversity. 
It  calls  for  moral  purity,  for  intellectual  insight,  and 
clearness  of  vision ;  it  demands  incessant  spiritual 
purity  and  progress.  The  Christian  character  is 
bound  to  grow  in  breadth  and  depth,  in  length,  in 
height,  until  it  attains  all  moral,  intellectual,  and 
spiritual  excellence,  and  removes  all  defect. 

Here  there  is  a  new  evolution,  alike  in  general 
outline  to  all  the  processes  of  evolution  which  have 
gone  before.  It  assumes  all  that  has  been  attained  in 
the  previous  processes ;  but  on  the  position  gained  in'all 
the  past  outcome  of  the  toil  of  evolution  it  makes 
a  new  departure,  and  toils  upwards  towards  another 
and  a  greater  end.  He  who  has  this  new  life  is 
conscious  of  his  dependence,  knows  that  he  has 
experienced  a  new  beginning,  and  is  dependent  for 
progress  in  this  new  way  on  the  exercise  of  some 
influence  in  him  by  the  power  and  energy  from 
which  his  new  life  has  proceeded.     If  he  is  allowed 


EVOLUTION  AND  RELIGION  229 

to  express  his  experience  in  iiis  own  way,  he  will  say 
that  by  God  he  has  been  made  a  new  man  in  Christ, 
and  his  progress  in  Christian  life  depends  on  the 
grace  of  God.  He  feels  that  apart  from  Christ  he 
can  do  nothing,  with  Christ  he  can  do  all  things. 
The  growth  of  Christian  character  depends  on  his 
abiding  in  Christ. 

In  this  new  process  of  evolution,  then,  the  factors 
present  in  all  evolution  come  into  clear  consciousness, 
and  all  the  work  of  God  is  seen  to  be  on  one  plan  and 
of  a  piece.  We  may  learn  something  of  that  plan  by 
having  recourse  to  what  science  has  had  to  tell  us 
in  the  lower  spheres  of  evolution  ;  and  science  might 
learn  something  of  the  factors  of  evolution  by  a  study 
of  the  New  Testament  and  of  the  facts  of  Christian 
life.  We  might  learn  from  them  not  to  think  of  the 
becoming  of  things  as  sudden,  abrupt,  catastrophic, 
but  to  think  of  them  as  sk)w,  continuous,  ^pmgressive. 
But  we  might  also  learn  not  to  think  of  these  merely 
in  terms  of  second  causes,  apart  from  the  Power  by 
Whom  are  all  things  and  for  Whom  are  all  things. 
Things  are  never  removed  from  God,  neither  in  them- 
selves, nor  in  their  working,  nor  in  their  progress. 
Thus  the  process  of  pre-organic  evolution  will  become 
luminous,  for  it  is  working  upwards  under  the  guidance 
of  energising  Reason  to  a  higher  end.  They  are 
made  to  work  according  to  their  nature,  and  not 
contrary  to  their  nature.  Thus  there  is  one  kind  of 
evolution  in  the  pre-organic  world.  When  after  fit 
preparation  life  appears,  we  have  a  different  kind  of 
evolution,  proceeding  on  different  lines,  to  higher  ends. 
A  new  element  enters  in,  and  purpose   rules.     All 


230     CHRISTIANITY  AND  EVOLUTION 

parts  of  the  organism  are  for  the  organism,  and  no 
part  is  for  itself  alone ;  and  the  more  complex  the 
organism  is  the  greater  is  the  unity  of  the  whole. 
The  inorganic  world  is  in  the  service  of  the  world 
of  life.  One  kind  of  life  is  also  for  another ;  there  is 
not  only  competition,  there  is  co-operation. 

Then  there  is  conscious  life,  and  self-conscious  life. 
And  here  also  there  is  something  new.  Here  we  see 
the  world  of  things  in  the  ser\dce  of  a  world  of 
persons.  This  is  the  broad  outcome  of  the  cosmic 
process.  Can  we  say  that  this  is  accidental  %  a  mere 
fortuitous  outcome  of  a  process  that  has  proceeded 
without  an  aim,  or  without  a  purpose  ?  A  rational 
being  can  hardly  think  so.  At  all  events,  with  the 
advent  of  a  self-conscious  being  we  have  a  new  line 
of  evolution ;  for  the  self-conscious  being  no  longer 
modifies  himself  organically,  he  modifies  something 
else. 

But  with  the  self-conscious  being  there  appears  to 
be  for  the  time  an  arrest  on  progress ;  for  here  we 
come  on  phases  of  action  which  do,  indeed,  in  some  in- 
stances indicate  advance,  but  also  in  other  examples 
show  the  opposite.  In  moral  and  in  religious  conduct' 
there  are,  broadly  speaking,  mistakes  of  all  kinds 
made,  and  as  we  saw  man  was  worse  than  any 
animal,  and  more  evil  than  any  brute ;  but  he  was 
also  higher  and  better.  In  truth,  he  was  on  a  thfFerent 
plane  altogether,  both  in  good  and  in  evil.  All  things 
are  ruled  and  guided  according  to  their  nature : 
absolute  necessity  in  the  pre-organic  world,  relative 
necessity  in  the  organic  world  \  but  in  the  intellectual, 
moral,  and  spiritual  world  we  have  government  and 


EVOLUTION'  AND   RELIGION  231 

a  kind  of  rule  according  to  the  law  of  freedom. 
Thus  the  new  kind  of  evolution  takes  on  new  factors, 
and  its  method  must  widen  itself  accordingly.  We 
may  try  to  translate  freedom  into  necessity,  and  may 
delude  ourselves  into  thinking  that  we  have  done  so  ; 
but  the  fact  and  the  consciousness  ofjreedom  remain,  \\ 
and  also  the  fact  of  its  co-relative  responsibility.  ^j 

The  new  problem  of  rational  evolution  is  to  persuade 
rational  beings  to  be  wholly  rational,  moral  beings 
to  be  wholly  moral,  and  religious  beings  to  be  wholly 
and  adequately  religious.  The  Christian  view  of  the 
world  is  the  only  view  which  does  justice  to  all  the 
factors  of  evolution,  and  recognises  all  its  complexity. 
So  much  we  can  see ;  but  we  still  see  as  through  a 
glass  darkly.  We  see  enough  to  be  able  to  say, 
"Of  Him,  and  to  Him,  and  through  Him  are  alj_^ 
things."  But  there  is  much  that  we  cannot  yet 
understand  about  the  "  of  "  or  the  origin,  much  that 
is  dark  also  about  the  process  indicated  by  the  word 
"through";  and  the  goal,  though  indicated  in  outline, 
is  yet  only  indicated  in  general  terms.  While  we 
therefore  humbly  bow  our  heads  before  the  great 
mystery,  we  cannot  let  go  the  conviction  that  there 
has  been  an  "  of,"  and  there  is  a  "  to,"  as  well  as  a 
"  through,"  for  the  processes  of  the  world.  Thankful  I 
are  we  to  all,  be  they  who  they  may,  who  can  enable 
us  to  see  more  clearly  the  process  which  may  be 
summarised  by  the  word  "  through  "  ;  but  when  they 
have  shown  us  all  they  can  of  the  process,  we  claim 
the  right  to  look  at  all  they  discover  not  as  something 
which  can  be  in  itself  and  for  itself.  For  it  is  mean- 
ingless unless  the  "  through  "  is  related  to  an  "  of  " 


232     CHRISTIANITY  AND   EVOLUTION 

and  a  "to,"  or  rather  that  the  facts  symbolised  by 
all  three  words  are  facts  in  relation  to  Him  Who  in 
the  beginning  created  the  heavens  and  the  earth, 
Who  is  the  beginning  and  the  middle  and  the  end ; 
by  Whom  are  all  things,  and  for  Whom  are  all 
things.  To  all  that  science  teaches  us,  to  all  that 
history  proclaims,  to  all  that  philosophy  in  all  its 
branches  can  teach  us,  we  add  the  further  light 
which  revelation  brings,  and  in  that  light  all  falls 
into  harmonious  unity.  For  in  Christ  "  are  hid  all 
the  treasures  of  wisdom  and  of  knowledge,"  Christ, 
"  Who  is  the  image  of  the  invisible  God,  the  first- 
born of  all  creation ;  for  in  Him  were  all  things 
created,  in  the  heavens  and  upon  the  earth,  things 
visible  and  things  invisible,  whether  thrones  or 
dominions   or    principalities    or   powers;    all    things 

j  have  been  created  through  Him,  and  unto  Him;  and 
He   is   before   all  *  things,    and    in.__ffi^_all_things^ 

i\  consist." 


THE    END. 


Printed  hy  Hazdl,  Watson,  <L  Viney,  LcL,  London  and  Aylesbury. 


Date  Due                         1 

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